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"The meek shall inherit the earth... but not the mineral rights." 1
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INTRODUCTION
American property law contains a curious doctrinal phenomenon:
land may be horizontally severed into surface and subsurface estates
so that legal title to multiple land strata vests in different owners. 2
This concept seems antithetical to traditional notions of property
ownership that create in a landowner absolute, indivisible rights to a
vertical space extending from the center of the earth into the heav-
ens.3 Horizontal severance resonates in more modern theory, how-
2. See Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S.
55, 60 (1898) (stating that "[u]nquestionably at common law the owner of the soil might
convey his interest in mineral beneath the surface without relinquishing his title to the sur-
face," thereby separating ownership of surface from ownership of "mines beneath that sur-
face"); see also infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text (discussing theory and evolution of
severed estate doctrine).
3. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (explaining absolutist vision of prop-
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ever, that property ownership consists of a "bundle of sticks," such
as the rights to use, devise, or exclude, and thus multiple people can
own the "same" property if each possesses a different stick of the
bundle.4
For example, a mining company may obtain title to a subsurface
mineral estate while a private landowner or the government retains
ownership of the surface.5 This arrangement is thought to provide
specialization efficiencies because the surface owner can concentrate
on attaining optimal use of the surface while the mineral owner does
the same for the mineral estate.6 In the context of mineral develop-
ment, severance seems especially useful because mineral extraction
requires large investments of capital and sophisticated industry ex-
pertise, which are assets the typical landowner generally does not
have.7 Horizontal severance raises one fundamental problem, how-
erty ownership as "that sole and despotic dominion which one [person] claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe"). Blackstone specified the scope of land ownership as follows:
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as
downwards. Cujus est solum, eus est usque ad coelum, is the maxim of the law; upwards,
therefore no [person] may erect any building, or the like, to overhang another's land:
and downwards, whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of any land and the
centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's experience
in the mining countries. So that'the word "land" includes not only the face of the
earth, but every thing under it, or over it.
Id. at * 18; see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (describing "ancient
doctrine" of common law that "ownership of the land extend[s] to the periphery of the
universe").
4. In the late 1920s,Justice Cardozo first promulgated the notion that property owner-
ship is analogous to ownership of a bundle of sticks. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) (arguing that "[t]he bundle of power and privileges to
which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be
put together and rebound from time to time."); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979) (using Cardozo's terminology to discuss individual property rights as "strands" of
"bundle" of such rights).
5. Professor Fox is careful to point out that the term "surface estate," though widely
used, is imprecise. Cyril A. Fox, Jr., Private Mining Law in the 1980's: The Last Ten Years and
Beyond, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 795, 818 (1990). The so-called surface estate is usually a remainder
interest, in that a mineral estate generally terminates when the minerals are exhausted or
upon abandonment, depending on whether the mineral estate is a freehold or a leasehold,
respectively. Id. Thus the "surface estate" will expand to encompass both the surface and
subsurface estates once the mineral estate terminates, unless the parties have agreed other-
wise. Id. This imprecision noted, the term will nevertheless be used for the sake of
convenience.
6. The surface owner's optimal use of his or her estate is conditioned, of course, on the
mineral owner's reasonable use of the surface for access to the minerals. See infra notes 76-79
and accompanying text (explaining "reasonably necessary" test used in restricting scope of
mineral access easements).
7. See Ernest E. Smith, Evolution of Oil and Gas Rights in the Eastern United States, 10 E.
MIN. L. INsT. § 16.03, at 16-13 (1989) (explaining that even "shallow wells and relatively
crude technology" of oil industry are beyond reach of most landowners). Mining for hard
minerals tends to be even more capital intensive than oil drilling because of the greater risk
and higher equipment, production, transportation, and labor costs involved. 4 AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING §§ 122.02-03 (Rocky Mtn. Min. Law Found. ed., 2d ed. 1992). Mining is
generally financed through equity capital, whereas oil and gas drilling tends to be financed
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ever: access. In the absence of express easements set forth in sever-
ance instruments for mineral exploration and development, how is a
mineral owner to access his or her property?
Courts tend to become charged with answering this question, and
for decades they have resolved it by designating the mineral estate
dominant and the surface servient so that the mineral owner re-
ceives an easement encompassing as much of the surface as is "rea-
sonably necessary" to extract the minerals. 8 Unfortunately, this
seemingly pragmatic solution led to alarmingly inequitable results
in many cases, as mineral developers' reasonably necessary uses
often left surface owners' estates substantially or completely de-
stroyed.9 Change is afoot, however: the last two decades witnessed
a flurry of litigation, legislation, and even constitutional amendment
aimed at redistributing the rights and obligations of surface and
mineral owners.1 0 These actions were taken in an attempt to hal-
through debt capital. Id. § 122.03. The difference lies in the time required for development:
mining is a much slower process than drilling. Id. A mine often takes years to become profita-
ble and decades to be worked to exhaustion, during which time the market for a given mineral
can change dramatically. Id. Thus, landowners face major obstacles in attempting to mine
their lands.
8. An easement is a nonpossessory interest (incorporeal hereditament) in land and may
be defined as follows:
An easement is an interest in land in the possession of another which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in
which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him [or her] to protection as against third persons from interference
in such use or enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the owner
of the interest; and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 450 (1944). The traditional relationship between
dominant mineral owner and servient surface owner is explained in Getty Oil Co. v. Royal,
422 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), as follows:
It is elementary that the mineral lessee, insofar as the surface of land is concerned,
possesses the dominant estate, and the lessor, or surface owner, has the servient
estate. The mineral lessee, as the owner of the dominant estate, has the right to the
use and possession of so much of the surface as is reasonably required in the opera-
tion of his [or her] mineral lease.
Id. at 593.
9. See infra notes 74, 78, 86, 87, 230, 258 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases in which courts found mineral owner use of substantial portions or all of surface estate
to be in accordance with "reasonably necessary" mining use doctrine).
10. See Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 297-98 (Ky. 1987) (commenting that conflict-
ing rights of surface and mineral owners have led to "plethora of litigation" throughout na-
tion); infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text (surveying major legislative trends in field of
severance disputes and describing Kentucky voters' radical attempt to amend their state con-
stitution to redistribute some measure of power to surface owners). The Broad Form Deed
Amendment voted on and passed in Kentucky has been called a "thinly disguised attempt to
readjust property rights in favor of the surface owner and against the mineral estate owner by
mandating the reinterpretation of contracts made almost one hundred years ago." Carolyn S.
Bratt & KarenJ. Greenwell, Kentucky's Broad Form Deed Amendmnent: Constitutional Considerations,
5J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 9, 10 (1989-1990). I do not think the attempt was "disguised." There is
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ance increased demand for natural resources"I and improved meth-
ods of mining' against heightened environmental awareness'" and
strong surface development pressures.' 4 Millions of acres of min-
no question that this amendment and many of the legislative enactments adjust property
rights via contract reinterpretation. This is necessary only because conveyance instruments
are often ambiguous, and the ambiguities have been uniformly construed for over a century in
favor of mineral owners, much to the detriment of surface owner rights. See infra notes 63-75
and accompanying text (examining doctrine of mineral estate dominance and providing ex-
amples of extreme mineral estate impact on surface estate allowable under doctrine). The
choice to favor the mineral estate was political initially; therefore it is no great surprise to find
that when policy changes, the sanctioned interpretation of ambiguous severance language
changes as well.
11. See Marvin D. Truhe, Surface Owner vs. Mineral Owner or "They Can't Do That, Can
They?", 27 S.D. L. REv. 376, 379 (1982) (describing reawakening of interest in mining for
gold, uranium, oil and gas, coal, iron ore, industrial sand, and other minerals in South Dakota,
brought on in part by new mining techniques that allow more cost-effective extraction of min-
erals than previously available); David Darlington, Copper Versus Grandeur, AUDUBON, July-Aug.
1992, at 91 (describing newly discovered copper deposit in British Columbia's Tatshenshini
River wilderness and stating that "world demand for copper continues to grow," making min-
ing attractive economic prospect despite remoteness of site and adverse environmental im-
pact caused by mining process).
12. See, e.g., Roberts v. Twin Fork Coal Co., 223 F. Supp. 752, 752-53 (E.D. Ky. 1963)
(noting that coal extraction via stripping and auguring became profitable after World War II,
presumably because technological advances made removal of massive amounts of overburden
(topsoil covering mineral deposits) more efficient and therefore cheaper than it had been in
past; stating that new mining methods are "highly destructive" and "greatly increase the bur-
dens on the surface estate"). Another modern mining development is the process of heap
leaching, whereby cyanide is injected into the ground to remove gold. Truhe, supra note 11,
at 379. This method has led to the reopening of many old mines in South Dakota's Black
Hills. Id.
13. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) § 101, 30
U.S.C. § 1201 (1988) (reflecting concern over mining-induced subsidence damage to land,
buildings, and water resources and assigning liability for such damage to mineral developers).
For a discussion of SMCRA's effect in Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
West Virginia, see generally Richard Roth et al., Coal Mining Subsidence Regulation in Six Appa-
lachian States, 10 VA. ENVriL. L.J. 311, 324-42 (1991) (concluding that treatment of problems
falling under SMCRA differs from state to state because of variations in political and eco-
nomic clout of mining industry relative to that of surface owners).
American taxpayers are increasingly unwilling to subsidize mining activities by paying to
clean up after miners. See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 321 (Pa. 1973)
(stating that "[t]he public interest is not served if the public, rather than the mine operator,
has to bear the expense of abating pollution caused as a direct result of the profitmaking,
resource-depleting business of mining coal"), appeal dismissed sub non. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 903 (1974); see also John S. Palmore & Kevin M. McGuire, Avoidance of
Disputes Between the Surface Owner and the Coal Owner/Operator Through Properly Drafted Severance
Deeds, Leases, Subsidence Agreements and Other Instruments, 9 E. MiN. L. INST. § 6.0312], at 6-8
(1988) (describing increasing influence of environmental and sociological considerations on
use of private property stemming from property's finite nature).
14. See, e.g., Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164, 168 (Ala.
1982) (deciding dispute between shopping center developer and miner in favor of miner be-
cause of existing surface support waiver in severance deed); Island Creek Coal v. Rodgers,
644 S.W.2d 339, 344-45 (Ky. App. 1982) (construing mineral owner duty to support surface
estate as including weight of multiple houses in moder subdivision rather than simply as
weight of single house and barn existing at time of severance); see also Paul F. Hultin, Recent
Developments in Statutory andJudicial Accommodation Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 28 RocKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1021, 1021-22 (1983) (describing how increased population will cause
land to become scarcer and thus more valuable commodity, thereby greatly increasing compe-
tition for use of surface).
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eral lands in the United States are severed under turn-of-the-
century "broad form" conveyance instruments,1 5 and many dis-
agreements result when these instruments are interpreted in light of
modern mining methods and newly valuable mineral resources.' 6
Other disputes arise when mineral owners seek to exercise long-
dormant mineral rights on lands that have been improved by surface
owners. 17 All of these disputes impede the development of both
surface and mineral estates by destabilizing the certainty of invest-
ment planning.' 8
15. See infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text (defining broad form deeds and explain-
ing circumstances under which such deeds are used to sever surface and mineral estates); see
also J. Stephen Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners,
33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 871 (1980) ("Millions of acres of land in this country are owned by
persons who do not hold title to the underlying minerals."); James L. Huffman, The Allocative
Impact of Mineral Severance: Implications for the Regulation of Surface Mining, 22 NAT. REsOURCESJ.
201, 202 (1982) ("Most valuable minerals in the United States are owned separately from the
land which overlies them.").
16. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Shepherd, 888 F.2d 1533, 1534-37
(11 th Cir. 1989) (interpreting 1912 conveyance instrument to allow mineral owners to build
coal slurry pond and pump as new method of disposing of coal mining waste, despite place-
ment of facility on nine acres of surface owner's timberland); United States Steel Corp. v.
Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1380-90 (Pa. 1983) (litigating, as case of first impression, ownership of
coalbed or methane gas that is adsorbed in micropores of coal and has previously been vented
into atmosphere during coal mining as dangerous waste product because of its toxicity and
high flammability, but is now recognized as having energy source value); Martin v. Kentucky
Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 396-99 (Ky. 1968) (construing 1905 broad form severance
deed that did not specify approved mining methods as allowing modern surface mining,
thereby sanctioning 100% diminution in value of surface estate without imposing concomi-
tant liability on mineral estate owner for use of enormous implied "easement"), overruled by
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
17. See, e.g., Martin, 429 S.W.2d at 396 (listing house, outbuildings, and gardens as im-
provements surface owners would lose when mineral owners decided, 60 years after sever-
ance, to commence mining); see also Chandler v. French, 81 S.E. 825, 828 (W. Va. 1914)
(finding that 25-year period following execution of mining lease is unreasonable time to wait
for mining to begin). Professor Fox delineates a number of reasons why long-severed mineral
estates are not mined:
Some minerals go unmined as a result of the division of ownership which seems
inevitable when property interests pass from generation to generation. Others go
unmined when their corporate owners quietly go out of business without formal dis-
solution or bankruptcy proceedings. In still other cases, the minerals are being held
as reserves, either against present commitments for future production or strictly as
inventory for production or sale when market conditions warrant it. Finally, some
mineral deposits cannot be economically developed under present market conditions
or with current technology, but may be developed with changed conditions. Often
non-production of a particular mineral property is due to a combination of these
reasons.
Fox, supra note 5, at 819.
18. See Clyde 0. Martz, The New Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation
Act, 5 NAT. RESOURcES & ENV'T 30, 31 (Winter 1991) (explaining that mineral estate owners
can interfere with surface development and financing simply by expressing intent to exercise
mining rights in surface estate, and that surface estate owners can impair mineral develop-
ment by filing "unsuitable land for mining" petitions under federal or state SMCRA regula-
tions); see also Dycus, supra note 15, at 882-83 (observing that legal uncertainty as to scope of
potential mineral development instills reluctance in surface owners to develop their property
fully for "fear that their handiwork would be suddenly destroyed by the mineral owner").
MODEL SURFACE USE ACT
For these reasons, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (Commissioners) became involved in drafting a
uniform law for use by states in resolving severance disputes equita-
bly and predictably. 19 After examining state-to-state disparities in
mineral availability, severance practices, and dispute resolution
methods, the Commissioners drafted a model rather than a uniform
law so that states could look to the law for guidance but modify it as
necessary to meet local needs.20 The Commissioners spent three
years examining the multiplicity of problems that arise between sur-
face and mineral owners, 21 and on July 19, 1990, they approved the
Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation Act
and recommended its adoption by all the states. 22
This Comment will analyze the Model Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act (Act or Model Act). Part I exam-
ines the theory of estate severance, broad form deeds, and the dom-
inance of the mineral estate. Part II presents a survey of evolving
severance doctrines put forward by courts and legislatures, with a
special emphasis on the accommodation doctrine. Part III scruti-
nizes the Act itself, and Part IV analyzes the impact of the Act on
mineral development and surface ownership in several states. Part
V advances a series of recommended changes for the Act, and this
Comment concludes that while the Act represents a step toward at-
tainment of equity between surface and mineral owners, it is only a
small step. Unless the Act's provisions are strengthened, states
seeking balanced use of surface and mineral resources will be better
served by utilizing alternative statutory mechanisms.
I. HISTORY AND THEORY OF SEVERED MINERAL OWNERSHIP
A. The Doctrine of Estate Severance
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the Model Act
is a legal tool intended for use solely in the context of horizontally
severed estates. If one owner possesses a parcel of land in its en-
tirety, disputes between a "mineral" and a "surface" owner do not
arise and a statute of this kind is inapplicable. At early common law,
horizontal severance was not, in fact, a recognized legal doctrine,
for two reasons. First, the maxim cujus est solum, eus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos (to whomsoever the soil belongs owns also to the
19. Martz, supra note 18, at 30-31.
20. Martz, supra note 18, at 32.
21. Martz, supra note 18, at 30.
22. Martz, supra note 18, at 30. See generally MODEL SURFACE USE AND MINERAL DEVELOP-
MENT ACCOMMODATON ACT §§ 1-15, 14 U.L.A. 58-70 (Supp. 1992).
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sky and to the depths) dominated medieval English thinking about
property ownership, 23 and under this absolutist theory, any subter-
ranean minerals belonged solely to the surface owner.24 Second,
land transfers occurred through the ritual of "livery of seisin," or
delivery of possession, wherein land changed hands only after the
parties traveled to the land being conveyed and the transferor
handed the transferee a clump of soil or a tree branch taken from
the land. 25 By requiring the parties to grasp some physical manifes-
tation of the land being transferred, this method theoretically pre-
cluded conveyances of undiscovered subsurface mineral lands. 26
The doctrine of estate severance gained a foothold in English
legal theory via the operation of several ancient prerogatives of the
King.27 First, the King held exclusive power to coin money, and
incident to this right the King theoretically reserved all deposits of
gold and silver to himself when granting out fee estates, thereby
retaining sole right to extract these minerals. 28 Second, the King
23. Owen M. Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995, 996 (1980); see also Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky.
1929) (analyzing ownership rights to Great Onyx Cave under this "old maxim and rule"); 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at *18 (defining ownership of land as extending down to center of
earth).
24. Lopez, supra note 23, at 996; see also Edwards, 24 S.W.2d at 620 (quoting Blacks tone's
statement of traditional rule that "whatever is in a direct line between the surface of the land
and the center of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface").
25. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS 11 (2d ed. 1984). Additionally, the transferor had to chant words of grant while
handing the soil to the transferee. Id. In an age lacking detailed land records, this ceremony
worked to engrave the transfer in the participants' memories and sufficed to notify feudal
lords of the transaction. Id at 10-11. Livery of seisin remained the dominant method of land
transfer in England until 1536-and continued until 1845. Id. at 11. In 1845 the English Par-
liament passed the Real Property Act, which did not explicitly abolish livery of seisin but did
sanction the use of written deeds as granting devices, thereby producing the same effect as
outright abolition of the ritual. Id. at 11 n.25.
26. See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1976) (noting that
livery of seisin was "inconsistent with the passage of any fee interest in minerals in place as a
separate estate"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds by Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304 (Ky. 1987); cf. Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 483 (1858)
(describing conceptual difficulty experienced by English in applying livery of seisin to un-
opened mineral estates).
27. See The Case of Mines, 75 Eng. Rep. 472, 477 (Ex. 1567) (analyzing dispute between
Queen of England and Earl of Northumberland over mine of copper containing gold and
silver deposit and stating that "[a]ll mines of gold or silver throughout the realm, or of base
metal, wherein there is any ore of gold or silver of however small value, belong to the King by
prerogative, with liberty to dig... and carry it away from thence"). Among the prerogatives
assigned to English royalty were "dominion of the sea, control over navigation, foreign af-
fairs, defense of the realm, enforcing acts of Parliament, dispensing justice, coining money,
providing for [their] own household, granting offices and titles of nobility, and collecting
taxes." William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASrH. L. REV. 553, 562
(1972). The crown exercised these powers in its own right without needing parliamentary
authorization to do so, perhaps because the responsibilities existed prior to Parliament's as-
cension to supremacy. Id.
28. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18-19 n.20 (William D, Lewis ed., 1922)
(" 'Mines of gold and silver, by royal prerogative from time immemorial, have belonged to the
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was charged with responsibility for the defense of the realm, and to
fulfill this prerogative, he had the right to enter private lands to ex-
cavate saltpeter for use in making gunpowder. 29 The notion that
"royal mines" could exist separately from surface ownership arose
from these practices and provided an initial foundation for sever-
ance jurisprudence. 30
English colonists brought the royal mines concept to America:
many of the charters under which the eastern United States was set-
tled contained clauses reserving one-fifth of all gold and silver to the
crown.3' After the American Revolution, some states asserted their
own sovereign rights to precious metals, 32 and the U.S. Congress
crown.' ") (quoting WILLIAMS ON REAL PROPERTY, 14 n. (5 Am. ed. 1879)). An alternative
explanation for the King's gold and silver prerogative can be found in an almost quaint argu-
ment made in The Case of Mines on behalf of the Queen:
[The common law, which is founded upon reason, appropriates every thing to the
persons whom it best suits, as common and trivial things to the common people,
things of more worth to persons in a higher and superior class, and things most
excellent to those persons who excel all other; and because gold and silver are the
most excellent things which the soil contains, the law has appointed them (as in rea-
son it ought) to the person who is most excellent, and that is the King.
The Case of Mines, 75 Eng. Rep. at 479.
29. Stoebuck, supra note 27, at 563. The King's right to use private land in this fashion
was challenged through the court system in 1606, and in light of traditional English concep-
tions of absolute private property ownership, see supra note 3, the plaintiffs seemingly had a
strong case. Nevertheless, the King won. See The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre,
77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B. 1606). The court reasoned:
(A]lthough the invention of gunpowder was devised within time of memory... yet
inasmuch as this concerns the necessary defence of the realm, [the King] shall not be
driven to buy [saltpetre] in foreign parts; and foreign princes may restrain it at their
pleasure, in their own dominions: and so the realm shall not have sufficient [saltpe-
tre] for the defence of it, to the peril and hazard of it: and therefore insomuch as
saltpetre is within the realm, the King may take it... for the necessary defence of the
kingdom.
Id.
30. Cf Lopez, supra note 23, at 996 (questioning truth of King's prerogative mineral
rights practices but labeling such practices, if true, as first historical evidence of severance).
31. Lopez, supra note 23, at 996. The civil law systems of France, Spain, and Mexico also
contained doctrines allowing minerals to be reserved to the sovereign, so a majority of settlers
who ultimately became enveloped within the boundaries of the United States had some theo-
retical familiarity with estate severance. Id. at 996-97; see, e.g., Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312,
334 (1898) (noting that under Spanish law all minerals were perpetually reserved to gov-
erning power); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 816 (Tex. 1972) (Daniel,J., dissent-
ing) (tracing origin of estate severance rule in Southwest to rights of Spanish sovereign and
stating that Republic of Mexico and then of Texas retained Spanish law mandating sovereign
ownership of mines and minerals under all lands); see also Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 178
(Tex. 1977) (DanielJ., dissenting) (listing minerals owned separately by Spanish and Mexican
Governments in North America as "'not only the mines of gold and silver, but also those of
precious stones, copper, lead, tin, quicksilver, antimony, calmine, bismuth, rock salt and other
stoney matter (fossils), be they ores or semi-precious minerals, bitumen, and liquids (juices)
of the earth''" (quoting Ordinances of May 22, 1783, promulgated for Mexico by King of
Spain)). Mexican civil law governing mineral estate ownership remained effective in Texas
until 1866. Reed, 554 S.W.2d at 177.
32. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 18-19 n.20 (summarizing Pennsylvania and New
York state severance law); Lopez, supra note 23, at 997 n.8 (noting that Pennsylvania and New
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enacted a law reserving one-third of such metals to the Federal Gov-
ernment.33 These laws did not survive long,3 4 but they evidence co-
lonial acceptance of separate governmental mineral estate
ownership.
The Industrial Revolution provided impetus for discrete mineral
ownership theory to evolve into a comprehensive severance doc-
trine applicable to private parties as well as to government.3 5 Indus-
try and railroads needed large quantities of coal, iron ore, and other
minerals to manufacture products beneficial to society and to pro-
vide transportation for the growing nation.3 6 Many landowners
could not extract the enormous volume of minerals required by in-
dustry,3 7 nor did any one landowner necessarily own all the surface
overlying a given coal seam or iron deposit.38 Mining entrepreneurs
utilized governmental severance precedent to establish the right of
private parties to possess severed minerals,3 9 and under this theory,
developers were able to purchase minerals beneath many contigu-
ous privately owned surface tracts, thereby gaining opportunities
for large-scale production while avoiding expenditures for extrane-
ous surface lands.40 Surface owners also gained incentive to allow
their lands to be severed because they could use the capital gener-
York originally exercised sovereign power to reserve gold, silver, or other precious minerals
to benefit state government).
33. See 28JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789 378 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1933) (reprinting Act of May 20, 1785, ordinance for ascertaining mode of disposing of
lands in western territories, which provided for reservation to United States of "one third
part of all gold, silver, lead and copper mines").
34. See Lopez, supra note 23, at 997 n.8 (noting that Pennsylvania repudiated its mineral
reservation doctrine in 1843 and that New York asserted sovereign rights only "[fWor a short
time").
35. Lopez, supra note 23, at 997.
36. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893) ("Coal, oil, gas and
iron are absolutely essential to our common comfort and prosperity"); Lopez, supra note 23,
at 997 (mentioning "crucial role" played by mining in industrialization of East and settlement
of West).
37. See Phillip W. Lear, Multiple Mineral Development Conflicts: An Armageddon in Simultaneous
Mineral Operations?, 28 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 79, 83 (1983) (stating that landowners lack
capital and technology necessary to exploit mineral estate).
38. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. 1980) (discussing outcroppings of
lignite on plaintiff's land and at many other points in surrounding county; listing one out-
cropping within half mile and another within two miles of plaintiff's tract); Chosar Corp. v.
Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1988) (examining defendant's need to access "Splashdam
seam" of coal running beneath plaintiff's land from adjoining land where seam outcropped
and thereby allowed easier access to coal); Palmore & McGuire, supra note 13, § 6.02(1], at 6-
4 (suggesting that development of typical coal tract of approximately 7500 acres in eastern
Kentucky would require contract negotiations with over 100 different landowners and their
families).
39. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 203 (explaining that Americans resorted to existing
severance doctrine for economic advantages it provided to both surface and mineral
developers).
40. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 203-04 (stating that severance allowed "economies of
specialization" to benefit both estates).
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ated by their minerals to develop the surface. 41 Economically and
practically speaking, therefore, mineral severance provided a means
by which efficient and productive use could be made of multiple
land strata.42
41. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 203 (describing surface owners' generation of capital
via estate severance).
42. See Donald N. ZilIman &J. Russell Tyler, Jr., The Common Law of Access and Surface Use
in Mining, 1J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 267, 290 (1985-1986) (declaring that because severance doc-
trine allows exploitation of surface and minerals on same parcel of land, doctrine is "surely an
economically efficient use of scarce resources"); see also Huffman, supra note 15, at 202 (argu-
ing that principles of estate severance are optimal in terms of allocational efficiency). In fact,
Professor Huffman goes so far as to argue that the dominant estate rule that favors mineral
owners, see infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text, optimally simulates the intentions of the
parties to a severance and therefore results in efficient allocation of resources between surface
and subsurface owners. Huffinan, supra note 15, at 206. Professor Huffman explains the
economist's conception of efficient resource allocation as follows:
[R]esources are efficiently allocated when the total value of production of commodi-
ties and services in the society, as measured by prices reflecting individuals' willing-
ness to pay, is maximized. This maximization principle is unconcerned with how the
optimal production will be distributed among consumers. It is claimed to be optimal
only in the sense that no greater yield of goods and services can be achieved by any
alternative allocation of resources.... [A]ny efficient allocation of resources is effi-
cient only in the context of a particular distribution of wealth. Because value is mea-
sured by willingness to pay, the economist must take the existing distribution of
wealth as a given in assessing the efficiency of resource allocation at a particular
point in time.
Id. at 209. This theory is extremely troubling, because by endorsing a dominant mineral es-
tate doctrine as allocationally optimal, Professor Huffman is implicitly endorsing the current
distribution of wealth. But see id (asserting that subscribers to efficient-allocation-based-on-
willingness-to-pay theory do not necessarily support distributional consequences of such the-
ory). That is, for over a century surface owners and often society at large have been com-
pelled to subsidize the profits of private mining companies by absorbing the diminution in
value, repair, or replacement costs of mining-induced surface damage. See, e.g., Robert E.
Mintz, Strip Mining: A Policy Evaluation, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 479-85 (1976) (describing
health, safety, environmental, financial, and other consequences borne by third parties as re-
sult of surface mining operations). In a "fair" world, these externalities would be borne by
the mineral developer, who could either handle them herself and thus gain incentive to mini-
mize damage, or pass them on to society at large in the form of increased mineral prices.
When value is measured in terms of "willingness to pay," absurd results ensue. The things
that surface owners value but are not able (and therefore not "willing") to pay much for, such
as intact surface lands and unadulterated water supplies, will not be deemed as high in
"value" as a mineral estate that sells for a substantial sum of money, and thus use of the
surface will be deemed less "allocationally optimal" than use of the minerals. See Huffman,
supra note 15, at 209-10. But cf ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIrrY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENvTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, EPA23O-R-92-008, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EqurrY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMU-
NITIES 12, 17, 20-21 (1992) (explaining that "not in my backyard" syndrome leads in part to
siting of hazardous and solid waste management facilities in communities with "least ability to
mount a protest," that is, in low-income communities; noting existence of evidence that expo-
sures to and risk from environmental contaminants are higher than average for low-income
communities because those communities tend to be located in areas with toxic waste sites and
high levels of air pollution); Home Street, USA: Living with Pollution, GREENPEACE, Oct.-Dec.
1991, at 3, 8-13 (presenting case studies on how "[b]eing poor [and thus "unwilling" to pay]
in America means breathing foul air, working filthy jobs, and living next door to toxic waste
landfills and incinerators"). It is fundamentally irresponsible to write theoretically about allo-
cational efficiency without factoring in the reality that willingness to pay is not equivalent to
ability to pay. Any economic analysis that disregards distribution of wealth issues and never-
theless concludes that mineral estate dominance is optimal is therefore presumptively
inadequate.
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By 1900, the concept of estate severance was well established. 43
In all jurisdictions today, the owner of a fee simple may create as
many separate estates as there are different minerals or strata of
minerals under his or her land. 44 Severance may be accomplished
by exception, reservation, grant, or lease.45 Once ownership is
transferred, each severed estate is held under separate and distinct
title, each of the estates is subject to the laws of descent, devise, and
conveyance, and each is independently taxable and lienable."16
B. Broad Form Conveyance Instruments
Surface and mineral estates are commonly severed by means of
"broad form" conveyance instruments, or "deeds."147 Broad form
deeds generally create sweeping rights for the mineral owner in
terms of access easements and ownership privileges, but they fail to
precisely define the minerals conveyed, the mining methods to be
used, the expected surface damages, and the compensation to be
paid for that damage. 48 The deeds are notorious for their pervasive
43. Lopez, supra note 23, at 997-98.
44. Mara E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land Law, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 67 n.144 (1991);see, e.g., Davison v. Reynolds, 103 S.E. 248, 249 (Ga. 1920)
("The owner of the entire interest [in land] may sell the surface to A., the stratum of iron to
B., the stratum of coal to C., the stratum of oil to D., and a stratum of the air space above.").
45. According to Professor Fox, "an 'exception' is the retention of some thing or some
right which existed in the grantor before the conveyance, while a 'reservation' is the creation
of a new legal right--one which did not exist while the grantor held the estate-passing to the
grantor from the grantee." Fox, supra note 5, at 801 n.34. Practical difference between ex-
ceptions and reservations has all but disappeared, however, because many attorneys are una-
ware of the technical distinction between the two and thus draft deeds imprecisely. Id. Courts
realize this and focus on intent rather than on the actual words of conveyance used. See Bod-
caw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 254 S.W. 345, 346 (Ark. 1923) (observing that "[tihese terms are
too often used interchangeably ... to be material, and it always becomes a question to deter-
mine what the real intention of the parties was with respect to the thing granted"); Fox, supra
note 5, at 801 n.34 (listing illustrative cases). The legal distinction between a mineral grant
and a mineral lease retains vitality, however. In general, a lease conveys only a right to go on
someone else's land to extract something of value, whereas a grant conveys ownership of the
mineral in place. Depending on how a conveyance is phrased, though, a "lease" may some-
times convey ownership in place and thus act as a severance instrument. See, e.g., Hummel v.
McFadden, 150 A.2d 856, 861-63 (Pa. 1959) (holding that one agreement giving lessee right
to mine and remove coal so long as coal was mined and removed in paying quantities, and
another agreement giving lessee perpetual right to mine coal, with neither agreement man-
dating time, quantity, or royalty restrictions, were sales of coal in place and thus lessee ac-
quired fee simple ownership of coal).
46. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 587, 598 (Pa. 1893) (explaining that
once estates are severed, "[e]ach of the separate layers or strata becomes a subject of taxation,
of incumbrance, levy and sale, precisely like the surface"); Smith v. Jones, 60 P. 1104, 1106
(Utah 1900) ("When the surface and underlying mineral strata are separately owned, they
constitute separate corporeal hereditaments, with all the incidents of separate ownership.").
47. For convenience, this Comment will refer to broad form conveyance instruments,
which include deeds and leases, as "broad form deeds."
48. A recognized standard broad form deed does not exist, but the presence of three
elements is generally thought to make a deed "broad form": (1) the right to use and operate
on the surface, (2) a release of liability for surface damages, and (3) a detailed description of
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ambiguity and their tendency to completely subsume surface rights
to the mineral estate.49 For example, a widely used version of broad
form deed called a "Mayo deed" grants the mineral owner the right
to remove "[a]ll the coal, minerals and mineral products... in any
access easements. BARLOW BURKE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MINERALS AND NATURAL
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ON PRIVATE LANDS (forthcoming 1993) (draft ed. ch. 3, at 298, on
file with author). Broad form deeds may contain "detailed" descriptions of access easements,
but "detailed" does not necessarily mean "specific." For example, does a deed granting "the
right to operate any machinery and mining upon the surface" mean the same thing in 1992 as
in 1900? Clearly not. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (describing increased im-
pact on surface estate caused by technological advances in mining methodologies and energy
production techniques). Easements couched in sweeping terms such as these are inherently
ambiguous because the definitions of "machinery" and "mining" change over time, thereby
changing the meaning of the conveyance. The following excerpt presents typically detailed
yet ambiguous broad form deed language:
"Conveying all the minerals, etc ... and such of the standing timber thereon as
may, at the time of the use thereof, be or by the party of the second part [grantee], its
successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or convenient for mining purposes, or so
deemed necessary or convenient for the exercise and enjoyment of any or all of the
property rights and privileges herein bargained, sold, granted, or conveyed... and
the exclusive rights of way for any and all.., haul roads and other ways, pipe lines,
telegraph, and telephone lines that may hereafter be located on said land by the
parties of the first part, [grantor], their heirs, representatives, or assigns, or by the
party of the second part, its successors or assigns, or by any person or corporation
with or without the authority of either of said parties, their, or its heirs, representa-
tives, successors, or assigns; ... and to use and operate the surface thereof and any
and all parts thereof... and also the right to build, erect, alter, repair, maintain, and
operate upon said land.., any and all houses, shops, buildings .... and machinery
and mining and any and all equipment, that may by the party of the second part, its
successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or convenient for the full and free exer-
cise and enjoyment of any and all the property rights and privileges hereby bar-
gained, granted, sold, or conveyed; ... and the right to remove all pillars and other
lateral and subjacent supports (from the mines) without leaving pillars to support the
roof or surface; ... and the right to erect upon said land, and maintain, use, repair,
and operate, and at their pleasure remove therefrom any and all buildings and ma-
chinery and mining and any and all equipment, whether specifically enumerated
herein or not, that may by party of the second part, its successors or assigns, be
deemed necessary or convenient for the exercise or enjoyment of any or all of the
property, rights, and privileges herein... granted or conveyed, and also free access
to, upon, and over said land for the purpose of surveying and prospecting for said
property and interests.... And it, said party of the second part, its successors, and
assigns, to have unlimited time in which to do so, and shall not be limited to com-
mence the exercise or enjoyment of all or any of said property, rights, and privileges
at any particular or reasonable time; and when so commenced shall not be deemed to
have abandoned nor forfeited the same, nor any part thereof by a, or any cessation
thereof, or any part thereof.... But there is reserved to the parties of the first part
all the timber upon the said land, except that necessary for the purposes hereinbe-
fore mentioned; and there is also reserved the free use of said land for agricultural
purposes, so far as such use is consistent with the rights hereby bargained, sold,
granted and conveyed; and right to mine and use coal for their own personal house-
hold and domestic purposes."
Case v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 276 S.W. 573, 574 (Ky. 1925) (reprinting portion of elaborate
granting clause of broad form mineral estate deed).
49. Martz, supra note 18, at 30;James K. Caudill, Note, Kentucky's Experience with the Broad
Form Deed, 63 Ky. L.J. 107, 114 (1975). But see Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky.
1987) ("The provisions in typical broad form deeds are, byond cavil, clear and unambiguous.
They are, in fact, overwhelming in their language to demonstrate an intent to convey away the
rights to the minerals described.").
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and every manner that may be deemed necessary or convenient for
mining."50 This language can be interpreted so comprehensively
that ownership of the surface essentially devolves to the mineral
owner.
5 1
Broad form deeds received extensive use at the turn of the cen-
tury.52 In the East, mineral speculators traveled from town to town
using the deeds to purchase mineral rights under local people's
lands.53 Mining companies perceived that broad form language
would afford them "larger development rights and greater flexibility
S.. with less exposure to compensation claims than would be the
case if the grant or reservation language attempted in an abstract
way to describe the scope and impacting elements of potential sur-
50. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 41-42 (Ky. 1956), overruled in part by Akers, 736
S.W.2d at 304-05; see also Rice v. Stapleton, 502 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1973) (holding that
owner of mineral rights can use any means necessary and convenient for mineral removal
even if method damages surface that had been subsequently subdivided): Tolliver v. Pitts-
burgh-Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Ky. 1956), overruled in part by Kentland-
Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky. 1974) (overruling Tolliver's holding
that mineral owner is not liable to surface owner in nuisance). The "Mayo deed" is named
after John C.C. Mayo, a prominent turn-of-the-century mineral speculator who made a for-
tune purchasing and selling thousands of acres of mineral lands via these deeds. See HARRY
M. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE POWER 57-84 (1983) (relatingJohn Mayo's flamboyant life story
and his unique technique for purchasing mineral rights from landowners).
51. See Caudill, supra note 49, at 116-17 (speculating that Mayo deed language seems
challengeable only on public policy grounds, but pointing out that despite pro-mineral owner
language in deeds, situations nevertheless occur where rights and privileges of transactors are
uncertain).
52. Martz, supra note 18, at 30.
53. See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1968) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (noting that oftentimes books of uniform blank deeds were ordered by county
clerks for convenience of mineral developers; these deeds required only insertion of land
description, grantor's name, and acknowledgement by state to make conveyance valid), over-
ruled by Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 303-05. Many of the landowners were illiterate and had little idea
what riches they were granting away. HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS
70-76 (1962). Caudill describes a typical turn-of-the-century mineral conveyance transaction
as follows:
When the highland couple sat down at the kitchen table to sign the deed their
guest had brought to them they were at an astounding disadvantage. On one side of
the rude table sat an astute trader, more often than not a graduate of a fine college
and a man experienced in the larger business world. He was thoroughly aware of the
implications of the transaction and of the immense wealth which he was in the pro-
cess of acquiring. Across the table on a puncheon bench sat a man and woman out of
a different age. Still remarkably close to the frontier of a century before, neither of
them possessed more than the rudiments of an education. Hardly more than 25 per
cent of such mineral deeds were signed by grantors who could so much as scrawl
their names. Most of them "touched the pen and made their mark," in the form of a
spidery X, in the presence of witnesses whom the agent had thoughtfully brought
along. Usually the agent was the notary public, but sometimes he brought one from
the county seat. Unable to read the instrument or able to read it only with much
uncertainty, the sellers relied upon the agent for an explanation of its contents-




19931 MODEL SURFACE USE ACT
face uses."' 54 In the West, the Federal Government encouraged set-
tlement and preserved natural resources for the nation by allowing
homesteaders to patent surface estates while simultaneously reserv-
ing subsurface minerals to itself.55 Because the Government lacked
time and resources to perform geologic surveys before granting out
the surface, ambiguous reservations of "all minerals" frequently suf-
ficed to sever the estates. 56
Although broad form deeds often contain language expressly re-
serving access easements for the mineral estate,57 problems arise
when mineral owners try to parlay this language into the enormous
easements modem mining technologies require.58 For example, if
two parties contracted in 1890 to allow the mineral owner "all rights
and privileges necessary to go in and under [a] tract of land [to]
mine and remove therefrom all coal and minerals,"5 9 is it fair to
conclude that those parties anticipated and approved of the destruc-
tive easements required by modem surface, mountaintop, or chemi-
cal leach mining? Is it more reasonable to assume that the parties
contemplated easements only of the scope generally mandated by
mining methods known at the time of conveyance, plus or minus an
54. Martz, supra note 18, at 31.
55. See, e.g., Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, ch. 14, §§ 1-3, 38 Stat. 509 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-125 (1988)) (encouraging settlers to patent surface lands for
agricultural use but reserving portions of land containing phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas,
or asphaltic minerals to U.S. Government); Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, §§ 1-
11, 39 Stat. 862 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1988)) (allowing settlers to
build homesteads and take government land as their own but reserving ownership of coal and
other minerals that might be found on these lands); see also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra
note 7, §§ 9.03-05 (detailing mechanics and motives of Federal Government's promulgation
of these and other statutes enacted to allow settlers to obtain federal nonmineral lands).
56. See, e.g., Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, § 9, 39 Stat. 862, 864 (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1988)) (reserving all coal and "other" minerals to Federal
Government while allowing stockraising lands to be patented by private citizens). Prior to
Congress' enactment of the Stock Raising Homestead Act in 1916, the Federal Government
tried to classify lands in "mineral" and "nonmineral" categories. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING, supra note 7, § 9.05[l][a] n.1 (noting that federal mineral disposal system originated
with Land Ordinance of 1785). The process of land classification was far from scientific, how-
ever, and often depended on misinformation provided by individuals trying to obtain mineral
lands by having the lands categorized as nonmineral properties. Id. § 9.05[l][a]. In many
other cases, the technology of the time made it impossible to ascertain whether a given tract
of land contained minerals, and not surprisingly, much of the land patented as "nonmineral"
according to this classification system turned out to be rich in minerals. Truhe, supra note 11,
at 381 n.23. The Stock Raising Homestead Act's broad reservation of"coal and other miner-
als" allowed the Federal Government to defeat these inaccurate or fraudulent land classifica-
tions and retain mineral reserves for the United States. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462
U.S. 36,47 (1983) (describing Stock Raising Homestead Act as "the most important of several
federal land grant statutes enacted in the early 1900s that reserved minerals to the United
States rather than classifying lands as mineral or nonmineral").
57. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining treatment of access easements
in broad form deeds and providing example of typical deed language).
58. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (listing examples of expanded scope of
mining easements under modem technologies).
59. Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126, 1128 n.2 (6th Cir. 1971).
622 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsrrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:607
average usage tolerance? 60 If that same 1890 deed granted "all
minerals" to the mineral owner, is it fair to expand tie mining ac-
cess easement to include minerals not considered economically or
scientifically valuable in 1890?61 And what should happen under a
severance instrument that lacks easement language of any sort?62
All of these questions arise in the context of severed estates, and
liberal use of broad form deeds has complicated matters by increas-
ing the level of uncertainty involved in conveyance interpretation.
C. Mineral Estate Dominance
A simple way to resolve ambiguous conveyance disputes is to des-
ignate one estate as having priority over the other. Thus at common
law, the mineral estate has traditionally been considered dominant
and the surface estate servient to the extent the mineral owner must
use the surface to access the minerals. 63 Practically speaking, this
"mineral estate dominance doctrine" provides the mineral owner
access to his or her property, 64 but it also reflects policy considera-
60. Compare Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. 1970) (refusing to allow surface
destructive mining method to be used by mineral owner unless severance instrument contains
"some positive indication that the parties to the deed agreed to authorize" such method) with
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky. 1987) (allowing surface mining to go forward
despite lack of evidence indicating such intent in severance instrument). See generally ROGER
A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 459 (1984) (suggesting that "best formula" for
determining change in scope of easement over time is that "the purposes [of easement use]
may keep up with those changes that might be reasonably anticipated for the dominant tene-
ment-evolutionary but not revolutionary changes").
61. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (listing examples of litigation disputes
caused by broad conveyances of "other minerals" in context of newly valuable resources such
as methane, lignite, and uranium).
62. See Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 548-50 (1874) (implying access
easements for mining in absence of express conveyance language so that mineral owner could
exploit property).
63. See Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (stating that
"[i]t is elementary that the mineral lessee, insofar as the surface of land is concerned, pos-
sesses the dominant estate, and the lessor, or surface owner, has the servient estate"). This
"dominance doctrine" is used to imply mining easements when no express easements exist,
and to decide which party should prevail should a surface use dispute arise. See Dycus, supra
note 15, at 873 (arguing that mineral estate dominance is shorthand means of conveyancing).
64. If express access easements are not defined in the conveyance instrument, the min-
eral estate dominance doctrine allows courts to imply access easements for mining. See
Squires v. Lafferty, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (W. Va. 1924) ("When a thing is granted, all the means to
obtain it and all the fruits and effects of it are also granted."). This implied right of access has
variously been analyzed as an easement by necessity, Pyramid Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 99 N.E.2d
427, 429 (Ind. 1951); Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (Okla. 1940), or as an easement
appurtenant (i.e., inherent) to the mineral estate, Buck Creek R.R. Co. v. Haws, 69 S.W.2d
333, 335 (Ky. 1934). Necessity attaches because a mineral estate is considered valueless with-
out access to excavate the resources. See, e.g., Muscogee Mfg. Co. v. Eagle & Phenix Mills, 54
S.E. 1028, 1034 (Ga. 1906) (stating that "one who grants a thing is deemed also to grant that
within his ownership, without which the grant itself will be of no effect"); Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (quoting approvingly from law review article that states, "The
manner of enjoyment of the mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances");
Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 (W. Va. 1909) (questioning worth of reserved min-
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tions. Exploitation of America's mineral wealth has long been con-
sidered a critical goal taking precedence over ownership rights in
land surface. In 1882, the Supreme Court acknowledged a national
policy favoring mineral development by allowing mining to proceed
in the middle of a town.65 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articu-
lated this preference by stating, "To encourage the development of
the great natural resources of a country[, trifling inconveniences to
particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a
great community." 66 This same court vividly described perceived
consequences of curtailing mineral access:
[T]he public might be debarred the use of the hidden treasures
which the great laboratory of nature has provided for man's use in
the bowels of the earth. Some of them, at least, are necessary to
his comfort. Coal, oil, gas, and iron are absolutely essential to our
common comfort and prosperity. To place them beyond the
reach of the public would be a great public wrong .... [T]he
question we are considering becomes of a quasi public character.
It is not to be treated as a mere contest between A. and B. over a
little corner of earth. 67
In the heyday of industrial development, sentiments such as these
colored people's perceptions of the burdens borne by surface own-
ers under the dominance doctrine. 68 Surface damage caused by
erals without right of owner to use means necessary to enjoy them). Clearly, surface and
mineral estates may be severed in law, but they cannot be severed in fact. If a mineral owner
cannot access her minerals through the surface, she will have no way to enjoy her property,
and her property right becomes a nullity. See Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15
(Tex. 1921) ("The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied,
the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right.").
65. See Steel v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U.S. 447, 449 (1882) (using lan-
guage from Mining Laws of 1866 and 1872 to support statement that United States policy
favors mineral exploration and development). The Court asserted that "fto such [mining]
claims, though within the limits of what may be termed the site of the settlement or new town,
the miner acquires as good a right as though his discovery was in a wilderness ...... Id The
town in question in this case was Leadville, Colorado. Id. at 447.
66. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886), overruled by Common-
wealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974).
67. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893).
68. These sentiments retain viability today and are strengthened by threats to American
energy supplies such as the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Presi-
dent Carter responded to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 by developing a National Energy
Plan. ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL
ENERGY PLAN (1977). This plan emphasized the development of alternative energy sources
such as solar power to alleviate United States reliance on "rapidly depleting supplies of do-
mestic and foreign crude oil and natural gas." Frank F. Skillern, Environmental Law Issues in the
Development of Energy Resources, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 739, 739 (1977). The plan has failed, how-
ever, in the face of a political culture linking energy production with gross national product;
domestic energy policy continues to favor "large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive, in-
tegrated, and centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels." Joseph P. Tomain, The Domi-
nant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 375 (1990). As long as this
ideology persists, mineral development will receive high governmental and industry priority.
Id.; see also Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988) (stating that "it is
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picks, shovels, and mule-drawn scrapers 69 could perhaps be fairly
labeled a "trifling inconvenience," and perhaps even the worst-case
exercise of a dominant mining easement using nineteenth-century
technology would not substantially impair surface land value. Cir-
cumstances have changed, however. Mineral developers now have
powerful earthmoving equipment that allows a single miner to ex-
tract tons of ore per hour;70 new mining techniques inject cyanide
and other chemicals into the ground and allow old mines to be pro-
ductively reopened; 7' increased pressures for energy sources impel
the continuing policy of the Federal Government in the national interest to foster and en-
courage private enterprise in... the development of economically sound and stable reclama-
tion industries"). The same policy has been promulgated in subsequent mineral laws. See
National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1602 (1988) (pronouncing that "it is the continuing policy of the United States to promote
an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national security, economic
well-being and industrial production"); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43
U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (1988) (asserting that "it is the policy of the United States that... the
public lands be managed in a manner which recognizes the Nation's need for domestic
sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber").
69. See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Ky. 1968) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (describing "usual, known, and accepted" mining methods around 1905 as includ-
ing "'picks, shovels, and sip-scrapers drawn by mules to remove the thin overburden' "),
overruled by Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 303-05 (Ky. 1987).
70. Surface ("strip"), mountaintop removal ("contour strip"), auger, and longwall min-
ing methods all utilize massive machines that allow miners to excavate significantly larger
quantities of minerals than old-fashioned room and pillar mining. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING, supra note 7, §§ 1.06[2][b], 1.06[3], 1.06[4][f] (explaining functioning of each type of
mining technology); Dana Priest, Below Ground in Coal Country: Big Machines, Ready Replacements
and the Strike's Bottom Line, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 26, 1989, at D1 (noting that longwall production
is approximately five times faster than continuous room and pillar mining). Surface,
mountaintop, and auger mining are enormously destructive, however. Se,, Roberts v. Twin
Fork Coal Co., 223 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. Ky. 1963) (describing "highly destructive" post-
World War II strip and auger mining machinery that "greatly increase[s] the burdens on the
surface estate"); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 7, § 1.06[4][fl (describing use of
giant auger machines that can bore 100 meters into hillsides); Van Gelder, supra note 1, at 65
(printing photograph of mountaintop removal mining in Martin County, Kentucky).
Longwall mining creates rapid surface subsidence and may interrupt the flow of subterranean
waters. See Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1990) (Russell,J., dissent-
ing) (discussing evidence that longwall mining will cause plaintiffs' land surface to subside
into five swales, each three feet deep, 600 to 700 feet wide, and 3000 to 5000 feet long, with
resultant potential disruption of groundwater flows); I AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, supra note
7, § 1.06[2][b] (noting that as face of longwall mine moves forward into coal seam, roof sup-
ports move forward as well and exposed roof behind mined seam caves in).
71. See Bill Turque, The Warfor the West, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at 30-31 (describing
process known as "heap leaching" in which ore is drenched in cyanide to chemically separate
flecks of gold). High gold prices have spurred the reopening of old, previously unprofitable
mines, Truhe, supra note 11, at 379, and the amount of gold recovered with cyanide has in-
creased 6000% between 1979 and 1989. Turque, supra, at 31. Cyanide obviously has an
adverse environmental impact on the surface estate. Id. at 30-31.
Uranium can be efficiently mined via solution, or "in situ" mining, where a chemical leach
solution is injected into the ground and flushed through the underground ore. I AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING, supra note 7, § 1.06[4][b]. The uranium dissolves into the solution and is
pumped back up to the surface as "pregnant liquor," which is later filtered and precipitated
and made into a salable substance called "yellowcake." Lomex v. McBryde, 696 S.W.2d 200,
202 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). Again, a surface owner's land and groundwater are threatened by
this introduction of toxic chemicals into the environment via mining.
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production of previously "worthless" minerals such as oil shale, lig-
nite, methane, and geothermal steam;72 and new materials such as
uranium have been discovered.73 All of these changes impinge on
surface rights to an extent unfathomable in the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, if mineral dominance is construed literally, surface
owners holding land under ambiguous conveyances become subject
to any surface easement the mineral owner chooses to exercise. 74 In
its most draconian manifestation, the dominance doctrine can be
wielded to expand the scope of an implied mining easement to in-
clude any of the developments listed above. Thus, although a doc-
trine of mineral estate dominance may have seemed justifiable in the
nineteenth century, it hardly seems fair today.75
72. See United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. 1983) (litigating, as
case of first impression, ownership of methane gas under conveyance of "all the coal ...
together with... the right of ventilation"). Methane, or coalbed gas, is found in coal seams
and is released when the coal seam is fractured. See id. at 1383 (describing process by which
coalbed gas is extracted). Methane, measured in British Thermal Units (BTU) per pound, has
approximately 90% of the heating value of natural gas, although only 1% of the BTU value of
coal. Id at 1386. The gas has been vented into the atmosphere for years as a dangerous and
valueless waste product, and until the energy crisis of the 1970s, "it was still dismissed as
useless and called moonbeam gas." BURKE ET AL., supra note 48, ch. 1, at 31.
Lignite, another natural resource that has traditionally been thought commercially worth-
less, is an organic compound of carbon and hydrogen that exists in a form that could be called
"post-peat" or "pre-coal." Lignite's BTU value is not as high as coal's, as the deeper and
more compressed the plant material, the higher the BTU value. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING,
supra note 7, § 1.02[5][a]. Nevertheless, lignite is now used commercially as an energy source.
Id.; see also Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980) (litigating ownership of near-
surface lignite under conveyance of "all oil, gas and other minerals"), overruled by Moser v.
United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (rex. 1984). Oil shale and geothermal steam are
similarly relative newcomers to the commercial energy source arena. See, e.g., Andrus v. Shell
Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 663 n.6, 668-70, 672 (1980) (litigating ownership of oil shale deposits
and reprinting portions of congressional documents stating that in 1920 and 1931, oil shale
had no commercial value, i.e., could not be mined and disposed of profitably; holding that in
light of modem times' pressing need to find alternative energy sources, oil shale is to be
considered a valuable mineral); United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1276-81 (9th
Cir.) (holding that Federal Government reservation under Stock Raising Homestead Act of
1916 of "all the coal and other minerals" includes geothermal steam and other geothermal
resources), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
73. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1984) (litigating
dispute as to whether uranium is owned by mineral or surface estate owner under conveyance
of "oil, gas, and other minerals").
74. See, e.g., MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311, 319-20 (9th Cir.) (finding that
mineral owner's right to make reasonably necessary use of surface includes right to "wholly
destroy" surface, if such destruction occurs as result of "usual or customary" method of min-
ing), ceri. denied, 317 U.S. 692 (1942); Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Ky. 1956)
(allowing surface mining to go forward by focusing analysis on mineral dominance rather than
on intent of parties to allow certain types of mining), overruled on other grounds by Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987); Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555
(Miss. 1962) (agreeing that mineral owner's right to extract minerals by usual and customary
methods exists "even though the surface of the ground may be wholly destroyed as a result
thereof").
75. The mineral estate dominance doctrine was not equitable or justifiable in the nine-
teenth century either, because individual surface owners were forced to subsidize private min-
eral development. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (documenting precedence of
mineral estate over surface estate). The external costs generated by mining should be inter-
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II. EROSION OF MINERAL ESTATE DOMINANCE: TIlE RISE OF
REASONABLENESS, THE ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE, AND
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Common Law Developments
1. Scope of the mining easement
As mineral estate dominance became an accepted canon in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, two moderating principles arose to mitigate the
doctrine's potentially harsh consequences. First, it became axio-
matic that a mineral owner's implied use of the surface could not
exceed that considered "reasonable and necessary" for exploitation
of the minerals.7 6 Any use beyond this threshold level provides the
surface owner a cause of action for damages against the mineral
owner. 77 Typically, a surface owner must meet the rather high bur-
den of proving excessive, wanton, or negligent use of the mining
easement to obtain a remedy, but despite this qualification, a "rea-
sonable necessity" standard still narrows the easement scope that
could otherwise be broadly construed under the dominance doc-
trine.78 The rule can be justified in pragmatist's terms: it preserves
nalized by the parties creating the damage and reaping the profits: the mineral owners. See
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 321 (Pa. 1973) ("The public interest is
not served if the public, rather than the mine operator, has to bear the expense of abating
pollution caused as a direct result of the profitmaking, resource-depleting business of mining
coal."), appeal dismissed sub nom. Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 903 (1974).
76. See Truhe, supra note 11, at 385-88 (discussing legislative origins of' reasonably neces-
sary test and noting that reasonable necessity standard is recognized today in majority of
jurisdictions); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 2.15 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1989) (stating that servitudes reasonably necessary to enjoyment of minerals will be implied
from conveyances unless clearly contrary language exists in severance documents).
77. Theoretically, a holder of an implied or an express easement has no obligation to pay
the owner of the servient estate for the reasonable exercise of that easement because the
holder is merely exercising his or her property rights under the easement. See 1 HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLESJ. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218, at 186.45 (1992) (noting that usual
rules applicable to owners of dominant and servient estates apply to severed mineral interests
and that mineral owner must use easements with due regard for interests of surface estate).
But once easement use exceeds that considered reasonably necessary to attain its purpose,
liability attaches. See Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 594 (Okla. 1959) (noting that
surface owner's only basis for recovery of surface damages is "proof of wanton or negligent
destruction" by mineral owner or proof that damages were "not reasonably necessary" for
mineral development), superseded by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 318.1-.9 (West 1991 & Supp.
1993); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810-12 (Tex. 1972) (reversing lower court
judgment that found mineral owner's use of water underneath surface estate in production of
oil as not reasonably necessary use of mining easement).
78. The burden of proof on the surface owner is sometimes difficult to meet because the
definition of "reasonably necessary" can be broadly defined to mean "convenient," "profita-
ble," or "in accordance with industry practices." Dycus, supra note 15, at 880. Under flexible
definitions such as these, courts have found that "reasonable use" can include use of all of the
surface estate. Id. (citing Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941)). In such situations, "reasonably necessary use" obviously does not act as much
of a brake on the mineral estate dominance doctrine. See Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d
40, 43 (Ky. 1956) (holding that any coal mining method, including surface mining, may be
used under broad form deed without any obligation to pay damages except for those caused
19931 MODEL SURFACE USE ACT 627
the original intent of the parties to the severance by acknowledging
the patent illogic of reserving a surface estate if miners are expected
to completely destroy that estate.79
Second, in the context of implied and express mining easements,
surface owners are assigned an absolute right of subjacent sup-
port.80 That is, mineral developers must provide subterranean sup-
port for the land surface and for improvements existing or
reasonably anticipated to be constructed on the surface after mining
commences. 81 The mineral owner is held strictly liable for any dam-
age to land or structures caused by his or her failure to fulfill this
obligation.82 A strict liability standard reduces the burden of proof
by oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious actions), overruled on other grounds by Akers v.
Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky. 1987).
79. See, e.g., Payne v. Hoover, Inc., 486 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Ala. 1986) (finding only
available method of extracting limestone to be surface mining and therefore not allowing
mining to commence because it would destroy surface and negate intent of parties to mineral
severance to preserve surface); Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1960)
(refusing to allow use of water-flooding process of recovering oil because method could not
have been contemplated by parties to severance in light of fact that such method destroys
surface); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 170 A.2d 97, 98-99 (Pa. 1961) (stat-
ing that where language of contract is ambiguous, language will be construed so that rational
and fair result will ensue; holding strip mining to be barred because such mining subverts
contracting parties' intent). But see Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 397-
98 (Ky. 1968) (deciding that mineral owner paid sufficient sum of money for mineral estate to
encompass value of surface estate, so despite severance event, which, according to court, sur-
face owner might have indulged in simply to retain whatever bare value title might have,
mineral owner's employment of surface mining, which will destroy surface estate, is not "un-
reasonable"), overruled by Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 303-04. One commentator has argued that the
reasonably necessary limitation restricts the mineral owner's "paramount interest in the real
property," so the mineral estate is not truly dominant. See Phillip E. Norvell, The Coal and
Lignite Lease Compared to the Oil and Gas Lease, 31 ARK. L. REV. 420, 443 (1977) (asserting that
mineral owner does not have right to destroy surface).
80. See Gabrielson v. Central Serv. Co., 5 N.W.2d 834, 838-39 (Iowa 1942) (reasoning
that undisputed fact of mine cave-in was sufficient to establish lack of support for surface and
affirming lower court's award of damages to surface owner for injuries to house caused by
mineral owner's failure to provide adequate subjacent support); Penman v. Jones, 100 A.
1043, 1045 (Pa. 1917) (finding that general conveyance of coal, machinery, fixtures, tools, and
so on does not grant mineral owner release from absolute obligation to support surface); Cole
v. Signal Knob Coal Co., 122 S.E. 268, 269-70 (W. Va. 1924) (noting that surface owner's
absolute right of surface support derives from legal doctrine "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,"
or "so use your property as not to injure the rights of another," and awarding damages to
surface owner for loss of horse that fell through opening in surface caused by coal mining).
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 820 (1979). The section provides:
(1) One who withdraws the naturally necessary subjacent support of land in an-
other's possession or the support that has been substituted for the naturally neces-
sary support is subject to liability for a subsidence of the land of the other that was
naturally dependent upon the support withdrawn.
(2) One who is liable under the rule stated in Subsection (1) is also liable for harm
to artificial additions that result from the subsidence.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Breeding v. Koch Carbon, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(applying strict liability standard for damage to land and buildings caused by withdrawal of
subjacent support, unless buildings' weight contributed to subsidence); Western Coal & Min-
ing Co. v. Young, 65 S.W.2d 1074, 1075-76 (Ark. 1933) (noting that surface owner's right to
subjacent support is absolute and cause of action for subsidence damages need not be predi-
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required of the surface owner, and thus if this doctrine can be
wielded prospectively or if damages assessed are substantial enough
to serve as a deterrent to irresponsible mineral development, a sub-
jacent support rule can significantly limit easement scope.83 The ra-
tionale supporting this rule demonstrates the same pragmatic
reasoning reflected above: severance is conceived of as a significant
event evidencing intent to utilize both estates and to preserve maxi-
mum pre-mining value of the surface estate for use by the surface
owner.
84
In theory, these two limiting principles help to equalize the power
of surface and mineral owners by encouraging fair utilization of
both estates. The principles seemingly go so far as to partially in-
vert the traditional roles of the estates: the surface estate becomes
dominant and the mineral estate servient to the extent that the min-
eral owner's absolute freedom of surface action is curtailed.8 5 In
practice, however, these rules are not always wielded in a fashion
consistent with their theoretical basis. For the past century, courts
operating on the premise that mineral exploitation is a critical na-
tional priority have routinely found ways to obviate any restraining
influence reasonable use and subjacent support ideas might have on
the dominance of the mineral estate.8 6 Even the "old reliables" of
tort law, which include the doctrines of waste, nuisance, and tres-
pass, provide a surface owner no remedy in a nation hungry for nat-
cated on mineral owner negligence); Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048, 1050 (QB.
1850) (establishing absolute subjacent support doctrine by relying on earlier lateral support
jurisprudence); see also Zillman & Tyler, supra note 42, at 280-81 (tracing history of subjacent
support doctrine and noting severe view taken by English courts of land subsidence, which
resulted in courts' adoption of strict liability standard and extreme reluctance to acknowledge
even express waivers of subjacent support).
83. See Brooke v. Dellinger, 17 S.E.2d 178, 183 (Ga. 1941) (using subjacent rights theory
to preclude use of surface mining method on surface owner's land); Campbell v. Campbell,
199 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tenn. 1946) (holding miner liable for surface damage caused by loss of
subjacent support despite surface owner's construction of building on land with knowledge of
severed mining rights).
84. Breeding, 726 F. Supp. at 648-49.
85. See Norvell, supra note 79, at 439-40 (describing impact of reasonably necessary use
and absolute subjacent support rules as rendering surface and mineral estates "mutually ser-
vient" and "mutually dominant").
86. See, e.g. Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(construing 1907 conveyance language "without leaving any support for the overlying strata"
as unequivocal waiver of surface support so that longwall mining can be used by mineral
owner); Trklja v. Keys, 121 P.2d 54, 54-55 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (allowing dredge mining
for gold in creek bottoms to go forward despite concomitant destruction of surface because
such mining is "usual manner" of gold mining operations); Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (finding absolute duty of subjacent support
waived by implication in sulphur mining context because subsidence therefrom is "necessary,
natural, normal, inevitable" result of such mining); see also Vest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959,
960-61 (5th Cir. 1985) (declaring that "[s]adly for the surface owner, Texas law ... implies
that a mineral [conveyance] gives a large measure of deference to the [mineral owner's] view
of reasonableness").
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ural resources.8 7 A veritable wall of case precedent has been
constructed on the foundational social policy favoring mineral de-
velopment, and curiously, that wall is not held together by societal
or even mineral owner efforts. Instead, it is mortared in place with
the sacrifices of individual surface owners compelled to yield the
value of their land to mining companies "for the good of the
country." 88
2. The accommodation doctrine
National priorities change, however. Under pressure from in-
creasingly powerful agricultural, environmental, and surface de-
velopment interests, the precedential wall favoring mineral
development is beginning to crumble. A growing number of states
have adopted a common law principle known as "the accommoda-
tion doctrine," which builds on and transcends the traditional rea-
sonably necessary test.89 While the reasonably necessary paradigm
allows courts to focus solely on the needs and options of the mineral
owner, the accommodation doctrine mandates examination of sur-
face as well as mineral owner concerns. 90 If the mineral owner pro-
87. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (declining to
apply nuisance principles to case in which secondary removal of coal pillars would cause sur-
face subsidence under private landowner's house); P & N Investment Corp. v. Florida
Ranchettes, Inc., 220 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. App. 1969) (following majority of jurisdictions'
rule that one of several co-owners of mineral estate may develop minerals without consent of
other co-owners; extraction of minerals is material and continuing destruction of substance of
mineral estate and therefore fits definition of waste, but majority rule views stream of income
generated by property as important element of property ownership, so harm to property itself
is less valued than harm to stream of income generated by property); Wiggins v. Brazil Coal &
Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 960 (Ind. 1983) (refusing to apply trespass on case cause of
action to situation in which coal company continually pumped water out of strip mine and
thereby drained artificial lake that surface owner relied on for catfish farming and commercial
fishing purposes).
88. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (using now-famous quotes, "This is the
case of a single private house," and "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law" to strike down mining act that would have protected plaintiff's home from min-
ing-induced damage generated by privately owned mining company); Chartiers Block Coal
Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893) (stating that it "would be a great public wrong" to
prevent extraction of minerals, wherever they might be found).
89. See infra notes 100-15, 116-25, 126-33, 134-40, 141-49 and accompanying text
(describing accommodation theory adopted by Texas, Utah, North Dakota, Arkansas, and
West Virginia, respectively); see also Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374, 383 (La. 1988) (Dennis,
J., concurring) (citing favorably Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, landmark accommodation doctrine case
from Texas, in dispute between Louisiana oil and gas drillers and oyster bed lessees); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894, 896 (N.M. 1985) (promulgating Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones doctrine in severed oil and gas dispute in New Mexico).
90. See Bruce Kramer, Conflicts Between the Exploitation of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The Case for
Reciprocal Accommodation, 21 Hous. L. REV. 49, 60-61 (1984) (classifying reasonably necessary
test as "unidimensional" analysis focusing solely on mineral owner activities to determine
scope of mineral easement, whereas accommodation doctrine is "multidimensional" ap-
proach that examines rights and duties of both mineral and surface owners).
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poses to use a mining method that will interfere with an existing
surface use, the accommodation doctrine compel; the mineral
owner to utilize reasonable alternative mining methods, if such
methods exist. 9' Generally, it does not matter that the alternative
methods cost more to implement than the proposed method, so
long as the alternative cost is reasonable.92
This surprising infringement on previously nigh-inviolable min-
eral rights reflects a more balanced policy choice than previously
evinced. Rather than favoring mineral exploitation at the expense
of all else, the accommodation doctrine "serve[s] the public policy
of developing our mineral resources while, at the same time, permit-
ting the utilization of the surface for [other] productive ... uses."9 3
The accommodation doctrine is more equitable than the dominance
doctrine because it facilitates wider wealth distribution and broader
land utilization.94 Preference for mining activity is not completely
subsumed, however. The accommodation doctrine carefully pre-
serves mineral estate dominance by assigning the burden of proving
the existence of mining method alternatives to the surface owner,
and by providing that if no reasonable alternative exists, the mineral
owner may implement his or her proposed surface use despite the
fact that it interferes with the surface owner's use of his or her
land. 95
The accommodation doctrine is clearly a manifestation of the
common law's ability to adapt to changing societal conditions.9 6
Significantly, the doctrine first evolved in a western setting under
91. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (examining development of accommo-
dation doctrine in Texas and explaining mechanism by which mineral estate dominance is
retained despite accommodation theory's encroachment on traditional dominance).
92. See, e.g., infra note 109 (explaining differential in cost of drilling methods in Texas
accommodation doctrine case).
93. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622-23 (Tex. 1971).
94. Mineral estate dominance allows the mineral owner to use her land in any way she
deems necessary to make it profitable, so long as the use meets the reasonably necessary
requirement. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (explaining reasonably necessary
standard). It follows that the surface owner will not be able to use her land to the greatest
advantage for her, because her use is subject to the mineral owner's decisions. Equalizing the
power of the two estates will give surface owners more discretion in making land use deci-
sions, thereby potentially redistributing some of the mineral owner's wealth to the surface
owner. See Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622 (compelling mineral owner to accommodate surface
owner's farming activities even if mineral owner's costs increase).
95. See infra notes 109-10, 131-33 and accompanying text (explaining burden of proof
assignment promulgated by Texas and North Dakota courts in accommodation context).
96. For examples of common law adaptations to evolving social conditions, see State v.
Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678-79 (Or. 1969) (Denecke, J., concurring) (using creative "custom"
argument to find that dry sand area between mean high tide line and visible line of vegetation
on entire Oregon coastline belongs to state and cannot be privately owned: it is for public
use, despite overwhelming precedent to contrary); Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189
(Wis. 1982) (granting cause of action to owner of solar-heated home to prevent neighbor's
construction of house that would block solar collector; stating that old policies supporting
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the influence of powerful agricultural interests.97 Also significant is
the fact that accommodation ideas developed in the context of oil
and gas drilling rather than in the arena of hard mineral develop-
ment.98 Because the Model Act codifies a version of the accommo-
dation doctrine99 and is suggested for use in all states and for all
types of minerals, it is important to understand the functional dy-
namics of these factors. A basic understanding may be obtained by
examining the implementation of the accommodation doctrine in a
number of states.
a. Birthplace of accommodation
Texas blazed the trail in the development of accommodation the-
ory by advancing the prototypical doctrine in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones.100
In the case, Jones, the surface owner, used a self-propelled irriga-
tion system requiring seven feet of surface clearance to water his
cotton fields.101 Getty Oil, one of several mineral owners, installed
two oil pumps exceeding seven feet in height that obstructed the
operation ofJones' machine.10 2 Two other oil companies produced
oil from underneath Jones' land without interfering with his irriga-
tion system: Amerada Petroleum used hydraulic pumping units that
were only a few feet high, and Adobe Oil sunk beam-type units simi-
courts' reluctance to provide protection for sunlight access are "no longer fully accepted or
applicable. They reflect factual circumstances and social priorities that are now obsolete.").
97. SeeJomN S. LoWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 180 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones was first articulation of accommoda-
tion doctrine as separate analysis from reasonably necessary test). Of all major mineral pro-
ducing states in America, western states were the ones most likely to launch a doctrine such as
this because cattle ranching, crop farming, and other agricultural interests are major busi-
nesses in those states in the same areas that mining and drilling take place. In the Appalach-
ian Basin, much of the mining occurs in and under mountainous timberland that is largely
unsuitable for farming or livestock ranching and in fact is primarily wilderness. Where there
is no conflict between powerful opposing interests, there is little incentive to change the status
quo, and thus eastern states' severance jurisprudence lags behind western states' in this con-
text. Compare infra notes 100-33 (examining western accommodation doctrine developments)
with infra notes 141-49 (analyzing accommodation doctrine developments in West Virginia,
representative eastern state).
98. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining existing differences between oil
and gas and hard mineral extraction in terms of financing, equipment and transport require-
ments, and development periods). Because hard mineral development tends to require a
more substantial and more risky financial commitment than does oil or gas drilling, 4 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF MINING, supra note 7, §§ 122.02-03, courts may be less willing to infringe on long-
settled understandings between surface and mineral owners, regardless of the inequities of
the situation.
99. See infra notes 233-41 and accompanying text (describing quasi-accommodation doc-
trine adopted by Model Act).
100. 470 S.W.2d 618 (rex. 1971); see Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136
(N.D. 1979) (describingJones as "set[ting] forth what has become known as the 'accommoda-
tion doctrine' "); LOWE, supra note 97, at 180 (stating thatJones was first manifestation of dis-
crete accommodation doctrine).
101. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 620 (rex. 1971).
102. Id.
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lar to those used by Getty into concrete cellars to provide clearance
forJones' system.' 0 3 The lease granting out Getty's mineral estate
did not specify the type of oil pumps that could be installed on the
land, but it did contain a clause requiring the mineral owner to bury
any pipelines below ordinary plow depth, 10 4 which could be con-
strued as evidence of intent to allow farming to exist in tandem with
mining.' 05
Jones brought suit to enjoin Getty's use of the pumps and for
damages, and Getty argued that the easement required by its pumps
met the long-established reasonably necessary limitation on mineral
estate dominance.10 6 The court was not persuaded by Getty's argu-
ment, and stated:
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the estab-
lished practices in the industry there are alternatives available...
whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable
usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by
the [mineral owner]. 10 7
In the interest of realizing maximum benefit from both surface and
mineral lands, the court assigned the surface owner a right "to an
accommodation between the two estates."10 8 The court stressed
that this accommodation does not entail a balancing of surface
owner harm or inconvenience against mineral owner options; in-
stead, the surface owner must prove that the mineral owner's sur-
face use is not reasonably necessary by showing that reasonable
mining alternatives exist. 09 If the surface owner cannot carry this
103. Id.
104. Id. at 621.
105. But see id. at 625 (McGee, J., dissenting) (construing lease provision as explicitly de-
lineating all and only mining equipment required to be buried beneath land surface because
"it is elementary that an express stipulation upon a matter excludes the possibility of an impli-
cation upon the same subject").
106. Id. at 621.
107. Id. at 622.
108. Id. at 623.
109. See id. at 627-28 (on motion for rehearing) (clarifying that initial issue is not question
of inconvenience to surface owner, but rather is evidentiary issue as to whether surface owner
is able to carry burden of proving mineral owner's surface use is unreasonable). The court
stated, somewhat tautologically, that the reasonableness of a mineral owner's access easement
-may be measured by what are usual, customary and reasonable practices in the industry
under like circumstances of time, place and servient estate uses." Id. at 627. Thus, accommo-
dation must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. (hypothesizing as to potential dif-
ference in determined reasonableness of given mining use as applied to "bald prairie used
only for grazing" versus use "within an existing residential area. . ., campus . . ., or irrigated
farm").
By structuring the accommodation doctrine so that the issue of reasonable alternative min-
ing methods is a question of fact that must be proven by the surface owner, the Texas
Supreme Court preserved the dominant status of the mineral estate. See Kramer, supra note
90, at 65-66 (discussing Texas jurisprudence in context of North Dakota case). The court was
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burden of proof, then the mineral owner may proceed with the
planned surface use, and if the surface owner does meet the burden,
then a balancing of the options available to each party ensues. 110
Here, Getty clearly had two other reasonable options available while
Jones had none,"' so the court remanded the case for findings con-
sistent with the new doctrine. 112
The factors motivating the majority's promulgation of this new
accommodation doctrine were twofold. First, Texas had adopted a
policy favoring agricultural as well as mining activities, so the court
had legislative support to bolster its decision."13 Second, disputes
between surface and oil and gas owners in Texas arose infrequently,
apparently because drillers routinely accommodated surface uses to
avoid altercations of this sort. 114 In light of the latter factor, per-
haps the majority did not think its decision would cause the "tidal
not reluctant to impose restrictions on the mineral owner, however, as evidenced by its will-
ingness to uphold accommodation despite the increased costs the mineral owner would incur
in utilizing alternate mining methods. See Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622 (reprinting petroleum
engineer's and contract pumper's expert testimony that oil pump cellars would cost less than
$12,000 to install and would have lower maintenance costs than surface pumping units, and
that hydraulic pump installation would cost approximately $5000 more than installation of
Getty's offending pumps and would run extra $350 to $1000 to operate each year). Appar-
ently, increased costs for the alternative mining methods are acceptable as long as they are
adjudged to be reasonable. See id. (introducing discussion of expert witness testimony by
stating that "there was evidence to show that [Getty) had reasonable alternatives for obtaining
its oil").
110. Id at 627-28 (Steakley, J., on motion for rehearing). If the surface owner fails to
establish the existence of usual, customary, and reasonable alternative mining methods, then
the analysis reverts to the unidimensional question "whether the proposed [mining] use is
nonnegligent and will enhance mineral production" (i.e., the reasonably necessary test).
Mansfield, supra note 44, at 71.
111. See Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622-23 (discussing acute, persistent farm labor shortage that
compelled Jones' decision to purchase automatic sprinkler system in 1963; examining suitabil-
ity of substitutes such as manual or reversible automatic irrigation systems; finding each sub-
stitute to be unrealistic because of labor shortage or loss in irrigation time).
112. Id at 618, 623 (affirming lower court's reversal and remand of state district court's
granting of Getty Oil's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto).
113. See id. at 622-23 (discussing Texas public policy of developing minerals in tandem
with surface utilization for productive agricultural uses); see also id. at 622 (quoting court's own
recently articulated recognition that surface soil has value as natural resource in its own right,
per Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (rex. 1971), which states: "[the mineral estate]
owner is entitled to make reasonable use of the surface for the production of his [or her]
minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated, however, that the utility of the surface for agricul-
tural ... purposes will be destroyed or substantially impaired.") (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 628 (Steakley, J., on motion for rehearing) (taking judicial notice of exist-
ence of very few conflicts between surface and mineral owners on more than 378,000 oil and
gas wells operating in Texas and noting "usual and customary" practice of oil and gas opera-
tors is to "take due consideration" of servient surface owner uses; examples are Amerada's
and Adobe's conduct in this very case); see also Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral
Owners-What Happens When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D. L. REv. 41, 63-67
(1987) (surveying severed oil and gas disputes in Michigan and Oklahoma and finding that in
both states, general agreement exists that oil industry should, and routinely does, pay com-
pensation for surface damages above and beyond compensation bargained for in severance
documents).
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wave" of conveyance reinterpretation foreseen by the dissent.' 15 If
the Jones decision did not generate a stir in the realm of Texas oil
and gas severances, however, it certainly has given rise to a nation-
wide wave that is sweeping away the old reasonably necessary test
and replacing it with the accommodation doctrine.
b. The wave begins
In Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 116 Utah followed Texas' lead by
adopting the accommodation doctrine in the context of an oil and
gas versus agriculture dispute. Flying Diamond, the mineral owner,
wanted to build a road across the surface owner's clover and alfalfa
fields to access its oil well." 7 Rust, the surface owner, suggested
that the road enter his land from the north to minimize surface dam-
age and not interfere with land irrigation." 8 Flying Diamond con-
sidered Rust's suggestion but proceeded to build the road coming
in from the east, which used six acres of farmland and prevented the
irrigation of another fifteen acres.' 19 The court held Flying Dia-
mond liable for the value of the twenty-one acres of land rendered
unusable for agricultural purposes, and for the crops thereon, be-
cause an alternate, less damaging route for the access road existed
but was not used.' 20
To reach this conclusion, the court reasoned that each severed
estate holder "should have the right to the use and enjoyment of his
[or her] interest in the property to the highest degree possible not
inconsistent with the rights of the other."' 2 1 To define the meaning
of "not inconsistent with the rights of the other," the court cited
Jones for the proposition that a mineral owner should use alternative
methods to minimize damage to the fee holder, although he or she
need only use alternatives deemed "reasonable and practicable
under the circumstances." 122 This language seemingly indicates
Utah's acceptance of the accommodation doctrine, but the court
115. See Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 626 (McGee, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe oil and gas
lease becomes a mere letter in the sand, to be washed away by the tidal wave which will be
caused by the majority holding").
116. 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).
117. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 512.
121. Id. at 511.
122. Id. Interestingly, Utah is careful to use the term "fee holder" rather than "surface
owner" to indicate the owner of the "surface estate." Id. The terms "surface owner" and
"surface estate" are widely used but are problematic because they fail to convey that the sur-
face owner's interest is a remainder interest in many cases, in that once mineral extraction
terminates, the surface estate will again extend from the depths into the sky. See Fox, supra
note 5, at 818 (highlighting imprecise use of term "surface estate"). Thus "fee holder" is a
[Vol. 42:607
1993] MODEL SURFACE USE ACT 635
failed to delineate the parameters Texas used to confine the doc-
trine. The opinion does not mention the consequences of higher
costs for alternate mining methods, nor does it clarify which party
must introduce evidence of alternate uses.123 Presumably, Rust es-
tablished the feasibility and impact of the alternate road at trial, and
perhaps the court therefore decided that the surface owner's burden
of proof requirement had been fulfilled. Significantly, the court ex-
plicitly examined the magnitude of harm suffered by Rust and did
not analyze Flying Diamond's reasons for building the road where it
did. 12 4 This consideration of surface owner concerns is sufficient to
establish the court's analysis as something more than the reasonably
necessary test, because that test focuses solely on mineral owner op-
tions.125 Thus Utah has adopted the accommodation doctrine, al-
beit in a somewhat equivocal fashion.
c. Point of clarification
North Dakota also followed Texas' lead, but the state adopted a
clearer Texas-style accommodation doctrine than did Utah. In Hunt
Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh,126 the North Dakota Supreme Court explicitly
adopted the accommodation doctrine set forth in Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones.127 In the case, Kerbaugh, the surface owner, failed to provide
evidence that reasonable alternatives to seismic mapping existed for
Hunt Oil, the mineral owner, to use in exploring for oil.128
Kerbaugh proved only that Hunt Oil's seismic activity disrupted the
flow of a spring he used for domestic and agricultural purposes and
left open holes and debris on his property.' 29 The Flying Diamond
decision had implied that these factors should be weighed when de-
more accurate term to indicate this property interest: kudos to Utah for its precise
terminology.
123. Compare Flying Diamond, 551 P.2d at 511-12 (failing to specify details of mineral
owner's duty to use reasonable and practical alternatives) with Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470
S.W.2d 618, 622-23, 627-28 (Tex. 1971) (setting forth clear requirement that surface owner
must present evidence as to existence of reasonable alternative mining methods and that in-
creased cost for alternative use is acceptable, presumably so long as it is reasonable).
124. Flying Diamond, 551 P.2d at 511-12.
125. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining unidimensionality of reasonably
necessary test and multidimensionality of accommodation doctrine).
126. 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
127. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979) (stating, interest-
ingly, that "[w]ejoin with the Utah court in adopting the accommodation doctrine set forth in
Getty [Oil Co. v. Jones]"). The court thus does not appear to be as troubled by the lack of
substantive detail in the Utah opinion as I am.
128. See id. at 137 (suggesting alternatives that Kerbaugh might have introduced as includ-
ing prior geophysical exploration or aerial mapping (i.e., method that would not "travers[e]
over cropland")).
129. Id. at 133.
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termining accommodation, 30 so the court in Hunt Oil took action to
clarify the analysis. Because a "pure balancing test is not involved
under the accommodation doctrine where no reasonable alterna-
tives are available," 31 the court refused to consider Kerbaugh's
harm in deciding that Hunt Oil would not be required to accommo-
date Kerbaugh's surface uses.13 2 The court made clear that only
when alternatives are shown to exist is a balancing of' the mineral
and surface owners' interests mandated.' 3 3 In the absence of such a
showing, the mineral owner's implied access easement will expand
to allow the reasonably necessary mining use.
d. Prospective surface uses
In its purest form, the accommodation doctrine protects a surface
owner's existing surface uses only.' 34 Arkansas has taken the doc-
trine a step farther, however, by using it to protect a surface owner's
proposed surface use. In Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips,'3 5 the
Arkansas Supreme Court awarded damages to the Phillipses, surface
owners, because Diamond Shamrock, the mineral owner, drilled a
gas well on the precise location the Phillipses had selected for their
130. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (noting court's focus in Flying Diamond
on surface owner harm in accommodation analysis that does not clearly delineate doctrinal
parameters, thereby leaving impression that accommodation is simply balancing of surface
and mineral owner circumstances, whether or not, perhaps, surface owner has carried burden
of proving existence of reasonable alternative mining methods).
131. Hunt Oil, 283 N.W.2d at 137.
132. Id.
133. See id., stating:
[A] pure balancing test is not involved under the accommodation doctrine where no
reasonable alternatives are available. Where alternatives do exist, however, the con-
cepts of due regard and reasonable necessity do require a weighing of the different
alternatives against the inconveniences to the surface owner. Therefore, once alter-
natives are shown to exist a balancing of the mineral and surface owner's interest
does occur.
Id.
134. See Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (stating that accommo-
dation may be required "where there is an existing use by the surface owner" that would be
impaired) (emphasis added); id. at 627-28 (holding that "in determining the issue of whether a
particular manner of use of the dominant mineral estate is reasonable or unreasonable, we
cannot ignore the condition of the surface itself and the uses then being made by the servient
surface owner") (emphasis added). The phrase "uses then being made" underscores that
accommodation applies to current surface uses only. An authority in the field of oil and gas
law has summarized the accommodation doctrine (in its purest form) as follows:
[W]here a severed mineral interest owner or lessee asserts rights to use of the surface
that will substantially impair existing surface uses, the mineral owner or lessee must
accommodate the surface uses if he [or she] has reasonable alternatives available....
[Trhe accommodation principle is limited by three requirements: (1) there must be
an existing surface use; (2) the proposed use must substantially interfere with the
existing surface use; and (3) the lessee must have reasonable alternatives available.
LOWE, supra note 97, at 181-82 (citingJones).
135. 511 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974).
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retirement home.' 3 6 Diamond Shamrock had agreed to drill the
well elsewhere and had filed public notices to that effect, but for
unspecified reasons the company ultimately drilled exactly where it
had promised it would not. 3 7 The court found this behavior to be
unreasonable in light of the existent alternative well sites Diamond
Shamrock had stated it would use and therefore awarded the Phil-
lipses actual damages for diminution in value of their property.'3 8
The paper trail left by Diamond Shamrock made this an easy case,
possibly one resolvable without the invocation of the accommoda-
tion doctrine. 3 9 Nevertheless, Arkansas' expansion of the doctrine
to protect future surface owner uses is doctrinally significant be-
cause it acknowledges that mining activity can seriously curtail sur-
face rights by precluding secure surface development for the
duration of potential mineral exploitation.' 40
136. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160, 161, 164 (Ark. 1974).
137. See id. at 162 (discussing two notices drillers are legally required to file in Arkansas:
first, notice of intent to drill accompanied by plat showing proposed location of well, and
second, completion report upon consummation of well; Diamond Shamrock filed both notices
and each showed location of well in pasture behind Phillipses' homesite, but actual well was
drilled directly on homesite). If the drilling easement in this situation is considered to be an
easement implied by necessity, then typically the servient estate owner is allocated the first
chance to select the right-of-way location. If the servient and dominant estate owners do not
agree on easement placement, then a court must settle the issue. See Hancock v. Henderson,
202 A.2d 599, 603 (Md. 1964) (holding that location of easement implied by necessity may be
decided by court in absence of agreement between parties in manner least burdensome to
servient tenement); Higby Fishing Club v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 79 A. 326, 326-27 (N.J.
1911) (asserting court's jurisdiction to determine parties' rights by locating easement if par-
ties cannot agree on easement placement). Ostensibly, the parties in this case had agreed on
the location of the oil well. See Diamond Shamrock, 511 S.W.2d at 161 (reciting Mr. Phillips'
testimony that Clovis Moody, Diamond Shamrock official who died before trial, had assured
him that well could be drilled in pasture behind homesite). Possibly, communications be-
tween various Diamond Shamrock employees could have gone awry, especially in light of Mr.
Moody's death, because he had been the party discussing easement location with Mr. Phillips.
Id. at 164.
138. See Diamond Shamrock, 511 S.W.2d at 163-64 (reasoning that because Diamond Sham-
rock had inflicted permanent damage on Phillipses' homesite, measure of damages equals
difference between before- and after-damage value of property, which is diminution in value
measure). The court considered but declined to award punitive damages because "[g]ross
negligence, without willfulness, wantonness, or conscious indifference, does not justify inflic-
tion of punitive damages," id. at 164, and the plaintiffs here failed to establish "willfulness,
wantoness, or conscious indifference" on the part of Diamond Shamrock. Id-
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (pointing out difference between Diamond
Shamrock's stated conduct and documented actual conduct). Based on the notices and
records Diamond Shamrock filed with the state, presumably the Phillipses could have won this
case in a simple negligence action, and if they could have proven malicious intent or conscious
indifference, they perhaps could have obtained punitive damages as well.
140. Ifa mineral developer need only accommodate existing surface uses, per Getty Oil Co.
v. Jones, then a surface owner who had planned to construct an apartment complex or a horse
farm on the surface ten years into the future may not be able to do so because the mining
easement either has harmed or may harm her proposed development location. If the parties
have freely and knowledgeably agreed to such an arrangement in the severance instrument,
then there is nothing unjust about this result. If the surface owners hold title under an old
ambiguous conveyance document, however, and mineral development has not yet or not re-
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e. Hard mineral application
The foregoing cases demonstrate that the accommodation doc-
trine has gained fairly wide acceptance in the context of oil and gas
drilling. 141 Doctrinally there is nothing explicitly or implicitly re-
stricting accommodation to this context, so West Virginia under-
took to expand the theory's application into the realm of coal
mining. Surprisingly, West Virginia's conception of accommoda-
tion suggests a broad doctrine favoring surface owners to a greater
extent than does the Texas version. In Buffalo Mining Co. v. Mar-
tin,142 the West Virginia Supreme Court construed an 1890 sever-
ance deed to find an implied right for the mineral owner to
construct electric lines on the surface.1 43 In reaching this result, the
court described what it implied to be the mineral owner's burden of
proving reasonable necessity of a surface use, stating that the bur-
den becomes "more exacting" in the context of implied as opposed
to express easements, requiring a showing "not only that the right is
reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral, but also that
the right can be exercised without any substantial burden to the sur-
cently occurred and thus seems unlikely, then such a result may be unfair. See Palmore &
McGuire, supra note 13, § 6.0211], at 6-3 to -4, stating:
In the usual [severance dispute] arising in the eastern United States the surface
and coal estates were severed by remote predecessors in interest and the current
surface owner may not even be aware that a coal owner exists and has rights to the
surface. It is not unusual to find a surface owner who believes that the entire fee has
been owned by his or her family for years and that anyone seeking access to the
surface is a trespasser.
Id. Mining activity, especially for hard minerals, can last for many years. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55.154 (Michie 1986) (creating presumption that no recoverable minerals exist under sur-
face tract if mineral development has not taken place for 35 years); Dethloff v. Zeigler Coal
Co., 412 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ill. 1980) (analyzing coal mining lease that, by its terms, lasted 25
years from date of deed execution and continued for so long thereafter as mineral owner
deemed necessary to extract all of coal), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Henderson v. Virden
Coal Co., 78 Ill. App. 437, 442-46 (1898) (enforcing extreme 999-year lease in coal mining
context). The Model Act itself contemplates that "ongoing mineral development" can last for
upwards of 30 years beyond the point at which initial development ceases. See infra notes 202,
223 and accompanying text (quoting Model Act's definitional language for "ongoing mineral
development").
141. See supra note 89 (listing Texas, Utah, North Dakota, Arkansas, West Virginia, Louisi-
ana, and New Mexico as states adopting some form of accommodation doctrine in oil and gas
context); see also Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Corp., 776 P.2d 736, 742 (Wyo. 1989)
(citing Getty Oil Co. v.Jones in support of proposition that Texas jurisprudence has consistently
favored dominance of mineral estate and positing that Texas law in this area is not essentially
different from developed Wyoming law). This statement may represent Wyoming's adoption
of the accommodation doctrine, although if so, the state is using it to provide the surface
owner continuing damages from the mineral owner so long as mineral development persists,
rather than requiring the mineral owner to use alternative mining methods. Mingo Oil, 776
P.2d at 742. In this sense Wyoming's "accommodation doctrine" functions more like a sur-
face damage statute than like the accommodation doctrine. See infra notes 176-80 and accom-
panying text (explaining mechanics of surface damage acts).
142. 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
143. Buffalo Mining Co..v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725-26 (W. Va. 1980).
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face owner."' 44 This requirement essentially makes the surface
owner dominant because presumably the mineral owner will not be
able to use an implied easement if he or she fails to show that it
causes an insubstantial burden to the surface owner. The court did
not carry the analysis through, however, because the surface owners
did not raise the issues of undue burden and reasonable necessity at
trial.' 45
Nevertheless, by removing the burden placed on surface owners
to show the availability of alternative mining methods, West Vir-
ginia's adaptation of the accommodation doctrine discards the sole
mechanism intended to maintain mineral estate dominance under
accommodation theory and concomitantly allows the surface estate
to become dominant. 146 It is not clear whether West Virginia in-
tended this result, 147 but it is nevertheless significant that an accom-
modation doctrine of sorts has gained the approval of an eastern
state in a hard minerals context and thatJones has been cited favora-
bly under those circumstances. Importantly, the court notes that
"[w]e do not, nor do other courts, make a distinction between the
extent of the right to surface use under coal severance deeds and oil
and gas or other mineral severances."1 48 The Model Act, perhaps
following the lead of the West Virginia court, similarly does not dis-
144. Id. This language implies that the burden of proof rests on the mineral owner be-
cause a surface owner usually would not have sufficient knowledge of a mineral owner's oper-
ations to establish that a mining method is "reasonably necessary for the extraction of the
mineral," id. at 725, even if he or she had such a perverse inclination to do so. If the burden
of proof is indeed assigned to the mineral owner, the surface owner is relieved of the some-
times onerous obligation to establish the existence of reasonable alternative mining methods.
See, e.g., Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137 (N.D. 1979) (concluding that surface
owner failed to prove existence of reasonable alternatives to mineral owner's seismic oil and
gas exploration and thus could not recover for damages caused by mineral owner's seismic
activities).
145. Id at 726.
146. See Clinton W. Smith, Note, Disturbing Suface Rights: What Does "Reasonably Necessary"
Mean in West Virginia?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 817, 821 (1983) (suggesting that West Virginia
Supreme Court is equating due regard theory with undue burden concept and thus surface is
transformed into dominant estate). The decisional language used in the Note to support this
suggestion is the court's statement that" 'a right to surface use will not be implied where it is
totally incompatible with the rights of the surface owner.'" Id. (quoting Buffalo Mining, 267
S.E.2d at 725).
147. See Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 725-26 (holding that surface easement will not be
implied when totally incompatible with surface owner rights and stating that concept it is
defining "has been most clearly articulated in oil and gas cases"; citing Flying Diamond and
Jones as examples of concept). It is not true thatJones will never imply a mining easement if it
conflicts with surface rights: in such a situation, the mineral owner may go forward with his or
her surface use. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. Thus, West Virginia seems to
have overlooked Texas' retention of mineral estate dominance within the accommodation
doctrine, so it is not clear whether the court truly intends the result to be surface estate domi-
nance or, rather, theJones result.
148. Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 726 nA (citing, as in accordance with this proposition,
Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976); Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. 1971); Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1950)).
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criminate on the basis of mineral context when determining the rel-
evance of accommodation. 149
B. Statutory Developments
Before turning to an analysis of the Model Act, a brief survey of
recent legislative developments that affect the rights and obligations
of surface and mineral owners is in order. Many states have opted
to approach severed ownership disputes via legislation rather than
through common law change, thereby precluding, perhaps, more
wide-ranging acceptance of the accommodation doctrine. 150 The
legislation can be organized into five categories: consent statutes,
lapse statutes, methods statutes, reclamation statutes, and surface
damage acts. Each of these categories will be briefly summarized
and the states adopting them noted. Familiarity with these efforts is
important in a comparative sense because each type of statute
presents dispute resolution theories and procedures that the Com-
missioners had available for incorporation into the Model Act.
1. Consent statutes
First, many states have singled out surface mining, a particularly
controversial mining method, for special legislative treatment via
"consent" statutes. Under the typical consent statute, an owner of
severed surface-minable minerals must obtain the consent of the
surface owner before mining can proceed.' 5' In effect, these stat-
149. See infra note 202 (quoting Model Act's broad definition of "mineral" as including
gas, oil, coal, sand and gravel, building stone, gemstone, clay, ores, steam and other geother-
mal resources, etc., and subjecting excavation or harnessing of all such substances to Act's
accommodation doctrine).
150. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1717, 1717-22 (1982) (arguing that legislation is much more efficient and effective way to
achieve social change than is common law). Because adoption of a Texas-style accommoda-
tion doctrine may represent a dramatic change for states previously operating solely under
the reasonably necessary test, courts may be reluctant to "legislate" the new theory, and thus
legislatures have stepped in to provide solutions for severance disputes.
151. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 9-16-5(2) (1987) (providing that surface mining permit applica-
tion shall contain statement that applicant has right by "legal estate owned" to surface mine
land, and shall explicitly reference source of that right); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-112(2)(d)
(1984) (stipulating that application for mining permit shall include source of applicant's legal
right to enter and mine land); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, para. 4506, § 5(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992) (stating that application shall contain statement that applicant has right and
power by legal estate to engage in surface mining); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-07(d)(i)
(Supp. 1991) (requiring that surface mining permit application be accompanied by agreement
signed by applicant and landowner, if landowner is different person than applicant, granting
state employees and subcontractors right of entry onto land to restore land surface if miner
fails to do so); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 444-550.1(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring that applica-
tion for strip mining permit include identification of source of applicant's legal right to strip
mine land); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1513.07(B)(2)(a)(i) (Anderson Supp. 1991) (stating that
coal mining permit application must contain names and addresses of all owners of surface and
mineral properties to be mined); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 45-6B-6(11) (1983) (stating that
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utes modify the common law dominance doctrine by giving surface
owners the power to gainsay the surface mining of their lands. Sev-
eral states with powerful mining lobbies have therefore struck down
consent statutes as unconstitutional takings of property and impair-
ments of contracts, stating that the statutes' "primary purpose and
effect.., is to change the relative legal rights and economic bargain-
ing positions of many private parties under their contracts rather
than achieve any public purpose."1 52 Many other states continue to
maintain consent statutes, however, as a means of "promoting fair-
ness and understanding between the parties." 153
2. Lapse statutes
Another type of statute frequently attacked on constitutional
grounds is the "lapse" or "dormant mineral" statute.154 Legisla-
application for mining permit must include written consent of applicant and of all others nec-
essary to grant legal access to property); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-8-205(a)(1)(F) (Supp. 1992)
(providing that surface mining permit application must include identification of source of op-
erator's legal right to enter and so mine land); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.133(6) (West
1978) (requiring permit application to include information concerning applicant's legal right
to surface mine affected land); W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-9(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (Supp. 1992) (stating
that surface mining permit must contain names and addresses of surface as well as mineral
owners, and that all record owners of surface and subsurface areas contiguous to proposed
mining area must be notified of details of such mining); Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-406(b)(xi) (Supp.
1992). The Wyoming statute contains typical consent language requiring a surface mining
permit application to include "an instrument of consent from the resident or agricultural
landowner, if different from the owner of the mineral estate, granting the applicant permis-
sion to enter and commence [the] surface mining operation, and also written approval of the
applicant's mining plan and reclamation plan." Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-406(b)(xi) (Supp. 1992).
For a discussion of Wyoming's consent statute, see Thomas Reese, Comment, The Surface
Owner's Easement Becomes Dominant: Wyoming's Surface Owner Consent Statute, 16 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 541 (1981) (discussing constitutionality of Wyoming's surface owner consent law from
perspective of takings law, federal preemption (supremacy clause), and equal protection
doctrine).
152. Department for Natural Resources & Envt. Protection v. Number 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d
684, 687 (Ky. 1975) (striking down Kentucky consent statute as unconstitutional under tak-
ings and impairment of contracts clauses of United States and Kentucky Constitutions). The
Kentucky statute required that a surface mining permit application contain:
[A] statement of consent to have strip mining conducted upon the area of land de-
scribed in the application for a permit. The statement of consent shall be signed by
each holder of a freehold interest in such land.... No permit shall be issued if the
application therefor is not accompanied by the statement of consent.
Id. at 686 (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350.060(8), repealed by 1980 Ky. Acts 62.377); see also
Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 737 P.2d 478, 484 (Mont. 1987) (striking down Mon-
tana consent statute as unconstitutional taking, violation of due process, and impairment of
contractual obligation).
153. Dycus, supra note 15, at 886; see, e.g., Cogar v. Sommerville, 379 S.E.2d 764, 767-70
(W. Va. 1989) (applying consent statute requiring surface owner consent to mining within 300
feet of surface owner-occupied dwelling unit to decades-old broad form deed that waived
surface damages and holding that statute overrides deed); see also Mansfield, supra note 44, at
78 (arguing that consent statutes make surface owner "joint venturer" with mineral owner).
154. The statutes are also labeled "merger" statutes, Truhe, supra note 11, at 415-16, or
"marketable title" statutes, Smith, supra note 7, § 16.06[2][b], at 16-40 to -41. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, see infra note 157, lapse statutes had been
frequently struck down as unconstitutional takings and due process violations. See, e.g., Wil-
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tures enact these statutes to allow ownership of mineral estates to
lapse after a specified period of nonuse and revert to either the sur-
face owner or the state. 155 States differ in specifying the parameters
of prescribed "use": "use" variously means actual or attempted
mineral development, payment of taxes, rents, or royalties, periodic
registration of ownership interests with the county clerk, or even
simply the sale of the mineral estate. 156 In general, lapse statutes
are meant to resolve uncertainties of title created by stale or aban-
doned mineral claims and to otherwise encourage mineral develop-
ment for the general welfare of a state's citizens.' 57 The Supreme
Court upheld Indiana's mineral lapse statute in Texaco, Inc. v.
Short 158 by affirming the notion that government can condition the
retention of a protectible property interest on the performance of
son v. Bishop, 412 N.E.2d 522, 524-26 (Ill. 1980) (invalidating Illinois' Dormant Mineral Act
on due process grounds because Act failed to provide notice of any kind to mineral owners
that their interests must be recorded to prevent forfeiture); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d
732, 742-46 (Minn. 1979) (striking down Minnesota Mineral Registration Act as violative of
due process clause because notice-by-publication provisions were inadequate and no hearing
was provided to noncomplying mineral owner before property became forfeited); Wheelock v.
Heath, 272 N.W.2d 768, 771-74 (Neb. 1978) (holding Nebraska lapse statute unconstitutional
as violative of due process and contract clauses to extent statute operated retroactively).
155. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 883.220 (West Supp. 1991) (providing 20-year period for
termination of dormant mineral rights); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 712.02 (Harrison 1989) (authoriz-
ing 30-year lapse period for establishing marketable title); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (Michie
1991) (outlining procedures for property owner to gain title to mineral estate by adverse
possession if owner of mineral rights neither worked nor attempted to work mineral rights
nor paid taxes due on such rights for 7-year period); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Bums
1980) (mandating 20-year period within which severed mineral estate must be used, or else
reverts to surface owner); NEB. REv. STAT. § 57-229 (1988) (asserting that severed mineral
interest will be deemed to be abandoned if it is unusued for 23-year period) (held unconstitu-
tional under due process and contract clauses of United States and Nebraska Constitutions to
extent operates retroactively in Wheelock v. Heath, 272 N.W.2d 768 (Neb. 1978)); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 1-42.1 to -42.9 (1983 & Supp. 1992) (setting forth parameters for extinguishment of
variety of "ancient" mineral rights when such interests are not being mined, are adversely
possessed, or are not listed for tax purposes for 10- to 50-year periods); Onto REV. CODE;
ANN. § 5301.56 (Anderson Supp. 1991) (specifying factors used to determine whether mineral
interest will be deemed abandoned and vested in owner of surface); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-
108(c) (Supp. 1991) (establishing procedures for extinguishment and reversion of mineral
interests to owner of surface when such interests are unused for 20-year period). The Indiana
law cited above contains typical lapse language, which states:
Any interest in coal, oil and gas, and other minerals, shall, if unused for a period of
20 years, be extinguished, unless a statement of claim is filed... and the ownership
shall revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it was carved.
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Bums 1980). This is the language held constitutional in Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525-30 (1982).
156. See Smith, supra note 7, § 16.06[2][b], at 16-46 (noting that Michigan and Ohio stat-
utes treat sale, leasing, mortgaging, or other transfer by recorded instrument as "use");
Joshua E. Teichman, Comment, Dormant MineralActs and Texaco, Inc. v. Short: Undermining the
Takings Clause, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 157, 162 (1982) (describing Indiana statute's definition of
.use" as including actual development of minerals or payment of rents, royalties, or taxes).
157. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 524 n.15 (1982) (quoting lower court opinion
explaining that purposes of Indiana lapse statute are driven in part by dependence of state on
limited fossil fuel resources).
158. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
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acts indicating intent to retain that interest.1 59 Despite the sanction
of the Supreme Court, lapse statutes are disfavored by some com-
mentators as divestitures of valuable mineral property rights with-
out due process of law.' 60 Only one state has held its lapse statute
unconstitutional since the Short decision,' 6 ' however, which indi-
cates the strength of the public policy concerns supporting the
statutes.
3. Mining methods statutes
A few states have attempted to resolve deed interpretation dis-
putes by legislatively dictating a standard rule of construction: in
broad form deeds and other ambiguous conveyance instruments, al-
lowable mining methods are restricted to those available at the time
the conveyance was executed.' 6 2 Thus if a mineral severance oc-
curred in 1892 under a broad form deed and the mineral owner
wants to longwall mine in 1992, the mineral owner will not be able
to do so because longwall mining was not a recognized mining
method in 1892.163 This legislatively imposed rule of construction
operates on the premise that the parties executing a mineral deed in
1892 could not have contemplated the destructive impact modem
mining methods have on surface estates and thus could not have
had the intent to allow such use of the surface. 1' Kentucky's first
159. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525-30 (1982).
160. See Truhe, supra note 11, at 416 (stating that after Short decision, practical effect of
lapse statutes is to render mineral property rights null).
161. See Riddleberger v. Chesapeake W. Ry., 327 S.E.2d 663, 664-68 (Va. 1985) (holding
Virginia lapse statute unconstitutional because it only applied to certain populations west of
Blue Ridge Mountains; condition had no rational relationship to presence of minerals and
thus was arbitrary).
162. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.930-.945 (Baldwin 1984) (providing that absent ex-
press delineation of allowable mining methods in coal severance instruments, intent of parties
will be construed in favor of position that coal may only be extracted by methods commonly
employed in Kentucky at time instrument was executed), held unconstitutional in Akers v. Bald-
win, 736 S.W.2d 294, 309-10 (Ky. 1987), reinstated via constitutional amendment, Ky. CoNsT.
§ 19(2) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-102 (1982) (establishing rule of construction for coal
severance contracts that do not specify allowable methods of coal extraction: courts must
presume that parties to such contracts intend that minerals be mined only in fashion com-
monly used in Tennessee at time contract was executed) (held constitutional in Doochin v.
Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Tenn. 1981)).
163. See Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., 722 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (W.D. Va. 1989) (deciding
coal severance case in part on geologist's affidavit, furnished by plaintiff and undisputed by
defendant, that longwall mining was unknown in United States in 1908 and was not estab-
lished until many decades later). But see Culp v. Consol Penn. Coal Co., No. 87-1688, 1989
WL 101553, at *8, *11-12 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989) (asserting that longwall mining has been
used in Pennsylvania and around world for at least past century and supporting assertion with
quotes from multiple scholarly treatises).
164. See, e.g., Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 534-36 (Colo. 1923) (holding that severance
deed expressly granting mineral owner right to use as much of surface as is reasonably neces-
sary to sever coal does not give mineral owner right to strip mine, because "use" cannot be
construed to mean "destroy"); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ohio
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attempt at enforcing a statute of this type resulted in a court deci-
sion that the law unconstitutionally violated the separation of pow-
ers doctrine by interfering with the judiciary's role in interpreting
conveyance instruments.' 65 Kentucky voters later amended their
state constitution to include the text of the methods act, in effect
trumping the state supreme court's decision to the contrary, 165 and
the federal constitutionality of that amendment has been upheld, at
least in part. 167 One other state operates under a similar act that
has passed state constitutional muster, 16 but this approach to
resolving severance disputes is much criticized and has not gained
wide acceptance.' 69
1974) (construing deed containing no express language regarding allowable coal mining
methods and stating that "the right to 'use' the surface cannot be reasonably construed as the
right to destroy [the surface]"); Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. 1970) (refusing
to imply surface mining easement unless mineral owner could positively demonstrate that
parties to deed agreed to authorize practices that could potentially result in total destruction
of surface); supra note 79 (providing analogous cases from Alabama, Pennsylvania, and
Kentucky).
165. See Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 309-10 (Ky. 1987) (striking down Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 381.930-.945 (Baldwin 1984), Kentucky's version of mining methods statute,
which prohibited strip mining under provisions of broad form deeds).
166. In 1988, Kentucky voters participated in a state referendum on coal mining conflicts
and passed, by 83% of the vote, a constitutional amendment that retroactively imposed a
special rule of construction on coal conveyances. Bratt & Greenwell, supra note 10, at 9-10.
In the absence of express conveyance language or surface owner permission, the amendment
limits construable mining methods to those commonly known at the time the mineral estate is
severed from the surface estate. Ky. CONST. § 19(2). The amendment provides:
In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever the surface
and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a right to extract miner-
als, which fails to state or describe in express and specific terms the method of coal
extraction to be employed, or where said instrument contains language subordinat-
ing the surface estate to the mineral estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the in-
strument was that the coal be extracted only by the method or methods of commer-
cial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at
the time the instrument was executed, and that the mineral estate be dominant to the
surface estate for the purposes of coal extraction by only the method or methods of
commercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area
affected at the time the instrument was executed.
Ky. CONST. § 19(2). This language is identical to the language of the statute struck down in
Akers, 736 S.W.2d at 308; its enactment is a clear repudiation of that decision. It seems un-
likely that Kentuckians really want to limit miners to the use of turn-of-the-century mining
methods only, but by amending their state constitution in this fashion, the voters sent a clear
message that they were unhappy with the courts allowing large-scale surface and mountaintop
mining to go forward under century-old mineral conveyances.
167. See United States v. Stearns Co., 873 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1989) (remanding case
to U.S. district court for determination of Kentucky methods act amendment's (KY. CONST.
§ 19(2)) validity under U.S. Constitution), appeal after remand, 949 F.2d 223, 225-26 (6th Cir.
1991) (observing that U.S. district court had determined on remand that methods act amend-
ment was valid under U.S. Constitution on particular facts of case, and declining to reconsider
that decision or consider amendment's constitutionality in toto).
168. See supra note 162 (noting that Tennessee mining methods statute was held
constitutional).
169. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 5, at 831 n.152 (stating colorfully that in context of allowable
mining methods, "[c]ourts should not be Luddites"). Luddites were a "group of early Nine-
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4. Reclamation statutes
The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SM-
CRA) 170 and analogous state laws 171 introduce principles of formal
land use planning into the surface coal mining context by compel-
ling miners to submit land reclamation plans to government before
beginning surface mining.1 72 SMCRA provides that land affected by
mining will be restored to "a condition capable of supporting the
uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or
higher or better uses of which there is reasonable likelihood." 173
Thus surface miners must backfill mining pits to the land's original
contour, restore topsoil and replant native flora, and replace origi-
nal groundwater sources and flows.1 74 Clearly, federal and state
SMCRAs modify the traditional dominance doctrine for the benefit
of surface owners, because without the statutes, mineral owners
have no obligation to repair or restore the damage they cause in the
"reasonable" exercise' of their mining easements. 75
teenth Century English textile workers who protested lower wages and use of labor-saving
textile machines by destroying the machinery." Id (citing MALCOLM I. TomIs, THE LUDDITES
11-13 (1970)).
170. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) §§ 101-201, 401-
908, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1211, 1231-1328 (1988).
171. See John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania's Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How "Cooperative Federalism" Can Make State Regulatory Programs
More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. RFt. 903, 920-67 (1986) (examining Pennsylvania's SMCRA
analogue); Roth et al., supra note 13, at 322-42 (analyzing state SMCRAs in Kentucky, Mary-
land, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia); see also Theodore M. Vestal, The First
Decade of the Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Oklahoma,
23 TULSA L.J. 593, 601-12 (1988) (describing consequences of federal takeover of SMCRA
inspection and enforcement functions in Oklahoma).
172. See Lee W. Saperstein, An Analysis of U.S. Surface Mining Law and Its Attitude Toward
Land Use Planning, 5J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 235, 235 (1989-1990) (noting that SMCRA's introduc-
tion of land use planning principles into coal mining context (concepts such as designation of
lands as unsuitable for mining of coal or other minerals, provision for reclamation of mined
areas in conformance with area use plan, etc.) was notable because body of United States
mining law previously contained few planning precepts).
173. SMCRA § 515(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2) (1988).
174. Id. § 515, 30 U.S.C. § 1265; Saperstein, supra note 172, at 235.
175. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (explaining that mineral owner is liable for
only that use of mining easement deemed unreasonable and unnecessary, as judged by what is
usual, customary, and according to standards of industry); see also Palmore & McGuire, supra
note 13, §§ 6.05[2]-.07, at 6-28 to -41 (analyzing "substantial" changes in common law rules
induced by enactment of SMCRA and equivalent state programs).
SMCRA benefits the general public as well as surface owners. One of the central congres-
sional findings driving enactment of SMCRA was as follows:
[M]any surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that burden
and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing
the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural,
and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods,
by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural
beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life
and property[,] by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counter-
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5. Surface damage acts
Finally, a number of state legislatures have opted to enact surface
damage statutes as a means of injecting fairness into the mineral
estate dominance doctrine. Typically, these statutes hold mineral
developers strictly liable for damage to land surface and structures
caused by mining, regardless of the allocation of risk set forth in the
severance instrument and despite the fact that at common law a
mineral owner incurred no such obligation.176 In part, surface dam-
acting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural
resources ....
SMCRA § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1988). But see Huffman, supra note 15, at 203 (arguing
that SMCRA's mandatory reclamation procedures will likely lead to allocational inefficiencies
in most cases).
176. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, paras. 9651-9657 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (pro-
viding for reasonable compensation of surface owners by oil and gas developers for damages
caused to surface by drilling and production operations); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-7-1 to -6
(Burns 1980 & Supp. 1992) (establishing that any transfer of oil and gas subsurface interest
rights also transfers express rights and privileges including accountability to surface owner for
actual damage to surface resulting from subsurface operations); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-
504 (1991) (protecting surface owners by requiring oil and gas developers to compensate
surface owners for lost land value, lost agricultural production, and lost value of surface im-
provements caused by drilling operations); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1-04 (1987) (ensuring
that owners of surface will be compensated for damage to or interference with their property
and improvements thereon resulting from oil and gas development) (upheld against constitu-
tional challenge in Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 554-60 (8th Cir. 1984)); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 38-18-07.1 (1987) (stating that unless provided for in lease, mineral developer
shall annually compensate surface owner in amount equal to damages sustained to agricul-
tural activity as result of mining activity); Omo RE v. CODE ANN. § 1509.07.2 (Anderson 1986)
(requiring oil or gas well owners to restore land surface within areas disturbed by drilling and
production); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 318.1-.9 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (requiring that
oil and gas developers be responsible for plugging wells and for negotiating with surface
owners for payment of any damages caused by drilling operations) (upheld against constitu-
tional challenge in Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Okla. 1986)); S.D. CODFMED
LAws ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to -11 (1983) (mandating mineral developer payment of damages to
surface owners for injury to property or improvements thereon and for interference with use
of property due to mineral development); TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-604 (1989) (obliging oil
and gas developers to compensate surface owners for specified items including lost use of
land, damages to crops and water supplies, costs of personal property repair, and diminution
in value of surface lands and other property); W. VA. CODE § 22B-2-3 (1985) (requiring oil
and gas developers to compensate surface owners for losses incurred by surface owners as
result of drilling operations). The North Dakota statute contains typical surface damage lan-
guage pertaining to oil and gas operations, but is equally relevant in any mining context:
The mineral developer shall pay the surface owner a sum of money equal to the
amount of damages sustained by the surface owner ... for loss of agricultural pro.
duction and income, lost land value, lost use of and access to the surface owner's
land, and lost value of improvements caused by drilling operations. The amount of
damages may be determined by any formula mutually agreeable between the surface
owner and the mineral developer. When determining damages, consideration must
be given to the period of time during which the loss occurs and the surface owner
may elect to be paid damages in annual installments over a period of time; except
that the surface owner must be compensated for harm caused by exploration only by
a single sum payment. The payments contemplated by this section only cover land
directly affected by drilling operations. Payments under this section are intended to
compensate the surface owner for damage and disruption; any reservation or assign-
ment of such compensation apart from the surface estate except to a tenant of the
surface estate is prohibited.
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age statutes represent a realization that the parties profiting from
mining should bear the cost of surface damages, in contradiction to
common law rules grounded on the opposite assumption. 177 In ad-
dition, these statutes represent an admission that broad form sever-
ance deeds and other standardized conveyance instruments can
resemble contracts of adhesion, in that landowners commonly oper-
ate with much less information than do mining companies and thus
contractual allocation of damage is frequently unfair.'78 Surface
damage statutes are another type of law often challenged on consti-
tutional grounds, but many states uphold them as protective of eco-
nomic and agricultural concerns, which are cognizably valid public
purposes.1 79 The acts plainly alter the traditional relationship be-
tween mineral and surface estates by giving more power to the sur-
face estate and by deterring wasteful mining practices, thereby
encouraging equitable use of both estates.' 80
N.D. CENrT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (1987). Under traditional common law, the mineral owner
could use its implied surface easement without obligation to restore the surface, Warren Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 362-63 (Tex. 1957), or to pay compensation to
the surface owner for use thereof, Vest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1985).
177. See Polston, supra note 114, at 42-44 (noting natural tendency for courts to have
looked to implied easement jurisprudence when creating mining access easements, but argu-
ing that courts did not examine "whether the solution overshot the objective" by affording
mineral owners greater rights than necessary to further mineral estate productivity and seem-
ingly never considered possibility of conditioning mineral owners' right of access on obliga-
tion to pay for surface estate destroyed by mining operations). Professor Polston goes on to
argue that, based on his studies of Michigan and Oklahoma severance disputes in the context
of oil and gas drilling, "it is apparent that the parties who engage in the business of extracting
minerals believe that the extraction industries should bear the cost of surface damages." Id
at 67.
178. See Clarence A. Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 49, 51 (1970) (explaining that disturbing inequities resulting from mineral conveyances
arise partially because of hasty execution of deeds). Judge Brimmer argues that severance
inequities result also in part because of "the appalling practical inequality of the negotiators
who produced the situation." That is,
[o]n the one hand is an urbane, diplomatic landman, well schooled in the details of
his lease form and versed in his [mineral] landman's handbook, who is the product of
a hundred negotiating sessions this year; and on the other hand is a rancher who at
worst may be negotiating his first lease in a lifetime and who probably may have
leased the same tract a few years before on a similar form and did not get hurt be-
cause there was no development.
Id.
179. See, e.g., Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 554-60 (8th Cir. 1984) (uphold-
ing North Dakota surface damage statute in face of challenges on due process, takings, and
equal protection grounds because statute is substantially related to legitimate state interest of
protecting state agriculture and economic interests). The court held further that the surface
damage statute did not destroy mineral owners' property rights; instead, it merely imposed
economic burdens on the mineral developer. Id at 558-59.
180. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-602 (1989) (stating that "the exploration for and
development of oil and gas reserves must coexist with the equal right to the use, agricultural
or otherwise, of the surface of land within the state of Tennessee"). Requiring mineral own-
ers to pay damages can serve as an effective deterrent to wasteful easement use. See Murphy,
729 F.2d at 555 (explaining cost-benefit analysis mineral owners might engage in when con-
fronted with duty to pay for surface damage).
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The Model Act is a form of surface damage statute, although it
falls far short of imposing strict liability on mineral owners for all
mining-induced surface damage. 8 An early draft of the Act es-
poused three goals motivating enactment: (1) minimization of harm
suffered by surface estate owners, (2) prevention of potential loss of
the surface that may harm the general public by depleting available
land for agricultural or other beneficial use, and (3) amelioration of
unsettled disputes between surface and mineral estate owners so as
to avoid undue impact on mineral development itself.'8 2 The cur-
rent version of the Act is not so expressly solicitous of surface estate
rights, ' 83 but these goals are nevertheless representative of the gen-
eral concerns motivating states to adopt surface damage statutes.
III. THE MODEL ACT
The Model Act is synthesized from statutory consent, reclama-
tion, and surface damage principles and common law accommoda-
tion theory. Consent ideas are extant in provisions requiring
notification and agreement, acquiescence, or arbitration of pro-
posed mineral or surface development;' 8 4 reclamation theory in-
terjects the wisdom of advance planning into severance disputes; 8 5
surface damage tenets mandate equitable allocation of development
costs between parties;' 86 and accommodation precepts require co-
181. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text (describing Model Act's provision of
reasonable rental and consequential damages only (no compensatory or punitive damages)
for mineral owner nonaccommodation of surface owner surface uses or improvements).
182. See Stacey L. Graus, Comment, Suface Use and Damages Statutes: "Cloud"ed Constitution-
ality, 6 J. MIN. L. & POL'y 87, 87 (1990-1991) (citing language from UNIF. SURFACE USE AND
DAMAGES AcT 2 (Draft from Meeting at Kauia, Hawaii, 1989), precursor of Model Act).
183. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text (arguing that Act's stated policy of
preserving opportunities for optimum development and use of all surface and mineral re-
sources is contradicted by Act's promulgation of mineral estate dominance doctrine).
184. See infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text (providing text of Act's sections deal-
ing with indemnification of proposed mining use (§ 4) and proposed surface uses (§ 5)). The
Act does not incorporate consent jurisprudence per se, in that one of the parties does not
have to obtain the consent of the other to proceed, but the Act does provide for notification
and agreement between the parties, id., which approximates consent theory.
185. See infra notes 242-54 and accompanying text (detailing Model Act provisions that
allow accommodation requirements to be determined in advance). SMCRA is an important
statute for the Act to emulate in that it proactively handles problems before they occur, rather
than reacting to "done deals" per the common law.
186. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text (analyzing text of Model Act § 10 that
sets forth rental and compensatory damages for mineral owner nonaccommodation of surface
owner surface uses or improvements). Unfortunately, the Act's restrictive rental value ap-
proach to allocating development costs is not as equitable as the remedy provided by surface
damage statutes, which generally provide actual damage or replacement value relief for sur-
face injuries. See supra note 176 (providing text of typical surface damage statute allowing for
actual damages); see also Dycus, supra note 15, at 889-90 (arguing that "payment of money
damages may not fairly compensate the surface owner who has reasonable, but conflicting,
expectations concerning the use of his [or her] land").
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operation. 187 In theory, these concepts could be forcefully amalga-
mated to equalize the power of the two estates, and indeed, an
earlier version of the Act reflects intent to do just that.188 Unfortu-
nately, the official version of the Act has been eviscerated to the
point that its enactment in many states will only negligibly alter the
status quo.189
A. Section 1: Statement of Policy and Findings
The Model Act begins by setting forth an explicit declaration of
the policy choices motivating development and enactment of the
statute: "[t]he public policy of this State is to maximize the eco-
nomic, cultural, and environmental welfare of the people by pre-
serving all reasonable opportunities for optimum development and
use of all surface and mineral resources."' 90 Inclusion of this decla-
ration is refreshing in light of the tendency of state minerals statutes
to leave off policy explanations.19 1 Interestingly, the drafters want
to "maximize . . . economic, cultural, and environmental wel-
fare." 192 Considering the mathematical impossibility of maximizing
three dependent variables simultaneously, 193 this statement is per-
187. See infra note 233 and accompanying text (setting forth text of § 3(b) of Model Act
that, in conjunction with § 2(1)'s definition of accommodation, specifies parameters of Act's
accommodation doctrine).
188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (providing language of Model Act draft
from 1989 that stressed surface equity).
189. See infra notes 300-49 and accompanying text (analyzing application of Model Act in
two states with common law accommodation doctrines and in two states without common law
accommodation doctrines, and finding minimal impact in each case).
190. MODEL SURFACE USE AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOMMODATION ACr § 1(a) (Supp.
1992) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The section provides:
§ 1. Statement of Policy and Findings.
(a) The public policy of this State is to maximize the economic, cultural, and en-
vironmental welfare of the people by preserving all reasonable opportunities for op-
timum development and use of all surface and mineral resources. To that end, it is
declared that where mineral estates are severed from surface estates by grant or res-
ervation it is the public policy of this State to: (i) facilitate responsible development
of surface and mineral estates by quantifying so far as practical the surface and min-
eral rights and burdens arising from the severance of the estates; (ii) encourage ac-
commodation of potentially conflicting interests by agreement; and (iii) provide
expeditious procedures for defining and quantifying rights and obligations of owners
of severed estates whenever uncertainties exist and conflicts arise.
Id.
191. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-168 (Michie 1991) (setting forth seven-year adverse
possession timetable but neglecting to enunciate reasons for enacting statute); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (Anderson Supp. 1991) (supplying 20-year lapse statute period, but
failing to explain reasons for prescribing such period); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-153 to -155
(Michie 1986) (establishing 35-year lapse statute period without mention of underlying policy
considerations for creation of period).
192. MODEL Acr § 1(a).
193. Economic, cultural, and environmental concerns are inextricably intertwined. For
example, if environmental concerns are "maximized," that is, given priority above all else, a
coal company may no longer be able to sell high sulfur coal on the market, which would force
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haps meant to suggest an ordering of priorities: economic welfare
first, cultural second, and environmental third. Without explicit
enunciation of precedence, a "plain meaning" argument could be
advanced to support highest priority maximization of any of the
factors.
Ostensibly, the Act's central policy statement values surface de-
velopment on a par with mineral development. If this is true, the
Act will certainly transform existing relations between surface and
mineral owners. 94 To attain this seemingly equitable goal, the Act
proclaims three ancillary policies to: (1) quantify surface and min-
eral rights and obligations, (2) encourage accommodation, and (3)
provide efficient severance dispute resolution procedures.195 In the
interest of efficiency, the drafters were careful to protect the Act
from the multitude of constitutional challenges that have plagued
statutes of this sort. 196 This is handled by section 1(b) upon enact-
ment, so that adoption of the Act qualifies its policies within the
purview of the enacting state's police power.197 Strangely, this pro-
vision can be used to essentially delegate a private power of eminent
domain to mineral owners for surface access use and as such will be
discussed further below.' 98
it to go out of business, causing subsequent economic loss for the coal company's employees
and cultural loss in the coal community's way of life. See McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. EPA,
622 F.2d 260, 263-67 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding Clean Air Act against constitutional chal-
lenge from low sulfur Kentucky coal company wanting to sell coal in Ohio high sulfur coal
producing region; Clean Air Act required Ohio utilities to (1) burn low !;ulfur fuel, or (2)
install flue gas desulfurization system (scrubbers); all utilities chose less expensive low sulfur
option, so EPA invoked § 125 of Clean Air Act to protect local/regional coal industry, i.e.,
Ohio coal companies, that could only mine and produce high sulfur coal; result was that all
Ohio utilities had to buy Ohio coal and install scrubbers to meet Clean Air Act requirements).
Congress enacted § 125 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7425 (1988), not in response to
environmental concerns, but rather out of concern for the potential economic and cultural
hardships that could be inflicted on regions by the Clean Air Act, as in this example regarding
the Ohio high sulfur coal industry. See 123 CONG. REC. 18,458-96 (1977) (containing Senate
floor debate discussion of rationale for enacting Clean Air Act § 122, now contained in
amended form at Clean Air Act § 125).
194. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 627 (Tex. 1971) (preserving mineral
estate dominance even while granting surface owners' accommodation); Mansfield, supra note
44, at 70 (stating that "[t]he mineral estate remains dominant despite the fact that some mod-
eration of the superiority of rights [has] occurred").
195. MODEL AcT § 1(a)(i)-(iii).
196. See supra notes 152-53, 154-61, 165-69, 179 and accompanying text (relating various
constitutional questions raised by statutes that alter entrenched property interests).
197. See MODEL AcT § 1(b). This section provides:
§ 1. Statement of Policy and Findings.
(b) The [legislative body of this State] finds that this public policy can be pursued
without impairment of any constitutionally protected right of owners of severed es-
tates through the exercise of the state's police power in the manner provided in this
[Act].
Id
198. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text (arguing that even though surface
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Section 1 concludes by specifying that damages will be the sole
remedy for violation of the provisions of the Act, so that injunctions
or permit and license denials will not be available to hinder mineral
development. 1 99 After explicitly declaiming state's policy as the util-
ization of "all surface and mineral resources," this provision makes
clear that the drafters intend mineral resources to be favored. Min-
ing can never be enjoined by a surface owner under the Act, no mat-
ter how severe the anticipated mining-induced surface damage or
valuable the surface use.200 Surprisingly, this section implicitly
promulgates mineral estate dominance, in complete contradiction
to the Act's preliminary representations of estate parity. 201
B. Section 2: Definitions
Section 2 presents definitions of doctrinally critical parameters
contained in the Act to forestall inconsistent interpretations of key
provisions.20 2 Unfortunately, the drafters failed in at least three re-
spects to clearly articulate the absolutely central definition of "ac-
commodation." First, the drafters did not specify, in text or in
owner is able to bring suit for nonaccommodation against mineral owner, damages provided
by Act are so low as to fail to deter abuse of mining access easement).
199. MODEL ACr § 1(c). The section provides:
§ 1. Statement of Policy and Findings.
(c) The [legislative body of this State] declares that the purpose of this [Act] is to
provide damages as the sole remedy for violations of duties and obligations provided
by this [Act] and not otherwise to limit or restrict the right of an owner of a severed
mineral interest to engage in the development of minerals. This [Act] does not limit
or restrict action upon or issuance of any permit, license, or approval required under
other law for mineral development.
Id.
200. See id. (stating that damages are sole remedy under Act).
201. Compare MODEL ACr § 1(a) (announcing support for "optimum development and use
of all surface and mineral resources") with id § 1(c) (preserving mineral estate dominance in
Act by providing no injunctive remedy for surface owner, which implicitly means mineral es-
tate will at times take precedence over surface estate).
202. MODEL AcT § 2. This section provides:
§ 2. Definitions.
(1) "Accommodation" means the exercise of mineral development rights with
due regard for the rights of the surface owner as to surface use and improvements, if
technologically sound and economically practicable alternative methods of mineral
development exist. "Accommodate" has a corresponding meaning.
(2) "Mineral" means gas, oil, coal, other gaseous, liquid and solid hydrocarbons,
oil shale, cement material, sand and gravel, road material, building stone, chemical
substance, gemstone, metallic, fissionable and nonfissionable ores, colloidal and
other clay, steam and other geothermal resources, and any other substance defined
as a mineral by any law of this State.
(3) "Mineral developer" means the owner of a severed mineral estate or any
lessee or other person who has rights of mineral development.
(4) "Mineral development" means the full range of activity, from exploration
through production and reclamation, associated with the location and extraction of a
mineral which will cause physical damage to the surface. The term includes (i)
processing and transportation of the minerals if those operations are conducted on
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comments, which party must carry the burden of pleading and prov-
ing the existence of alternative mining methods.203 The Act draws
its definition of accommodation from Moser v. United States Steel
Corp. ,204 but ironically, that case is a quiet title rather than an accom-
modation case.20 5 Moser affirmed the holding of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones
and extended it to apply to nonspecific as well as specific mineral
conveyance situations, but at no time did the court in Moser analyze
the components ofJones' accommodation doctrine or create its own
doctrine.20 6 Getty Oil Co. v. Jones is cited in the Act as "apply[ing] or
further defin[ing] accommodation," 20 7 so perhaps it is fair to as-
sume that the drafters meant to adopt Jones' prototypical and oft-
quoted analysis as the Act's own doctrine.
If that is true, however, why would Getty Oil Co. v. Royal 208 be se-
lected to illustrate the application of accommodation theory? This
bizarre choice presents a second problem with the Act's definition
of accommodation, because Royal is an inverted example of the ac-
commodation doctrine that again does not clarify allocation of the
burden of proof.20 9 The established common law accommodation
doctrine applies in cases involving mineral owner utilization of min-
the same surface tract from which the underlying mineral is extracted; and (ii) recov-
ery of any mineral left in residue from previous extraction or processing operations.
(5) "Ongoing mineral development" means: (i) the continuation of any mineral
development that is being conducted on or under the surface; (ii) additional mineral
development that is identified in a work plan, pooling or unitization agreement, or
other document, that has been approved by an agency responsible for regulating the
mineral development; or in drilling or mining logs or other records maintained by a
mineral developer;, or (iii) the resumption or extension of mineral development
within 30 years after the previous production stopped.
(6) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, part-
nership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(7) "Surface" means the exposed area of land, improvements on the land, subja-
cent and lateral support for land and structures, and any part of the underground
actually used by a surface owner as an adjunct to surface use, such as root medium,
groundwater, and construction footings.
(8) "Surface owner" means a person who holds an interest of record in the sur-
face estate or a person in possession of the surface who holds an unrecorded interest
in the surface estate, excluding adverse claimants without adjudicated title.
(9) Except when expressly stated otherwise, "surface use or improvement"
means an existing or future surface use or improvement.
Id-
203. See id. §§ 2(1), 3(b) & cmts. (neglecting to assign burden of proof).
204. 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984); see MODEL AcT § 2 cmts.
205. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tex. 1984) (litigating
claim to quiet title to ownership of uranium ore).
206. See id. at 103-04 (failing to elaborate on accommodation doctrine jurisprudence set
forth in Jones).
207. MODEL Aar § 2 cmts.
208. 422 S.W.2d 591 (rex. Civ. App. 1967).
209. See Mansfield, supra note 44, at 70 & nn.163-64 (describing Royal as case stressing
surface owner's right to use surface so long as no "unreasonable interference" with mineral
owner's use results, and observing that decision "served notice that the Texas courts would
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eral estate dominance to gain expanded access easements, while the
surface owner invokes accommodation to mitigate the dominance
doctrine's harsh effects. 210 In Royal, however, the surface owner was
the party wanting to change the status quo by installing gates across
the mineral owner's long-established access roads, so the parties'
accommodation roles were flipped.2 11 The court in Royal balanced
the utility of surface owner versus mineral owner conduct, and with-
out delegating the burden of showing available alternatives, decided
that it was not unreasonably inconvenient to require the mineral
owner to accommodate the surface owner's gates. 212
The Act's express discussion of the balancing in Royal comprises a
third problem with its definition of accommodation.2 13 Getty Oil Co.
v. Jones and Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh make clear that a balancing of
surface and mineral owner options does not take place until after
the surface owner has successfully demonstrated the existence of
reasonable mining method alternatives. 21 4 The Act's definition
mentions nothing about this condition (which, ironically, is included
in the Jones accommodation doctrine to preserve mineral estate
dominance) and instead leaves the impression that a balancing
should occur immediately after a severance dispute arises.2 15 The
drafters probably did not intend this result, deriving as it does from
their failure to think through the burden of proof problem, but the
end result is an unclear definition of accommodation. Royal may
have been chosen as the doctrinal example to illustrate that accom-
modation can work both ways, but if that is the rationale for its se-
lection, the point is made at the expense of a clear delineation of
accommodation principles. 216 A resultant misunderstanding or mis-
no longer rubberstamp a (mineral owner's] claim of necessity"; analyzing Getty Oil Co. v. Jones
(and not Royal) as adopting accommodation doctrine).
210. See supra notes 100-33 and accompanying text (explaining accommodation doctrine
development in Texas and doctrine's use and refinement in Utah and North Dakota).
211. See Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (declining to
grant injunction sought by mineral owner to prevent installation of gates across access roads
because mineral owner's having to get in and out of truck five times rather than once to
maintain oil well was not considered unreasonable inconvenience).
212. Id. at 593-94.
213. See MODEL AcT § 2 cmts. (describing propriety of instructing jury to balance incon-
venience to mineral developer with utility to surface owner in determining accommodation).
214. See supra notes 109-10, 126-33 (delineating parameters of accommodation doctrine).
215. See MODEL AcT § 2(1) & cmts. (failing to assign burden of proof and using Royal's
"unreasonable inconvenience" balancing test to illustrate accommodation doctrine).
216. That is, while the established accommodation doctrine involves mineral owner ac-
commodation of surface owner existing surface uses, the drafters apparently wanted to ensure
surface owner accommodation of existing (and future) mineral owner surface uses. Thus,
despite the fact that Royal is not truly an accommodation doctrine case, see supra note 209, the
drafters utilized the case because it almost matched the paradigm they wanted to establish.
See Ronald W. Polston, Oil and Gas Law Developments, 10 E. MIN. L. INST. § 21.0313], at 21-11
(1989) (stating, with respect to preliminary version of Model Act, that "[t]o give an appear-
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application of accommodation theory therefore pervades the Act,
and surface owners are consequently denied the moderating effect
the doctrine can produce on mineral estate dominance. 21 7
Another confusing element contained in the Act derives from its
use of the definition of "surface use or improvement." The Act de-
clares plainly enough that, "[e]xcept when expressly stated other-
wise, 'surface use or improvement' means an existing or future
surface use or improvement. " 218 When this definition is incorpo-
rated into the definition of accommodation, the Act emulates the
Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Phillips by including a surface owner's future surface development in
the accommodation family.219 This result might lead one to believe
that a mineral owner would be routinely obliged to accommodate
future as well as existing surface developments under the Act, but
such is not the case. A close reading of the Act reveals that the only
future surface use even remotely protectible is one that can be quali-
fied under the difficult terms of section 5.220 The Act's use of the
term "surface use or improvement" is misleading because it por-
trays the expanded version of the definition as the rule when it is in
fact the exception, and simple existing surface use is the rule.
The other parameters contained in this section are defined com-
prehensively to allow universal application of the Act. The defini-
tion of "mineral" includes any substance considered valuable now
or in the future.221 "Surface" encompasses land, buildings, roads,
subjacent and lateral support, groundwater, and that part of the
subsurface used for surface-owned items such as trees and base-
ance of even-handedness the [A]ct also requires the surface owner to accommodate the min-
eral developer").
217. See supra notes 203-16, infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text (pointing out in-
consistencies and shortcomings in Act's definition of accommodation); see infra notes 229-32,
236-38, 244-45, 249-54, 258-63, 266-67, 268-81, 286-88 and accompanying text (discovering
hidden inequities in Act that favor and promulgate mineral estate dominance).
218. MODEL AcT § 2(9). Contra id. § 2 cmts. (explaining definition of accommodation by
stating "thus mineral owners or developers may not impair an existing surface use or improve-
ment") (emphasis added). Apparently, this explanation is not "expressly stating otherwise"
because it is contained in comments, not in the body of the Act. Nevertheless, if the drafters
are going to use examples to help illustrate the Act, they should strive to be more precise to
avoid misleading readers.
219. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (examining Arkansas' extension of
accommodation principles to include surface owner's proposed surface uses).
220. See MODEL Aar § 4 (providing that mineral owner need only furnish plan to accom-
modate existing and not future surface uses, but that mineral owner will be indemnified from
liability for damage to both existing and future surface uses); id. § 5 (offering means ofprotec-
tion for surface owner's proposed surface use); infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text
(explaining implications of confusing usage of proposed versus existing (and versus future)
surface improvements language in §§ 8(b) and 8(c)).
221. MODEL ACT § 2(2); see supra note 202 (reprinting text of Model Act § 2(2)).
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ments. 222 "Ongoing mineral development" is very broadly defined
to include not only existing and documented planned mining activ-
ity, but also "resumption or extension of mineral development
within 30 years after the previous production stopped. '223
C. Section 3: Easement for Surface Access and Use Accommodation
Section 3 codifies the common law mineral estate dominance doc-
trine for use in construing conveyances lacking express assignments
of estate priority.2 24 This result is foreshadowed by section l's pro-
hibition of injunctive relief, but it is nevertheless surprising to dis-
cover the Act's drafters expressly sanctioning a doctrine that is
progressively weakening. 225 The drafters could have designated the
estates mutually dominant and mutually servient, or they could have
chosen the surface estate to be the dominant estate.226 Either of
these choices would provide the surface owner a greater voice in the
placement and scope of mining access easements, while the mineral
owner's right of access could be preserved via easement by necessity
jurisprudence. 227 By promulgating the mineral dominance doc-
222. MODEL AcT § 2(7).
223. Id § 2(5).
224. Id. § 3(a). The section provides:
§ 3. Easement for Surface Access and Use Accommodation.
(a) The separation of a mineral estate with a right of mineral development from
the surface by deed, lease, or other instrument, in the absence of language in the
instrument to the contrary, establishes the mineral estate as the dominant estate and
creates an easement on and through the surface for reasonable access to the minerals
in place and for reasonable use of the surface in the development of the mineral
estate, as defined by other law of this State.
Id.
225. See supra notes 89-98, 151-80 and accompanying text (explaining accommodation
doctrine and statutory developments aimed at curtailing mineral estate dominance and inject-
ing fairness into severance disputes).
226. In 1949, one modern-thinking commentator described the mutual rights and obliga-
tions of surface and mineral owners in the following terms:
The surface and mineral estates are not only mutually dominant, but are also mutu-
ally servient estates. The surface estate is burdened with the right of access, and the
mineral estate is burdened with the right of the surface owner to insist that the sur-
face be left intact and that it not be rendered valueless for the purposes for which it is
adapted, by depletion of sub-surface or surface substances.
Eugene 0. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. LJ. 107, 113 (1949); see
also Smith, supra note 146, at 821 (stating that under West Virginia Supreme Court's decision
in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, surface estate becomes dominant); Reese, supra note 151, at
541 (arguing that under Wyoming consent statute, surface owner has dominant estate).
227. An easement by necessity is implied based on the presumption that a conveyance
would not have been made but for an understanding between the parties that each has a right
to access his or her own tract. An easement will be created by implied reservation if it can be
shown that: (1) there was an initial unity of ownership of the now severed dominant and
servient estates; (2) the mining easement is a necessity, not a mere convenience; and (3) the
necessity existed at the time of the severance of the two estates. Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d
622, 625 (rex. 1950). Obviously, easement by necessity jurisprudence makes the surface es-
tate servient to the extent of the easement, but if the surface estate is considered to be domi-
nant overall, regardless of the servitude, then perhaps the mineral owner would have to
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trine, the Act reveals itself to be targeted not to achieve "optimum
development and use of all surface and mineral resources"; 228
rather, the Act is primarily focused on maintaining the status quo of
maximizing mineral developer profit by minimizing surface owner
power to object to wasteful or destructive mining practices.
This inference is supported by the Act's failure to confront the
problem of defining the scope of the implied mining easement. The
Act sanctions a "reasonable use of the surface in the development of
the mineral estate" standard but explicitly leaves the definition of
"reasonable use" to the common law of enacting states.229 Unfortu-
nately, disagreements over the definition of "reasonable use" moti-
vate an enormous number of lawsuits, 23 0 and the Model Act does
nothing to quell this furor. Granted, it is difficult to propose guide-
lines for a factor that varies dramatically between states, depending
variously on the mineral involved, the mining methods available,
contemporaneous market factors, and the political influence of
mining or surface development interests. 231 By doing nothing
to impede iterative litigation over the meaning of "reasonable
use," however, the Act subverts its stated goal of "quantifying...
surface and mineral rights and burdens" to facilitate resource
obtain the surface owner's consent before placing or expanding an easement. This would
provide the surface estate a measure of protection beyond easement by necessity precepts,
which allow the servient estate owner first crack at placing the easement but then no control
over expansion of the easement once it is located. See supra note 137 (explaining easement
placement under easement by necessity doctrine).
228. MODEL AcT § 1(a).
229. See id. § 3 cmts. (stating that Act "does not provide a basis for deciding whether a
particular means of access or a particular use . . . is within the scope of the easement....
Decisions as to what reasonable surface uses exist for the mineral developer will continue to
be made under the common law of the state.").
230. See, e.g., Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Shepherd, 888 F.2d 1533, 1534-37
(1 th Cir. 1989) (allowing nine-acre slurry pond used for modem coal processing method to
be constructed on surface owner's timberland); Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429
S.W.2d 395, 397-99 (Ky. 1968) (failing to provide, as sought by plaintiffs, that under mineral
deed, owner of minerals had no right to remove coal by strip or auger mining), overruled by
Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 303-05 (Ky. 1987); Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387
S.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Va. 1990) (finding longwall mining reasonable mining use because would
not appreciably harm plaintiff's land, despite evidence that land would subside in five swales);
see also Van Gelder, supra note 1, at 64 (giving journalist's perspective of "reasonable use" as
follows: "Eastern Kentucky, like much of Appalachia, is virtually a polluter's theme park.
Worked over by coal companies ... the state has more than its share of... sawed-off-at-the-
knees, strip-mined mountaintops."). Van Gelder is referring, in the last part of the quote, to a
mining method called "mountaintop removal," which seems to be a prima facie unreasonable
use of land. See Van Gelder, supra note 1, at 65 (reprinting photograph of "mountaintop
removal" mining method, which involves destruction of entire surface estate).
231. See Roth et al., supra note 13, at 341-42 (analyzing treatment of coal mining subsi-
dence in six Appalachian states and concluding that differences in dispute resolution tech-
niques and assignments of rights and obligations between surface and mineral owners "may
reflect the states' political cultures and perhaps the relative political and economic clout of the
... mining industry vis-a-vis surface owners").
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development. 232
The Act's sole mechanism for limiting mineral easement scope is
contained in section 3(b).23 3 This section codifies a version of the
accommodation doctrine, giving surface owners an opportunity to
defeat proposed mining practices if alternative methods of mineral
development can be proven to exist.23 4 While the common law
accommodation doctrine compels a showing of "reasonable" alter-
natives,2 35 the Model Act requires a demonstration that "technolog-
ically sound and economically practicable" alternatives exist.2 36
The drafters presumably altered the common law test in the interest
of precision, but these new terms are as enigmatic as the reasonable-
ness standard, and beyond that, they may impose a heavier burden
on the surface owner. The Act's standard is symbiotically inter-
twined with the state of technological development and the condi-
tion of the marketplace, whereas the reasonableness test involves
free evaluation of a multiplicity of factors.2 37 By narrowing the
232. See MODEL Acr § l(a)(i). Actually, by defining the term "mineral" to include not
only oil, gas, coal, etc., but also sand and gravel, id. § 2(2), the Act is surreptitiously ex-
panding the scope of what may be considered a reasonable use of the mining easement. Many
disputes have arisen over the ownership of sand and gravel and other near-surface substances
whose extraction generally spells devastation for the surface estate. See, e.g., Watt v. Western
Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1983) (resolving dispute regarding inclusion of gravel in
reservation of "other minerals" to Federal Government under Stock Raising Homestead Act
and holding that gravel is included in reservation); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 743 (Tex.
1980) (holding, as matter of law, that lignite is "at the surface" of land and is thus part of
surface estate, and is not conveyed to mineral owner in grant of "oil, gas, and other miner-
als"). Thus, while explicitly declining to define "reasonable use" and leaving the definition to
state common law, MODEL ACr § 3(a) cmts., the Act nevertheless presumes to define "min-
eral" in such a way that even surface mining could ensue within the scope of the mining
easement, because sand and gravel cannot be mined any other way. In light of this result, it is
strange that the Act's drafters did not simply leave the definition of "mineral" to the common
law of enacting states, as they did the definition of "reasonable use," because the former
implicates the latter and thus the two should be treated consistently. States adopting the Act
should be aware of this hidden conundrum and modify the definition of mineral to match
their own common law or statutory definition.
233. MODEL AcT § 3(b). This section provides:
§ 3. Easement for Surface Access and Use Accommodation.
(b) A surface access and use easement under subsection [3](a) is subject only to
accommodation to surface uses and improvements and enlargements or curtailments
effected under Section 4, 5, 6, or 8 or by agreement.
Id.
234. ld
235. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (explaining definition of "reasonableness"
set forth in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones).
236. MODEL AcT § 2(l).
237. See Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 627 (Tex. 1971) (stating, somewhat cir-
cularly, that reasonableness of mining access easement may be measured by "what are usual,
customary and reasonable practices in the industry under like circumstances of time, place
and servient estate uses"). Presumably, the Getty standard can take into account the condition
of the marketplace in the future, not just in the present, as well as the scope and value of
surface uses, the location of the mining, any routine practices mineral developers engage in
voluntarily to accommodate surface uses, and the like. All of these factors provide a surface
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qualifying criteria for alternate mining methods to two highly tech-
nical areas, the Act makes it more difficult substantively as well as
statistically for a surface owner to prevail.23 s
The accommodation doctrine adopted by the Act also contains
the problems discussed previously regarding the confusing defini-
tion of "accommodation" and the misleading scope of the phrase
"surface use or improvement." 239 These problems manifest them-
selves in the Act's treatment of proposed mineral and surface devel-
opment in sections 4, 5, and especially 8, which are discussed below.
In an effort to clarify rights under the accommodation doctrine
before disputes arise, these provisions provide for predevelopment
approval of "enlargements or curtailments" in the mining access
easement.240 The Act's accommodation doctrine is therefore sub-
ject to these provisions and must also defer to express party agree-
ments according to the requirements of section 6.241
D. Section 4: Protection of Mineral Development
Section 4 indemnifies a mineral owner from liability for surface
damage so long as mining activities remain within the purview of the
accommodation doctrine. 242 A mineral owner can ensure that pro-
owner more "wiggle room" than would singular focus on technological and economic
conditions.
238. This statement assumes the surface owner must carry the burden of proving the
existence of alternative mining methods, despite the Act's failure to assign the burden. See
supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text. If a surface owner could previously draw on a
number of factors and now can only examine two factors in an attempt to prove the existence
of alternatives, she is statistically less likely to succeed because optional avenues have been
foreclosed. If the surface owner must rely on only technological and economic factors to
prove her case, she may have a difficult time substantively if she is not informed in these areas,
and because many laypersons do not possess detailed mineral industry knowledge, lack of
reasonableness may be a difficult burden to carry for surface owners. See Hunt Oil Co. v.
Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 137 (N.D. 1979) (finding that plaintiff did not introduce evidence
of reasonable alternatives to seismic exploration for oil and thus could not enjoin such explo-
ration, despite evidence of seismic activity's adverse effect on plaintiff's land and water
resources).
239. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text (criticizing Act's definitions of "accom-
modation" and "surface use or improvement").
240. MODEL AcT § 3(b) & cmts.
241. Id.
242. Id- § 4. This section provides:
§ 4. Protection of Mineral Development.
If a mineral developer gives each surface owner notice of proposed mineral devel-
opment, together with a plan to accommodate existing surface uses or improvements
protected by Section 3(b) or a plan satisfying requirements for a permit under fed-
eral or state law, the mineral developer is not liable for failure to accommodate sur-
face uses or improvements affected by the proposed plan unless (i) a surface owner
serves on the mineral developer a written objection to the plan within 60 days after
receipt of notice, challenges the plan by a proceeding under Section 8 and obtains a
favorable determination in the proceeding, or (ii) the mineral developer makes mate-
rial deviations from the plan which result in material injury to surface uses or im-
provements entitled to protection under the accommodation doctrine.
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posed mineral development will not give rise to liability by notifying
each surface owner of development plans and by including proce-
dures to accommodate existing surface uses, or alternatively, by in-
cluding a design consistent with state or federal mining permit
requirements, with the notification. 243 This method of indemnifica-
tion raises two important points. First, a mineral owner need only
consider existing surface uses when developing an accommodation
plan, so the mineral owner will automatically be indemnified from
liability for damage to future surface uses. 244 Second, it is not en-
tirely clear that state or federal mining permit requirements are
equivalent to mandatory accommodation procedures for surface
lands and structures. A mineral owner will most likely choose the
path of least resistance, so it is important to clearly understand
whether the former provides as much protection for the surface
owner as the latter. Unfortunately, the Act does not clarify this
matter.245
A surface owner can challenge a mineral developer's plan by
sending the developer a written objection and by subsequently initi-
ating a proceeding under section 8 of the Act.246 A mineral owner
will only be held liable for surface damages if the surface owner's
section 8 challenge succeeds or if the mineral owner materially devi-
ates from his or her plan and material surface damage results that
Id
243. Id
244. See id § 4 (requiring mineral developer to file "a plan to accommodate existing sur-
face uses or improvements" but finding that mineral developer is "not liable for failure to
accommodate surface uses or improvements affected by the proposed plan"). By explicitly
clarifying that the plan need only consider existing uses and then negating liability for damage
to uses "affected by the proposed plan," the Act is limiting the mineral developer's liability to
cover damages to existing surface uses only. See id. § 2(9) (proclaiming that "[e]xcept when
expressly stated otherwise, 'surface use or improvement' means an existing or future surface
use or improvement"). The Act could have extended liability for existing and future surface
uses merely by leaving off the word "existing" in the first clause quoted above. Id. Of course,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise a plan that would accommodate all possible
future surface uses. But considering that the duration of mineral development under the Act
can extend 30 years beyond the end of current development, which may be 20 to 30 years
itself, it would be more equitable to require mineral owner examination of likely surface de-
velopments. Short of that, the term of the mining activity should be clearly proclaimed so that
surface owners understand, up front, the length of time that secure surface development will
be precluded.
245. An analysis of state and federal permitting requirements is beyond the scope of this
Comment. Presumably, permit requirements vary from state to state; some states will have
permitting requirements more stringent than the accommodation doctrine, and some will
have requirements less stringent. Either way, the mineral developer will be able to choose
either the accommodation doctrine or a lesser standard, assuming the developer chooses the
easiest path for itself. If the standard is lower than the accommodation doctrine, then obvi-
ously this provision of the Act will not provide much of a hurdle for mineral owners to secure
indemnification of planned mineral development activities against existing and future surface
estate uses.
246. MODEL ACT § 4(i).
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would have been protected under the accommodation doctrine. 24 7
E. Section 5: Protection of Surface Use or Improvement
Section 5 attempts to provide a similar method for surface owners
to obtain prior approval for proposed surface uses under the accom-
modation doctrine. 248 Unfortunately, the provision is so biased in
favor of mineral development as to be almost useless for surface
owners. First, a surface owner must notify a mineral developer of
proposed surface uses, but if there is "ongoing mineral develop-
ment," which is broadly defined to include existing and planned
mining and the "resumption or extension of mineral development
within 30 years after the previous production stopped," the mineral
developer is not liable for any damage to that surface use.249 If
ongoing mineral development does not exist, 250 the mineral devel-
oper may still evade liability by objecting in writing to the surface
owner. 251 This is sufficient in itself to defeat liability unless the sur-
face owner has the wherewithal to institute a section 8 proceed-
ing.252 And even if a section 8 proceeding is joined, the mineral
247. Id § 4(i)-(ii).
248. Ia § 5. This section provides:
§ 5. Protection of Surface Use or Improvement.
(a) A surface owner who desires protection for a proposed surface use or im-
provement may give the mineral developer notice of the use or improvement. The
mineral developer is subject to a claim for damages for any injury that subsequent
mineral development causes to the use or improvement unless there is ongoing min-
eral development or the mineral developer makes a written objection to the pro-
posed use or improvement to the surface owner within 60 days after receipt of the
notice.
(b) If the mineral developer makes a written objection on the surface owner pur-
suant to subsection (a), the surface owner may gain protection for the proposed use
or improvement only by (i) entering into an agreement with the mineral developer,
or (ii) obtaining a determination in a proceeding under Section 8 that there is no
probability of future mineral development or that technologically sound and eco-
nomically practicable mineral development can be conducted without material injury
to the surface use or improvement.
Id
249. See id. § 5(a) ("mhe mineral developer is subject to a claim for damages . . . un-
less there is ongoing mineral development"); id. § 2(5) (defining "ongoing mineral
development").
250. This is an unlikely situation, because if the Act is adopted by a state, a mineral devel-
oper could ensure that this requirement is always fulfilled simply by inserting additional min-
eral development plans into the drilling or mining logs or other records maintained by that
selfsame mineral developer. See MODEL ACT § 2(5)(ii) cl. 2 (providing that mineral devel-
oper's own records are sufficient to establish existence of ongoing mineral development).
This kind of planning via mineral developer record keeping, i.e., according to the records of
the party with the most to gain from having ongoing mineral development proclaimed, may in
and of itself be sufficient to guarantee that the requirement is met, much to the detriment of
the surface owner.
251. MODEL AcT § 5(a) ("[TMhe mineral developer is subject to a claim for damages...
unless ... the mineral developer makes a written objection to the surface owner ... within 60
days").
252. See id. § 5(b)(i)-(ii) (providing protection to surface owner's proposed surface use
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developer need only show a probability of future mineral develop-
ment to continue to forestall liability.2 5 3 If the surface owner cannot
counter with a showing of alternative mining methods, then the sur-
face owner cannot attain indemnification for his or her proposed
surface use.254 This section therefore offers limited practical assist-
ance to surface owners and will more often than not fail in its at-
tempts to provide certainty to surface planning efforts.
F. Section 6: Modifications of Easement for Surface Access and Use
Section 6 limits the Act's accommodation doctrine to apply only
to implied mining easements and privileges.2 55 If a severance in-
strument contains an express waiver or requirement of surface dam-
age payments or expressly protects certain surface uses or mining
rights, then the Act's accommodation doctrine is applicable only to
the extent that it does not infringe on these express provisions.2 56
Additionally, the Act's accommodation doctrine will recognize and
respect any agreements struck between surface and mineral owners
relating to surface uses or improvements or damages.2 5 7
Once again, the Model Act fails to provide guidance in a much
litigated area,258 preferring to leave the validity of severance provi-
sions to be decided under common law contract and property prin-
after mineral owner objects in writing if and only if surface owner and mineral developer
come to agreement or if surface owner presses and wins § 8 claim).
253. Id. §§ 5(b)(ii), 8(b)-(c). The Act does not specify "how probable" mineral develop-
ment must be. Is the probability factor 95%? 75%? 50%? Or can a mineral developer defeat
a surface owner's attempt to protect a proposed surface use with a 5% probability factor?
The term "foreseeable future" is equally ambiguous. See id § 8(b)-(c) (using term "foresee-
able future" but failing to define duration of term).
254. See id. § 5(b) (providing protection to surface owner for proposed surface use only if,
after mineral developer has made written objection to proposed use, surface owner obtains
favorable ruling in § 8 proceeding or strikes bargain with mineral developer).
255. Id. § 6. This section provides:
§ 6. Modifications of Easement for Surface Access and Use.
An easement for surface access and use and the obligation to accommodate are
subject to (i) any provision of a deed, lease, or other instrument which expressly
requires payment of surface damages, or waives surface damages, or protects surface
improvements constructed before or after severance occurs or the obligation to ac-




257. Id. § 6(ii).
258. See, e.g., Eastwood Lands, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 417 So. 2d 164, 166-69
(Ala. 1982) (denying mining injunction sought by surface owner wanting to build shopping
center on surface because of waiver of surface support in severance instrument); Bevander
Coal Co. v. Matney, 320 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Ky. 1959) (upholding broad form deed waiver of
surface damages in context of auger mining); Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Ky.
1956) (upholding broad form deed waiver of surface damages in context of strip mining, so
long as miner's behavior is not "oppressive, arbitrary, wanton, or malicious"), overruled on other
grounds by Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky. 1987).
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ciples. 25 9 Given the disparity in mining knowledge and relative
bargaining power between mining companies and private landown-
ers, many severance instruments are actually contracts of adhesion
and thus waivers of surface damage contained in these conveyances
are invalid. 260 In addition, the definition of "surfhce damage"
changes as mining methods evolve, rendering contemporary inter-
pretation of dated waiver provisions imperative in the interest of eq-
uity.261 The Act is not responsive to these concerns, however: it
merely provides a caveat that any provisions found contractually in-
valid are not relevant to the Act and thus avoids the substantive is-
sue.262 As a result, a surface owner operating under a questionable
deed must first litigate the validity of the deed before he or she can
utilize the accommodation protections of the Act. Multiple litiga-
tion costs tend to deter parties having limited resources, and be-
cause many surface owners do not stand to gain enormous profits by
challenging the validity of their surface damage waivers, they will
not "choose" 263 to do so. For all practical purposes, this provision
implicitly favors mineral owners because it essentially sanctions the
questionable waivers that have been inserted into deeds to protect
mining interests.
G. Section 8: Determination Whether Accommodation Is Required
Section 8 provides the ground rules for determining whether an
259. See MODEL AcT § 6 & cmts. (declining to extend protections of Act to disputes arising
from express contract waivers or other express provisions); id. § 11 (preserving surface and
mineral owners' remedies under "other law" that is not modified by Model Act).
260. See supra notes 53, 140, 178 and accompanying text (giving examples of disparities in
bargaining power between surface owners and mineral developers and pointing out fact that
people holding surface lands under long-unused severance deeds do not even realize, some-
times, that they do not own entire fee); Palmore & McGuire, supra note 13, § 6.02[2][a], at 6-6
(stating that contrary to standard rules of deed construction, Texas courts construe mineral
deeds against grantees, typically mineral owners, in recognition of fact that such deeds are
usually prepared by mineral developers themselves).
261. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (describing magnified scope of mining
access easements under modern day technologies).
262. Model Act § 6 comments provide that under the Act,
broad form mineral deeds and reservations do not waive damages unless damages
are expressly waived in addition to the broad form rights of access and use. Other-
wise this section does not declare the validity of these expansions or limitations but
assumes that they are valid under contract and property principles. If invalid, they
would have no relevance to this Act.
MODEL AcT § 6 cmts.
263. Cf Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfess Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1559, 1608-32 (1991) (explaining fallacy of "choice" rhetoric in context of women
"choosing" or "not choosing" to raise family and/or go to work; societal pressures are such
that "choice" is often truly not choice). Here, a surface owner may very much want to chal-
lenge mineral development, but because of lack of financial resources, lack of knowledge
about how to file a proceeding or even how to procure an attorney, and so on, he or she will
not "choose" to proceed.
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accommodation is required in proposed development disputes be-
tween surface and mineral owners. 264 Section 8(a) provides that
"[if] the surface owner and mineral developer are unable to reach an
agreement under Section 4 or 5, either party may institute a [Sec-
tion 8] proceeding." 265 This "either party" language is interesting
in light of language in sections 4 and 5 consistently placing the bur-
den of initiating proceedings on the surface owner, in either mineral
or surface owner-initiated development scenarios. 266 It is not clear
that mineral owners will ever need to resort to section 8 proceed-
ings to indemnify proposed mining under the Act's accommodation
doctrine, because sections 4 and 5 are designed to ensure that this
indemnification occurs by default, i.e., by lack of action on the sur-
face owner's part.26 7
264. MODEL ACr § 8. This section provides:
§ 8. Determination Whether Accommodation is Required.
(a) If the surface owner and mineral developer are unable to reach an agreement
under Section 4 or 5, either party may institute an appropriate proceeding.
(b) If it is determined in the proceeding that (i) mineral development in the fore-
seeable future is probable based upon reasonably foreseeable economic conditions
and technology and that technologically sound and economically practicable mineral
development cannot be conducted without material injury to the surface use or im-
provement, or (ii) that the proposed surface use or improvement would interfere
materially with technologically sound and economically practicable mineral develop-
ment, the mineral developer may exercise the development easement appurtenant to
the mineral estate without accommodation for the proposed surface use or improve-
ment and is not liable under this [Act] for damages to the proposed use or improve-
ment.
(c) If it is determined in the proceeding that (i) there is no probability of mineral
development in the foreseeable future, based upon reasonably foreseeable economic
conditions and technology, or (ii) the proposed surface use or improvement would
not interfere materially with technologically sound and economically practicable
mineral development, the mineral developer may exercise the development ease-
ment appurtenant to the mineral estate only with accommodation for the proposed
surface use or improvement and is liable under this [Act] for damages to that use or
improvement. If the determination under this subsection authorizes a new use or
improvement, and the surface owner does not begin the proposed use or construc-
tion of the proposed improvement within three years after the determination, the
mineral developer is thereafter relieved from the obligation to accommodate the
proposed surface use and improvement and is not liable under this [Act] for dam-
ages to the proposed use or improvement.
(d) The issues specified in subsections (b) and (c) are the sole substantive issues
for determination in the proceeding. A court may not enjoin mineral development
or surface use or improvement under this [Act].
(e) The court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and
other expenses incidental to the proceeding.
265. Id. § 8(a). Section 8 comments indicate that "[w]hat constitutes an appropriate pro-
ceeding will depend on the law of the state. For example, it might be a declaratory judgement
proceeding, a civil proceeding, or a proceeding in arbitration." Id. § 8 cmts.
266. See id § 4(i) (providing that "a surface owner ... challenges the plan by a proceeding
under Section 8"); id § 5(b)(ii) (stating that surface owner may obtain determination in pro-
ceeding under § 8).
267. See id § 4 (mandating that mineral owner be indemnified after serving notice "un-
less" surface owner takes action, or "unless" mineral developer materially deviates from plan
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Sections 8(b) and (c) present the dominant mineral estate doc-
trine in yet another guise: generally, a mineral developer need not
accommodate existing or future surface uses if there exists a
probability of mineral development in the foreseeable future or if
the proposed surface use would interfere with mineral develop-
ment. 268 Under either of these circumstances, a mineral developer
may utilize implied mining easements without liability for damages
to the surface.2 69 A surface owner is only eligible to receive nonac-
commodation damages when mineral development is not probable
in the foreseeable future or when the surface owner's proposed sur-
face use would not materially interfere with mineral develop-
ment. 270 Obviously, however, in either of these situations the
mineral owner does not need to accommodate the surface owner
anyway.
Sections 8(b) and (c) are riddled with the definitional problems
regarding "accommodation" and "surface use or improvement"
mentioned earlier. First, the accommodation language used here is
inverted, per Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, and in fact conflicts with standard
accommodation language used in section 5.271 That is, the Act sug-
gests that surface owners must accommodate mineral development
rather than vice versa, and again, the burden of proving accommo-
dation is not allocated to either party.272 The drafters ostensibly
manipulated the accommodation doctrine in this fashion so that it
could be applied to either party, but in so doing, they rendered its
purpose meaningless. Under the Act's wording, either the mineral
owner must show material interference of the surface use with min-
eral development, in which case the mineral owner is not liable for
damage, or else the surface owner must show lack of interference
with mining, in which case the mineral owner must accommodate or
pay damages. 273 But this is not an accommodation doctrine at all,
and material injury to surface uses results); id. § 5 (allowing mineral developer to defeat sur-
face owner's attempt to protect surface use by simply objecting in writing, and then surface
owner can only gain protection by reaching agreement with mineral developer or by ob-
taining successful result in § 8 proceeding).
268. Id § 8(b).
269. Id
270. Id § 8(c).
271. Compare MODEL Acr § 8(b)(ii)-(c)(ii) (defining accommodation analysis as consider-
ing whether "the proposed surface use or improvement would interfere materially with tech-
nologically sound and economically practicable mineral development") with id. § 5 (providing
protection to surface owner for proposed surface use if in § 8 proceeding it is determined that
"technologically sound... mineral development can be conducted without material injury to
the surface use or improvement").
272. See id. § 8(b)-(c) (failing to assign burden of proof to either mineral or surface
owner).
273. Id. § 8(b)(ii), (c)(ii).
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because if the surface owner shows that a proposed surface use will
not materially interfere with mineral development, then the mineral
developer need not change his or her behavior at all and will never
have to pay damages.
A second problem with section 8 lies in its selective employment
of the adjective "proposed." By inserting that word before "surface
use or improvement" in section 8(b)(ii) and in the third clause of
that subsection, the Act forecloses a surface owner's ability to chal-
lenge proposed mineral development that will affect existing surface
uses.274 If this is true, then a surface owner will not have an oppor-
tunity under the Act to forestall anticipated surface damage by a
proposed mining method. Instead, only section 10 will provide sur-
face owners a remedy for this type of harm, and that relief is less
than ideal because it manifests only after damage has been done to
the surface. 275 In addition, because clause 3 of this subsection is the
denouement of 8(b) (i) as well as 8(b) (ii), the use of "proposed" lim-
its a mineral owner's ability to indemnify new mining activity from
proposed surface uses only and not from existing surface uses.2 76 It
seems unlikely that the drafters intended this result because it ob-
structs advance quantification of party rights and obligations and
thus erodes the certainty of investment planning that is at the heart
of the Act.277
Section 8 goes on to impose a three-year time limit on surface
owners to begin any proposed use, without mandating a similar re-
striction for mineral owners. 278 Section 8(d) provides that the is-
sues raised in sections 8(b) and (c) are the "sole substantive issues
for determination in the proceeding" and that a court may not en-
274. Id. § 8(b). This subsection, if its part (i) or (ii) requirements are met, allows the
mineral developer to go forward with proposed mining without accommodating certain sur-
face uses. By inserting "proposed" into clause 3 of § 8(b), those "certain" surface uses are
limited to "proposed" surface uses. Thus, a surface owner utilizing this section to try to
protect an existing surface use from proposed mining will not be able to do so if "proposed
surface use or improvement" is read literally. Similarly, the surface owner may not be able to
protect "future" surface uses, because it is not clear that the term "future" is equivalent to the
term "proposed." And of course, the mineral owner will not be able to gain indemnification
from damage to "existing" and perhaps "future" surface uses under this provision, again
because of the qualifying adjective "proposed." Id.
275. See id. § 10(a) (providing maximum measure of damages attainable by surface owner
in civil action filed to recover for mineral owner nonaccommodation).
276. See supra note 274 (examining effect of use of term "proposed" in clause 3 of § 8(b)
on disposition of existing surface uses or improvements).
277. See MODEL Aar § 1(a) (asserting that quantification of party rights and obligations is
important public policy of state); id § 5 cmts. (stating that mineral owner's right to use sur-
face without payment for surface damage under dominance doctrine is key factor that im-
pedes surface development).
278. Id- § 8(c).
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join mineral or surface development under the Act.279 Finally, sec-
tion 8(e) discourages frivolous actions by awarding attorney's fees
and incidental expenses to the winner of the proceeding.280 This
qualification again works to deter surface owner suits because sur-
face owners generally have lower financial resources to use in litiga-
tion than do mineral owners, and because most surface owners
stand to gain much less, profit-wise, than do mineral owners.28'
H. Section 10: Measure of Damages for Failure to Accommodate-
Limitations
Section 10 specifies the measure of damages recoverable via civil
action by surface owners for mineral owner nonaccommodation. 28 2
The Act provides a surface owner two types of damages. First, the
surface owner may recover damages approximating the reasonable
rental value of surface lands actually occupied by the mineral devel-
oper or otherwise made unavailable to the surface owner during
mineral development. 28 3 Second, a surface owner may recover con-
sequential damages for actual injury to surface improvements
caused by the mining activities. 28 4 The mineral developer is allowed
to reduce his or her damage outlay by offsetting the value of "any
required reclamation activity or any benefits conferred on the prop-
279. Id. § 8(d).
280. Id. § 8(e).
281. See supra notes 53, 140, 178 and accompanying text (giving typical examples of sur-
face owner versus mineral developer bargaining capacities).
282. MODEL Acr § 10. This section provides:
§ 10. Measure of Damages for Failure to Accommodate-Limitations.
(a) If a mineral developer fails to accommodate a surface use or improvement
protected under this [Act], the surface owner may maintain a civil action to recover
damages for:
(1) loss of surface use limited to the greater of (i) loss of income for any
interrupted period of use of the surface or improvements under the accom-
modation doctrine, or (ii) loss of value of the use of the surface or improve-
ments during any period of interrupted use; and
(2) injury to or destruction of surface improvements limited to the lesser
of (i) the loss of fair market value of the improvement, or (ii) the cost of re-
pairing, relocating, or replacing the improvements.
(b) A mineral developer may offset the value of any required reclamation activity
or any benefits conferred on the property as a result of mineral development against
the amount of aggregate damages for loss of surface use and destruction of or injury
to surface improvements.
(c) An action to recover damages under this section may not be commenced
more than two years after the loss is or should have been discovered by the surface
owner, but the parties by agreement may modify or waive the period of limitation.
Id.
283. Id. § 10(a)(1); see Fox, supra note 5, at 845 (describing Act's damages as similar to
rent).
284. MODEL Acr § 10(a)(2); see Fox, supra note 5, at 845 (describing Act's additional con-
sequential damages).
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erty as a result of mineral development." 285 This would include the
value of an improved access road or the dredging of a pond,
whether or not the surface owner thinks those features are of benefit
to his or her property.
Again, the policy underlying this provision is mineral estate domi-
nance. The drafters plainly did not want to deter mining activities
of any stripe, as evidenced by the fact that they failed to provide
surface owners a punitive damages option for wanton and malicious
nonaccommodation and even declined to supply reasonable diminu-
tion in value damages for harm caused to surface land and improve-
ments. 28 6 By valuing surface injury at only the rental and/or
consequential damage level, section 10 encourages mineral owners
to abuse their accommodation obligations. In fact, this provision
may work to grant mineral owners a private right of eminent domain
because section l(b) qualifies the Act under an enacting state's po-
lice power.28 7 That is, if a mineral estate's overlying surface is only
used to grow corn or pasture cows or provide recreational hiking
and camping facilities, a mineral owner may find it more cost effec-
tive to destroy the surface and pay the penalty than to accommodate
the surface use.288 This result certainly does not further the Act's
policy of preserving surface resources and maximizing environmen-
tal welfare.
Section 10(c) sets forth a flexible two-year statute of limitations
within which time the surface owner must file a claim for dam-
ages.28 9 The two-year period begins to run at the point the loss is or
should have been discovered by the surface owner.290 Thus if sur-
face subsidence from underground mining does not occur until five
285. MODEL AcT § 10(b).
286. See id. § 10 (failing to provide such damage options for surface owners). For exam-
ples ofjudicial willingness to provide surface owners with equitable relief beyond the rental
and consequential damage level, see Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160,
164 (Ark. 1974) (considering but not assessing punitive damages because surface owner did
not establish wanton or willful misconduct on part of mineral owner); Akers v. Baldwin, 736
S.W.2d 294, 307 (Ky. 1987) (holding that diminution in value damages are available to sur-
face owner for damage caused by mining under implied access easements).
287. MODEL AcT § I(b); see Stoebuck, supra note 27, at 599 (explaining that eminent do-
main is "a power of government by which property of private persons may be transferred to
the government, or to an alter ego such as a public utility, over the transferor's immediate,
personal protest"). Here, private mining companies are acting as the "alter ego" of govern-
ment to consume the surface and pay the surface owners only rental value damages.
288. But see William T. Wilson, Note, Determination of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a
Matter of Law: Moser v. U.S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 715, 729-30 & n.106 (1984) (arguing
that reasonable rental value is equitable measure of damages for surface destruction because
it encourages parties to bargain and minimizes occurrence of litigation over appropriate level
of compensation for surface damage).
289. MODEL ACT § 10(c).
290. Id.
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years after mining ceases, the surface owner will have two years be-
yond that time to file a claim.
I. Section 11: Rights Preserved
Section 11 is perhaps partially intended to fill the breach left by
the limited remedy provided a surface owner in section 10. This
section preserves all other statutory and common law rights and ob-
ligations of surface and mineral owners so that claims under "ob-
struction, excessive or unreasonable use, negligence, nuisance,
malicious or intentional misuse, contract, other recognized grounds
and all causes of action conferred by other statutory law" are cogni-
zable in tandem with this Act.291 Thus, most of the provisions in the
Act establishing dispute resolution procedures and encouraging set-
tlement are optional. Only section 3 contains mandatory legal pro-
cedures: the mineral estate dominance and quasi-accommodation
doctrines are codified into state law by enactment of this Act.292
IV. MODEL ACT APPLICATION
In practice, the Model Act appears to be "full of sound and fury,
[s]ignifying nothing." 293 Perhaps this is an ungenerous characteri-
zation, but at a very basic level, the Act does little to change the
status quo. Certainly, surface owners have more rights under the
Model Act than anything contemplated under the mineral estate
dominance doctrine, but these new rights are so carefully con-
strained as to be almost meaningless. 294 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,295 Justice Holmes stated that "if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. ' 296 Apparently the Model Act draft-
291. Id. § 11 cmts. The section provides:
§ 11. Rights Preserved.
Except as specifically modified by this [Act], this [Act] does not limit liability of the
surface owner under other law for impairment or obstruction of mineral develop-
ment or correlative remedies of the mineral developer, or liability of the mineral
developer under other law for unreasonable or excessive use of the surface or correl-
ative remedies of the surface owner.
Id
292. See Martz, supra note 18, at 65 (stating that "except for the servitude in section 3,
[which is mineral estate dominance and the accommodation doctrine,] all provisions of the
Act prescribe optional procedures"). Martz served as an advisor to the Special Committee on
the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommoda-
tion Act and thus should have an insider's understanding of the statute.
293. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
294. See supra notes 229-32, 236-38, 244-45, 249-54, 258-63, 266-67, 268-81, 286-88 and
accompanying text (analyzing myriad ways Act favors mineral development over surface
rights).
295. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
296. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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ers heeded Holmes' words, because the Act does not go too far: it
falls far short.
A. Effect on States Lacking Common Law Accommodation Doctrines
The most significant change the Model Act achieves is the intro-
duction of the accommodation doctrine into states having no such
principle. Given the pervasiveness of mineral estate dominance and
the historic national preference for mineral exploitation, a doctrinal
shift to provide surface estates even a modicum of consideration
may seem revolutionary.297 In light of the national legislative trend
curtailing mineral dominance 298 and considering the limitations of
surface owner power under the Act's provisions, 299 however, the
Model Act's impact is almost laughingly inconsequential.
1. Pennsylvania
For example, the state of Pennsylvania does not have a common
law accommodation doctrine.300 If the dispute in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon arose today under the Model Act, how would the con-
troversy be resolved? The plaintiffs in Pennsylvania Coal sought to
enjoin full-extraction coal mining underneath their land because
such mining would cause the surface to subside, with resultant dam-
age to their home and water supply.301 First of all, the Model Act
297. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (explaining traditional preference for
mineral development).
298. See supra notes 150-80 and accompanying text (providing brief overview of consent,
lapse, mining methods, reclamation, and surface damage statutes that have been enacted by
many states in last 10-20 years to enhance rights of surface owners as against mineral owners).
299. See supra notes 229-32, 236-38, 244-45, 249-54, 258-63, 266-67, 268-81, 286-88 and
accompanying text (examining many different ways that Model Act favors mineral develop-
ment over surface rights).
300. But see Mansfield, supra note 44, at 71 n.175 (stating that Pennsylvania has adopted
accommodation doctrine in Einsig v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 452 A.2d 558 (Pa. 1982)).
Einsig, however, involves a dispute between competing mineral interests: an oil and gas
owner wanting to drill through a separately owned coal mine to reach the oil, 452 A.2d at 558,
560-61, and so is not directly relevant to this discussion of surface owner/mineral owner
disputes.
301. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922). Much of the coal deposit
underneath the Mahons' land had already been removed via the "room and pillar" method of
mining, during which "rooms" of coal are extracted and "pillars" of coal are left in place to
support the surface. Pennsylvania Coal planned to go back in and remove the supportive
pillars of coal (called full- or secondary-extraction mining), which the company felt free to do
under the surface damage waiver provision in its 1878 severance deed. Id. The Mahons in-
voked Pennsylvania's newly enacted Kohler Act, which barred the use of coal mining methods
that would cause subsidence of "any structure used as a human habitation," id. at 412-13, but
the Court would have none of it. Id. at 414. The Court struck down Pennsylvania's Kohler
Act and refused to grant the Mahons' injunction, finding that the statute "destroy[ed] previ-
ously existing rights of property and contract" and that "a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the con-
stitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 413, 416.
The Court decided a very similar case in 1987 but achieved the opposite result. See Key-
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does not offer injunction as a remedy,30 2 but seemingly the Act
would allow the Mahons, surface owners, to compel Pennsylvania
Coal, the mineral owner, to accommodate their home by providing
support for the surface. The Act would have no such effect, how-
ever. Pennsylvania Coal would first have to notify the Mahons of its
proposed mineral development according to section 4 of the Act, or
else leave itself vulnerable to accommodation liability.30 3 The noti-
fication would have to be accompanied by a plan to accommodate
the Mahons' house or by a plan satisfying federal or state permit
requirements.30 4 Pennsylvania Coal wanted to remove the support-
ive pillars of coal in this case, so it would have to replace the pillars
with some technologically feasible surface support system to meet
the accommodation requirement, or else it could fulfill the federal
or state permit requirements, whatever they might be.3° 5 Assuming
the coal company meets these criteria, it frees itself of all liability for
failure to accommodate surface uses unless the Mahons successfully
challenge its plan under section 8 of the Act.30 6
But the Mahons face another hurdle: section 6 of the Act.3 0 7 The
Mahons' 1878 surface deed contains an express waiver of any dam-
ages that might result from mining.308 Section 6 subjects the min-
eral access easement to any express surface damage waivers, so in
the end, the Mahons are left without a remedy under the Act.30 9
Even assuming the express waiver provision did not exist in the
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1987) (discussing
"devastating" environmental and economic effects caused by subsidence and upholding
Pennsylvania statute recognizing important public interest to be served by minimizing inci-
dences of subsidence). In the years between the Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone decisions a
national cultural shift toward enhanced environmental awareness has taken place, and the
Keystone opinion reflects this shift. The Court listed the following "devastating effects" of
subsidence:
[Subsidence] often causes substantial damage to foundations, walls, other structural
members, and the integrity of houses and buildings. Subsidence frequently causes
sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land difficult or impossible to develop.
Its effect on farming has been well documented-many subsided areas cannot be
plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of groundwater
and surface ponds. In short, it presents the type of environmental concern that has
been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades.
Id.
302. MODEL AcT §§ 1(c), 8(d).
303. See supra notes 242- 47 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Model Act
§ 4).
304. MODEL AcT § 4.
305. Id.
306. Id
307. See id. § 6 (precluding application of Act's accommodation doctrine to express waiv-
ers in severance instruments).
308. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922).
309. See supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Model Act
§ 6).
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Mahons' deed, the Model Act would still leave them without a pro-
spective remedy if section 8(b) is read, as written, to apply to pro-
posed surface uses only.310 That is, the Mahons would only be able
to obtain recompense for their home under section 10's after-the-
fact damage provision, because section 8(b)'s before-the-fact rem-
edy does not literally extend to existing surface uses.311
2. Virginia
Virginia also does not have a common law accommodation doc-
trine. Assuming the Model Act had been adopted in Virginia prior
to the dispute in Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co. ,312 what likely result? In
that case, the Larges wanted to enjoin Clinchfield Coal Company's
use of longwall mining underneath their eighty-one acres of moun-
tainous timberland.31 3 Again, under the Act, the Larges would be
unable to obtain an injunction.3 14 If Clinchfield filed a section 4 no-
310. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (highlighting faulty drafting of Act
with respect to use of terms "proposed," "existing," and "future," as applied to mining and
surface developments, uses, or improvements).
311. See MODEL Ac" § 8(b) (using adjective "proposed" to modify surface "use or im-
provement" in each of three instances used in section).
312. 387 S.E.2d 783 (Va. 1990).
313. Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 784 (Va. 1990). The court held that
longwall mining could not be enjoined, despite the Larges' jurisprudential "absolute" right to
subjacent support, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text, because no appreciable dam-
age would be caused to the surface by Clinchfield's longwall mining. See Large, 387 S.E.2d at
785 ("We have never decided whether a surface owner's right to subjacent support is violated
by mere surface subsidence."). The "mere" subsidence contemplated here consisted of 5
swales cutting across the Larges' land, each 3 feet deep, 600 to 700 feet wide, and 3000 to
5000 feet long. Id. at 787. Longwall mining had the potential to disrupt the flow of a stream,
a spring, and groundwater drainage patterns on the Larges' property, id., and as a result
would probably kill some of the timber on the land. Nevertheless, the court stated:
At law, a claim for a violation of subjacent support is implicitly premised upon a
showing of appreciable damage to the surface estate or diminution in its use. More-
over, until a surface landowner establishes damage to his [or her] property, he [or
she] has no cause of action. In equity, no prohibitory injunction against an antici-
pated wrong will issue unless "there is reasonable cause to believe that the wrong is
one that would cause irreparable injury and the wrong is actually threatened or ap-
prehended with reasonable probability."
Id. at 785-86 (citations omitted). The court held that the Larges had not proved reasonably
probable irreparable injury, so their request for an injunction was denied. Id. at 786.
The dissent found it "incredible" that mining operations that would "effectively duplicate
the consequences of a major earthquake" would not warrant injunctive relief. Id. at 787 (Rus-
sell,J., dissenting). Clinchfield had expressed no intent to restore the Larges' land after min-
ing was completed, so according to the dissent, subsidence would be an "irreparable injury."
Id. Furthermore, the majority's finding that anticipated subsidence would not harm the sur-
face "to any appreciable degree" was based solely on Clinchfield's expert testimony to that
effect and therefore should have been treated with suspicion. Id.
Coal Magazine called this decision a close case. R. Lee Aston, Court Decisions, COAL, Dec.
1990, at 78. Aston stated that the longwall mining method "squeaked by" and could have
been permanently enjoined if sufficient evidence of existent or future surface damage had
been shown by the plaintiffs. Id at 80.
314. See MODEL AcT §§ 1(c), 8(d) (forbidding injunction and allowing only damages as
remedy for mineral owner destruction of surface estate).
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tification of proposed mining, the Larges would have to challenge
the plan in a section 8 proceeding or automatically lose their oppor-
tunity to forestall damage and obtain a remedy. 315 The Larges
would need to forward a strong argument that alternatives to
longwalling exist because if they lose the proceeding, section 8(e)
ensures that they will pay attorney's fees and costs. 3 16 Again, as-
suming the Larges lack knowledge of mining methods, natural re-
source markets, and future energy demand trends, 317 they may be
unwilling to risk losing the proceeding if "technologically sound
and economically practicable" alternatives are not likely to be found
to exist. 31 8 Thus they may be deterred from challenging Clinchfield
and will automatically lose their potential right to damages.319
Assuming that Clinchfield does not utilize section 4 and instead
agrees to some measure of accommodation, or that the Larges win
in a section 8 proceeding, the Act imposes a duty on Clinchfield to
accommodate the Larges' surface use.3 20 In this case, that "use"
consists of simply allowing the timberland to be wilderness.3 2 l If
Clinchfield's mining activities harm the wilderness via subsidence or
interruption of water supplies, the Larges can bring a civil suit
under section 10 to recover money damages.3 22 Under section 10's
limited rental and consequential damage provision, however, it is
unlikely that a court would impose an amount of damages that
would deter Clinchfield from harming the surface. The monetary
value of using wilderness for aesthetic or recreational purposes is
speculative, and thus the Model Act will probably, at best, provide
the Larges a small sum of money, effectively licensing a continuing
315. Id § 4(i). If, of course, Clinchfield deviated in a materially significant way from its
accommodation plan and caused material surface injury, then the Larges would have a rem-
edy. Id. § 4(ii).
316. See MODEL AC § 8(e) (awarding attorney's fees and incidental expenses to prevailing
party).
317. See Smith, supra note 7, § 16.03, at 16-13 (explaining that even "shallow wells and
relatively crude technology" of oil industry are beyond reach of most landowners).
318. MODEL Ac § 8(b)-(c); cf. supra note 263 and accompanying text (explaining paradox
of "choice" in socially or financially constrained situations).
319. See MODEL Acr § 4 (ensuring that once mineral developer notifies surface owner of
proposed mining, surface owner will forfeit protections of Act unless he or she initiates § 8
proceeding or unless mineral owner materially deviates from plan and causes material dam-
age to surface uses or improvements).
320. See MODEL ACr § 3(b) (stating that mining easement is subject to accommodation
according to provisions of §§ 4, 5, 6, and 8 or by agreement).
321. See Large v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 387 S.E.2d 783, 784 (Va. 1990) (calling Larges'
land "unimproved and uninhabited timberland in a mountainous area," which could indicate
that Larges enjoyed hiking and camping there, or perhaps that they intended to use land for
logging).
322. See MODEL AcT § 10(a) (allowing surface owner to maintain civil action if mineral
developer fails to accommodate protected surface use or improvement).
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B. Effect on States with Common Law Accommodation Doctrines
1. Texas
Suppose the Model Act had been enacted in Texas before the wa-
tershed case of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones.3 24 What result under the Act? If
Getty Oil simply installed its tall pumps, Jones could bring a civil
action for damages under section 10.325 If Getty Oil filed a section 4
notice first, Jones would have to challenge the notice in a section 8
proceeding to preserve his rights.326 Beginning with the language
of section 8(b)(i), it is clear that a court or arbitrator would find that
"mineral development in the foreseeable future is probable based
upon reasonably foreseeable economic conditions and technol-
ogy."'3 2 7 Both Adobe and Amerada Oil Companies are already suc-
cessfully drilling on other parts ofJones' land. 328 Next, it is not true
that "technologically sound and economically practicable mineral
development cannot be conducted without material injury to the
surface use": again, both Adobe and Amerada are drilling nearby
using alternative methods, so section 8(b)(i) does not apply.329 Sec-
tion 8(b) (ii) does not apply either, because Jones has an existing, not
a proposed, surface use, unless "proposed" means both "proposed
and existing,133 0 in which case it still does not apply because the
irrigation system does not materially interfere with the drilling
323. Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-75 (N.Y. 1970) (changing tradi-
tional common law rule that once private nuisance is shown, injunction is granted, to new
balancing of equities test; here, cement factory was effectively given license to continue wrong
by being allowed to permanently pay off neighbors who were bothered by continual dirt,
noise, and vibrations generated by factory, rather than shut down factory).
324. See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971) (holding that mineral
owner Getty Oil must accommodate surface owner Jones' surface use, under court's newly
articulated accommodation doctrine, by employing reasonably available alternative mining
methods to extract oil).
325. See supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Model Act
§ 10).
326. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining that consequence of surface
owner nonaction under § 4 once mineral owner notification of proposed mineral develop-
ment is received is abdication of right to challenge development in § 8 proceeding and thus
loss of right to challenge development prospectively under Model Act).
327. MODEL Aar § 8(b)(i).
328. See supra text accompanying note 103 (noting that Amerada's hydraulic pumping
units and Adobe's sunken-cellar style pumps were both being used on Jones' land to accom-
modate his irrigation system).
329. See MODEL Acr § 8(b)(i). Here, mineral development is "probable," in fact, it is un-
derway, and it is not true that "technologically sound and economically practicable" mineral
development cannot be conducted without material injury to surface estate, because both
Amerada's and Adobe's mining methods do not cause such injury. Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470
S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. 1971).
330. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (noting ambiguity in Act's use of terms
"proposed," "existing," and "future" surface uses or improvements).
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alternatives."'
Section 8(c)(i) is the inverse of 8(b)(i) clause 1, and because a
probability exists that mining will occur, the section does not ap-
ply.332 That leaves 8(c)(ii), which does not apply either unless "pro-
posed" surface use can be read to mean "existing and proposed"
surface use.333 If this assumption cannot be made, Jones will have
no way to prospectively protect his existing surface use from a sec-
tion 4 proceeding, so this reading of the statute will be assumed.
Thus under 8(c)(ii), the inverse accommodation doctrine, accommo-
dation responsibility and liability for damage to Jones' cotton fields
and irrigation system attaches to Getty Oil because Jones' existing
irrigation system does not interfere with two alternative drilling
methods to Getty's proposed method. 33 4 Jones would win the sec-
tion 8 proceeding and obtain attorney's fees and costs from Getty
and would also have an action for damages under section 10 if Getty
fails to accommodate his surface use.33 5 The damages involved in
the real case and under the Act are quite similar.3 36
Thus the Model Act, if given the amended "proposed and ex-
isting" section 8 reading, reaches much the same result as the model
common law accommodation doctrine. Barring that interpretation,
however, a mineral owner could escape predamage accommodation
for existing surface uses merely by filing a section 4 notice: the Act's
current wording requires this result." 7 Considering that a previous
version of the Act did not contain this trap for the unwary, one is left
to wonder at the drafters' motivation for including it.s 38
331. See Jones, 470 S.W.2d at 622 (finding two "reasonable alternatives" to Getty's surface
use that did not interfere with Jones' irrigation machine).
332. MODEL ACT § 8(c)(i).
333. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
334. See MODEL ACT § 8(c)(ii) (allowing mineral developer to exercise access easement
only with accommodation if proposed surface use would not interfere materially with mineral
development).
335. See idL § 8(e) (awarding attorney's fees to prevailing party); id. § 10(a) (allowing sur-
face owner to maintain civil action if mineral developer fails to accommodate protected sur-
face uses).
336. Compare Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971) (remanding case for
determination as to liability and damages under accommodation doctrine and holding that
Getty's liability will not exceed amount beyond decrease in value of use of land from time
interfering pumps were installed to time of removal) with MODEL ACT § 10(a)(1) (providing
damages for greater of (1) loss of income for any interrupted period of use of surface under
accommodation doctrine, and (2) loss of value of use of surface or improvement during time
of interrupted use).
337. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (explaining consequences of language
choices in Model Act § 8).
338. See MODEL SURFACE USE AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOMMODATION ACT § 8(b)-
(c), 14 U.L.A. 46 (Tent. Draft, Supp. 1991) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(referring to simply "surface use or improvement," which, unmodified, means existing and
future surface uses and improvements, according to Model Act § 2(9)).
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What would happen if the facts in theJones case were inverted and
the irrigation system became a proposed use, the drilling an existing
use? Under this scenario, Jones would first have to qualify his pro-
posed use by filing a section 5 notice.33 9 If development was ongo-
ing, as it would be if Getty were drilling, Jones would not be able to
protect his surface use from mining damage at all, perhaps for a very
long time (thirty years or more).340 If mineral development did not
for some reason fit into the broad requirements of "ongoing min-
eral development," then Getty would have to object in writing to
Jones within sixty days to avoid liability.34 1 Jones could only then
gain protection by initiating a section 8 proceeding in which it was
found either that mineral development was not probable in the fore-
seeable future or that Jones' irrigation system would not materially
interfere with Getty's mining method.3 42 In the first instance Getty
Oil does not care whatJones does because it is not planning to drill,
and in the second, despite the inverted wording of the Act that sug-
gests the surface owner is accommodating the mineral owner, Getty
would have to use the alternative methods.3 43 Thus in most in-
stances, mineral owners are again protected from the reasonable
desires of surface owners to use their land, this time by an expansive
definition of ongoing mineral development that essentially says
to surface owners who want to develop their land: "not in your
lifetime."
2. Arkansas
Arkansas' willingness to apply the common law accommodation
doctrine to prospective surface uses in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Phillips can be used to underscore the Model Act's feeble protection
of proposed surface uses.344 If the Diamond Shamrock dispute arose
under the Model Act, the Phillipses, under section 5, could notify
Diamond Shamrock of the proposed placement of their retirement
home.345 The case does not make clear when Diamond Shamrock's
339. See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Model Act
§ 5).
340. See supra notes 248-54 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Model Act
§ 5 and noting Act's 30-year ongoing mineral development limitation on surface use
protection).
341. MODEL Aar § 5(a).
342. Id. § 8(b)-(c).
343. See id. § 8(c) (allowing mineral developer to exercise easement only with accommo-
dation if proposed surface use would not interfere materially with mineral development).
344. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Ark. 1974) (awarding
actual damages to surface owners for diminution in value of their property caused by mineral
owner's drilling of oil well on surface owner's planned homesite).
345. MODEL ACT § 5(a).
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plan to drill the offending gas well was adopted, but it does mention
that the well was part of the Union City Field, which was treated as a
unit for gas exploration purposes.3 46 If this well is considered part
of "ongoing mineral development," the Phillipses will not be able to
qualify their home under the accommodation doctrine and Diamond
Shamrock will not incur any liability under the Act for damage to the
home.3 47 Even if the Phillipses are able to qualify their home, the
Act will only provide them rental and consequential damages.3 48
Both of these results are inferior to the result of the case, which
provided actual damages (diminution in value) to the Phillipses for
their homesite.3 49
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
To make the Model Act something other than an exercise in self-
referential nonsense,350 the drafters have to give it some teeth, and
those teeth have to occasionally bite mineral owners.35 1 The Act
contains an explicit mandate to maximize the economic, cultural,
and environmental welfare of the people, not just of mining inter-
ests.352 Granted, easy and cheap access to minerals keeps mining
expenses down and allows developers to offer coal, oil, gas, and
other minerals to the public at low monetary prices. But at what
cost? Inexpensive coal and oil prices predicated at least in part on
the dominant mineral estate doctrine have contributed to the en-
trenchment of an American energy policy focused almost exclusively
on fossil fuel resources.3 53 This policy contributes in turn to the
346. Diamond Shamrock, 511 S.W.2d at 161.
347. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (examining implications of provisions
defining "ongoing mineral development" and concluding that mineral developer could en-
sure such development is always underway by including plans in own mining logs, because
such is sufficient under Model Act § 2(5)(ii) to qualify as "ongoing mineral development").
348. See supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text (explaining damages provision of
Model Act in § 10).
349. See Diamond Shamrock, 511 S.W.2d at 161, 164 (awarding diminution in value damages
as difference in value of Phillipses' homesite before and after drilling commenced, which in
this case was $4000).
350. One commentator has likened the Act to the Internal Revenue Code, saying that the
Act contains "several complex provisions that resemble the Internal Revenue Code in the
degree to which they tend to confuse the reader by repeated cross references to other sec-
tions." Polston, supra note 216, § 21.0313], at 21-10.
351. See Dycus, supra note 15, at 881 (analyzing "clear trend toward abandonment of the
dominance doctrine" that has emerged in recent years).
352. MODEL AcT § l(a). See generally Ted Gup, The Curse of Coal, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 54
(writing about legacy of coal mining in Appalachia and its impact on individual miners' lives,
and quoting GEORGE ORWELL, THE ROAD TO WIGAN PIER, as stating that "it is only because
miners sweat their guts out that superior persons can remain superior"). Perhaps the same
could be said for the losses of surface owners with respect to mining-induced surface damage.
353. See Tomain, supra note 68, at 374-75 (explaining that fundamental assumption sup-
porting domestic energy policy is existence of link between level of energy production and
gross national product, and that economies of scale existent in "large-scale, high-technology,
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daily degradation of our natural environment through air, water,
and aesthetic pollution caused by mineral excavation and use.354
And again in turn, our national culture suffers as people's quality of
life is negatively affected by the adverse side effects of mining activi-
ties.3 55 The Act has pledged to support these concerns, but to do
so, it cannot promulgate the mineral estate dominance doctrine. A
number of changes should be made in the Act so that the goal of
maximizing the welfare of the people can be attained through ra-
tional use of both surface and mineral estates.
First, the Act should be overhauled to clarify definitions and to
correct inconsistent or misleading statements. This modification
primarily involves a reworking of the definition of "accommoda-
tion" and an explicit articulation of existing versus future surface
uses or improvements in appropriate sections. That is, the accom-
modation doctrine is very precisely defined in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones
and in Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, and these cases can be used in
conjunction with Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips to delineate,
unambiguously and consistently, the various parameters of accom-
modation.356 After this doctrinal groundwork is laid, then perhaps
Getty Oil Co. v. Royal can be used to explain how "accommodation"
could work so that surface owners accommodate mineral owners,
although plainly the surface owner is not going to pay the mineral
owner for failure to accommodate the mining easement, so this par-
allel example is still somewhat fallacious.3 57 Additionally, the in-
creased burden on the surface owner of showing "technologically
sound and economically practicable" alternative mining methods
capital-intensive, integrated, and centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels" are there-
fore favored over small solar or wind energy firms); see also Gary E. Slagel, Collapsing a Myth,
ENvrL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 25 (stating that if government decrees that all surface support
rights should be conveyed to surface owner, then surface owner will gain power to preclude
mining or to sell support rights back to mineral developer, perhaps at higher price than in
original deed, which "could significantly disrupt both ... mining and energy costs"). This
statement directly supports the premise that surface/mineral owner relations and respective
power levels have an impact on energy costs. Id.
354. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 201 n.1 (stating that most common "third party im-
pacts" of surface mining are air and water pollution, subsidence, and aesthetic pollution, and
less commonly, flooding).
355. Huffman, supra note 15, at 201 n.1. American culture is affected when people are
warned that it is dangerous to go outside their homes on "high smog" days, or that a local
lake is too contaminated by acid mine drainage or petroleum runoff to swim or fish in, or that
our "purple mountain majesties" cannot be seen because the air is opaque with fossil fuel
emissions.
356. Compare supra notes 100-12, 126-33, 134-40 and accompanying text (relating
straightforward accommodation analysis set forth in listed cases) with supra notes 203-17, 234-
38 and accompanying text (pointing out inconsistencies and ambiguities in Model Act's defi-
nition of accommodation doctrine).
357. Cf supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text (criticizing drafters' selection of Royal
to illustrate machinations of accommodation doctrine).
1993] 677
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
should be reduced to "reasonable" alternatives, so that factors
other than economic concerns are weighed in the analysis.358
The problem surrounding the phrase "surface use or improve-
ment" can simply be resolved by explicitly providing the modifiers
"existing," "future," or "proposed," or combinations thereof,
wherever relevant. This method will obviate the Act's misleading
representation of the expansive version of the phrase as the rule,
when in fact it is the exception.35 9 More importantly, surface own-
ers will be able to protect against, or mineral owners to indemnify
themselves from, damage to existing surface uses or improve-
ments.360 Finally, the Act should either impose the burden of insti-
tuting a section 8 proceeding on the mineral owner in section 5
disputes, or it should admit that only surface owners are obliged to
bring section 8 actions to preserve their rights.36 ' All of these meas-
ures will help to provide clearer understanding of an otherwise mys-
tifying Act.
Second, the Act should impose accommodation duties whether or
not the severance instrument contains express waivers of surface
damage. Waivers of this sort are often unconscionable, and the Act
is defeating its stated purpose of providing efficient dispute resolu-
tion procedures if it compels surface owners to first litigate the va-
lidity of severance contracts before providing accommodation.3 62
That is, mineral owners should be held "strictly liable" for the ac-
commodation of surface uses in all cases, unless no reasonable alter-
native mining methods are shown to exist. This proposal is a hybrid
solution that, while not going as far as surface damage statutes in
imposing strict liability for all surface damages,363 at least recog-
nizes that mineral development should be pursued in tandem with
surface uses whenever possible. That goal, after all, is the very cor-
nerstone of traditional severance jurisprudence: estates are severed
so that optimal use can be made of multiple, not just of mineral,
land strata.364 Waivers of surface damage can result in a severance
358. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (examining burden of proof differ-
ences between two standards).
359. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (pointing out implications of specify-
ing existing versus future surface uses or improvements).
360. Cf supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (explaining that current use of term
"proposed" in Model Act § 8(b)(ii) and § 8(b) clause 3 affects ability of surface and mineral
owners to determine disposition of existing surface uses).
361. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text (pointing out fact that only surface
owners need to resort to § 8 proceedings to protect their rights under Act).
362. See MODEL Acr § l(a)(iii) (asserting that one of policies motivating s;tate enactment of
Act is to "provide expeditious procedures" for resolution of severance disputes).
363. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for strict liability
standard used in surface damage acts).
364. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discussing notion that estate severance
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becoming a sale of the fee,3 65 and the Act should recognize this bi-
zarre effect as the canard that it is.
Third, the Act should incorporate the rule used by several states
that, in the context of implied easements, only those mining meth-
ods contemplated by the parties at the time of severance may be
employed by the mineral developer.366 The Act evades this issue by
leaving the pivotal definition of "reasonable mining methods" to be
determined according to enacting state jurisprudence.3 67 This
equivocal position raises serious questions of fairness between the
states because, for example, Kentucky miners are allowed to strip
mine and Pennsylvania miners are not under similar deeds.368 In
addition, the Act's avoidance of the reasonableness issue allows ar-
guably unconscionable deed provisions to be enforced. That is,
some states base their approval of the utilization of extremely sur-
face destructive mining methods on the language of dated and am-
biguous conveyance instruments, and as mentioned previously, the
bargaining positions of many of the parties to such severances are
far from equitable.369 By sanctioning determinations that broad im-
plied easements are "reasonable" under these circumstances, the
Act is countenancing unconscionable behavior. This unjust result
can be avoided by restricting "reasonableness" to mean "reason-
able at the time of severance." If a mining developer finds herself
absolutely constrained by this interpretation of a deed, she can re-
negotiate the mining access easement with the surface owner. 370 In
allows economies of specialization so that highest and best use of both surface and mineral
estates can be made).
365. See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Ky. 1968) (holding
that because mineral owner paid sufficient amount for mineral estate to include value of sur-
face estate, he essentially paid for right to destroy surface, and that contractual basis for levy-
ing surface damage liability does not exist because of waiver of surface damage in deed),
overruled by Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 303-05 (Ky. 1987).
366. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text (examining statutory and common law
rules (and constitutional amendment) in Kentucky and Tennessee that limit mineral develop-
ment options in this way).
367. MODEL AcT § 3(a) & cmts.
368. Compare Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 305-07 (Ky. 1987) (allowing surface min-
ing to go forward under broad form deed as "reasonable use" of mining easement, although
also requiring mineral owner to compensate surface owner for mining-induced damage to
surface) with Stewart v. Chernicky, 266 A.2d 259, 263 (Pa. 1970) (refusing to imply expansive
scope of mining easement required by surface mining unless some "positive indications" of
intent to allow such easement can be found in severance instrument).
369. See supra notes 53, 140, 178 and accompanying text; cf. Jensen v. Southwestern States
Management Co., 629 P.2d 752, 755-57 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that specific perform-
ance of 55-year-old mineral deeds carrying rights to purchase surface at $70 or $75 per acre
would be inequitable and thus requiring payment of current market value); Quarto Mining
Co. v. Litman, 326 N.E.2d 676, 686 (Ohio 1975) (finding provisions in two 1906 severance
deeds giving mineral owner right to acquire surface area by paying $100 or $200 per acre to
be invalid because sum was so inadequate in current market).
370. Note that easement definitions generally emphasize the servitude imposed on the
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this way both parties will know what is involved in the employment
of a modem mining method, and both parties can intelligently and
reasonably decide whether the benefits of the method are worth the
costs.
Finally, the Act should establish compensatory and punitive dam-
ages for mineral developer nonaccommodation and willful nonac-
commodation, respectively, of surface owner surface uses or
improvements. Compensatory and punitive damage remedies
would forcefully curtail wasteful mining practices and compel min-
eral developers to internalize the surface damage costs of mineral
development rather than allowing those costs to be imposed on sur-
face owners, as has been done in the past.3 7 1 This result is alloca-
tionally efficient because if a mineral estate is not valuable enough
to make payment of surface damages economically expedient, then
mineral development should not interfere with the superior use of
the land by the surface owner.37 2 To be equitably efficient, nonac-
commodation damages must be significant enough to deter mineral
owners from using the Act as a private power of eminent domain, so
that damage measures are considered more than an ordinary cost of
doing business and thus are able to deter destructive mining prac-
surface rather than the benefit gained by the mineral owner. See Case v. Elk Horn Coal Corp.,
276 S.W. 573, 574 (Ky. 1925) (reprinting typical broad form deed that contains easement
language granting to mineral owner "exclusive rights of way for any and all.., haul roads and
other ways ... to use and operate on the surface ... to build, erect, alter, repair.., any and all
houses, shops, buildings.... and machinery and mining and any and all equipment"). This
focus permits the easement holder to employ modem technologies over the easement, e.g.,
"dump trucks instead of horse-drawn carriages, power lines instead of steam engines, etc.,"
without having to renegotiate the easement each time with the surface owner. BURKE ET AL.,
supra note 48, ch. 4, at 42. This result is obviously advantageous for the mineral owner, but it
can raise questions as to the validity of easement use under very old conveyances. See Lowe v.
Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 91, 93 (W. Va. 1980) (remanding case for evidentiary
hearing to determine whether hauling technology "is so different from inything contem-
plated in 1902 that it overburdens the surface owner's estate").
371. Cf Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1984). The court stated:
The requirement that mineral developers compensate surface owners for damage
they cause may well serve as an incentive for developers not to drill ... where drilling
is not likely to yield enough oil or gas to justify the loss to the economy from disrup-
tion of surface productivity. The compensation requirement might also create an
incentive for developers to not cause unnecessary surface damage, and to remedy
any damage-avoidable or unavoidable-they may cause.
Id; see also Davis Oil Co. v. Cloud, 766 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Okla. 1986) (upholding Oklahoma
surface damage act's requirement of compensatory damage payments as proper exercise of
state's police power because such payments "protect against waste of natural resources and
protect the rights of owners of those resources against infringement by others").
372. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 209 (stating that value is measured by willingness to
pay, and that "resources are efficiently allocated when the total value of production of com-
modities and services in the society ... is maximized"). But cf supra note 42 (questioning
validity of allocational efficiency theory because theory is based on premise of willingness to
pay as valid indicator of value).
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tices. 373 Compensatory and punitive damages will put some bite
into the Act by ensuring that this result occurs and will thereby fos-
ter rational and equitable utilization of both estates.
CONCLUSION
In an increasingly populated, increasingly energy-hungry world,
demands for mineral resources collide with claims for surface space
and a clean environment. In years past, mineral development re-
ceived priority over surface development because surface lands were
thought to be plentiful and because mineral resources were needed
for industrial advancement. As time has passed, priorities have
changed, and both common law and statutory doctrines have at-
tempted to move the traditional emphasis on mineral development
toward a more equitable policy that supports sensible utilization of
mineral and surface estates.37 4
The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommoda-
tion Act reflects this modem intent to accommodate multiple uses
of land, but as written, the Act does very little to usher in a new era
of equity. Unless the provisions of the Act are strengthened, other
types of legislation will render the Act moot. Surface owners and
the public are demanding and obtaining powerful measures such as
surface damage, lapse, and consent statutes that infringe on mineral
owners' property rights to an extent never before experienced, and
these measures are withstanding constitutional scrutiny. Modifica-
tions such as those proposed above must be made in the Act to sup-
ply it with power to bring about real, substantive change. If this is
done, the Act will become a significant force in precipitating the
equal dignity of severed estates.
373. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text (examining implications of Act's rela-
tively low measure of damages for nonaccommodation).
374. See Lopez, supra note 23, at 1029 (arguing that desires to protect environment com-
bined with exponential population growth have "caused increasingly severe pressures on a
diminishing surface estate, thereby providing the surface owner an improved negotiating
position").
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